Voting Machine Security Studies Show Continuing Problems

Anonymous commented on a previous post that raised questions about the security of Diebold voting machines. Diebold changed the name of its voting machine division to Premier Election Solutions in August. Anon pointed to the State of Alaska website with information on the State's ongoing study of Alaska's voting machine security. The project has been contracted to the University of Alaska Anchorage (the Department of Engineering seems to be doing the work.) A key aspect of this study is the review of studies already done by other states. The whole Phase Ia report was contracted to cover:

Overview-level evaluation of recent studies relative to existing Alaska systems,
technologies and procedures
Inclusions:
• A brief review of studies and tests that have been undertaken that might be relevant to Alaska’s situation.
• A summary of the University of California’s and Florida State University’s tests and conclusions, analyzing the recommendations that were made and are applicable to Alaska’s optical scanning technology.
• Research and assess improvements made by Premier (formerly Diebold) based on
California and Florida studies and their applicability to our systems
• Assessment of existing Alaska systems and equipment and ability to upgrade security functionality
• Research other states that are conducting similar research. Determine potential points of collaboration, partnership and leverage
• General evaluation of Alaska’s election policies, processes and procedures
• Provide repository for public input via Division of Elections website. Use this input to guide suggested approach for interactive public input/response in Phase 2. Ensure that both UAA and Division of Elections have record of public input. ....

From the Phase 1 Executive Summary we get synopsis of the overview of studies done by other states:

What did the California and Florida studies find?
As part of Phase I, we reviewed a number of election-security studies done in other states. But our reviews of the California and Florida studies were the most detailed—and those states use the same or similar electronic equipment as Alaska. Generally speaking, the studies identified a number of worrisome vulnerabilities, including:
• Vulnerability to the installation of malicious software that could allow incorrect recording or miscounts of votes.
•Susceptibility to computer viruses that could spread from voting machine to voting machine and to election management systems.
• Insufficient control of access to and management of machines, potentially making them accessible to unauthorized people.
The manufacturer of the equipment—Premier Election Solutions [Diebold]—made improvements in its software and machines, based on these studies. Follow-up studies by Florida investigators found that newer versions of Premier software and hardware corrected some but not all the flaws identified.
• Identify areas of risk in Alaska’s absentee and questioned ballot system.
• Assess vulnerability of paper ballots to tampering, and contrast with risks in electronic system.
• Determine points in the election system where there should be more redundancy in personnel or procedures.

I don't have time to get all the details at the moment. Above are the highlights from the summary. You can go to the full Phase 1a Report. The Overview of Studies begins on page 29 of the report (p. 36 on the PDF file). It looks at reports on

• Maryland
• Cuyohoga County, Ohio
• University of Connecticut Voting Technology Research Center Report
• State of California “Top-to-Bottom Review” (TTBR) Report (and Diebold's response)
• Florida Software Review and Security Analysis Summary

I would guess these are among the more objective looks at voting machine technology in use. Perhaps we can get more into this later. A giant tip of the hat to Anonymous for the link.