EarthRights Report on Burma and Chevron: The Human Cost of Energy

Last week I posted a copy of an email about a presentation in Chiang Mai entitled "Bio Fuel By Decree." Now I'm following that up with a little more substance. This is a report I got in an email from someone I met in Chiang Mai who works for EarthRights, a group that works to help Burmese Refugees in Thailand as well as Burmese still in Burma. I know a little about this organization and met various people who worked for them. They are dedicated and very competent. The people of Burma - including the last democratically elected President of Burma, Aung Sang Suu Kyi - have basically been imprisoned in their home by the SLORC for 20 years.

When people watched Schindler's List and other movies about the Holocaust, many asked, "How could people let this happen?" Well, variations of the Holocaust are happening now in various parts of the world, including Burma.

I'm posting here the EarthRights report. This report was done by people who have been working on these issues in and out of Burma for many years now. It is well documented. Certainly it does not tell everything because access to information in Burma and from Chevron is limited. But if you want to know what is happening in Burma, and how you support it when you buy Cheveron gasoline, read.

Below is most of the executive summary for those who don't have time to read the whole report. And for those thinking, "What can I do?" there is a recommendation highlighted in the executive summary below of recommendations "To the United States and the world community." [You can easily enlarge the pages of the document by clicking on the magnifying glass]

Human Cost Of Energy - Upload a doc

Read this doc on Scribd: Human Cost Of Energy

From the Executive Summary and Recommendations

. . . EarthRights International
(ERI) began documenting the human
Residents and refugees from fourteen
villages throughout the pipeline region,
with whom ERI conducted over 70
formal interviews in the past five years
as well as additional corroborative
contacts, confirm that, for the people of
Burma, “human energy” means human
exploitation. Chevron and its consor-
tium partners continue to rely on the
Burmese army for pipeline security,
and those forces continue to conscript
thousands of villagers for forced labor,
and to commit torture, rape, murder and
other serious abuses in the course of




Part 1 describes the background of
the Yadana Project, which involves a
pipeline constructed to carry gas from
offshore fields, across Burma, and into
Thailand. In 2005, Chevron became
part of the Yadana Project through its
acquisition of Unocal, one of the original
developers of the project. The Burmese
military junta, a brutal regime routinely
condemned by the United Nations and
the world community for its widespread
violations of basic human rights, is one
of Chevron’s partners in the project
through its military-run oil company,
Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise.

Part 2 explains how the Yadana Proj-
ect finances oppression. The project is
the single largest source of income for
the Burmese military; it was instru-
mental in bailing out the junta when it
faced a severe financial crisis in the late
1990s, and it has enabled the regime
to dramatically increase its military
spending and continue its rule without
popular support.

Part 3 describes how Chevron was
fully aware of the human rights abuses
associated with the Yadana Project when
it acquired Unocal in 2005, but nonethe-
less chose to stay involved with the
project and the Burmese military. The
Yadana pipeline is guarded by the Bur-
mese army, and the human rights abuses
committed by the army in the course of
providing security have been widely re-
ported and documented; victims of the
project sued Unocal in U.S. courts in the
landmark case Doe v. Unocal.

Part 4 documents the continuing seri-
ous human rights abuses by the pipeline
security forces, including torture, rape,
murder, and forced labor. Seventeen
years after abuses connected to the
Yadana Project were first documented,
and years after they were highlighted
in Doe v. Unocal, these human rights
abuses continue in the pipeline corri-
dor. Residents and refugees fleeing the
pipeline region report that they are still
forced to work for the pipeline security
forces, who continue to commit acts of
violence and terrorize the local popula-
tion. This forced labor occurs thousands
of times each year.

Part 5 debunks the oil companies’
claims that life in the pipeline region has
improved. While some villages have re-
alized minimal benefits from the compa-
nies’ socio-economic program, the ben-
efits do not reach the entire population
affected by the pipeline security forces.
Even for the chosen “pipeline villages”
life remains so difficult and dangerous
that families continue to flee for the rela-
tive safety of the Thai-Burma border.

Part 6 discusses Chevron’s response
to the 2007 demonstrations in Burma
against the military regime and the re-
gime’s crackdown. Despite its threefold
status as the largest U.S. investor in
Burma, the military’s direct business
partner, and a partner in the project that
constitutes the largest source of income
for the regime, Chevron has failed to
take any noticeable steps to condemn
the violent repression or to pressure the
military to respect human rights.

Finally, Part 7 describes Chevron’s
ongoing potential legal liability for its
role in the Yadana Project. Although
the Doe v. Unocal litigation resulted in
a settlement in 2005, that settlement
only covers the claims of the victims
involved in that suit; Chevron remains
responsible for compensating the thou-
sands of other residents of the pipeline
region who have suffered abuse by pipe-
line security forces.

Two appendices offer additional detail
on oil and gas investment in Burma.
Appendix A details the Shwe Project,
a new gas project which could dwarf
Yadana both in revenues for the military
and in the abusive impact on the local
population. The project is being devel-
oped by South Korea’s Daewoo Interna-
tional along with other companies from
Korea, India and China. Appendix B
briefly outlines China’s growing involve-
ment in Burma, especially in the oil and
gas sector.
The Yadana Project remains a serious
problem both for the people of Burma
and for Chevron itself.

In light of this,
EarthRights International makes the
following recommendations:

To the Burmese military regime:
» The SPDC should cease human rights
abuses against the people of the pipe-
line region and throughout Burma,
including extrajudicial killings, sexual
violence, torture, excessive force, ar-
bitrary detentions and imprisonment,
forced labor, and forced relocation,
and abide by its obligations under in-
ternational law to respect fundamen-
tal human rights and environmental
protection.

» The regime should begin a full transi-
tion to a system of government that
allows for all of Burma’s peoples to
fully participate in development deci-
sions and freely determine their own
futures.

To Chevron Corporation and its
partners:
» Chevron, Total, PTTEP, and all other
oil and gas companies in Burma should
suspend ongoing projects, cease de-
velopment of new projects, and refuse
to sell gas that enriches the Burmese
regime until the SPDC fully respects
internationally-guaranteed human
rights and environmental protections
and allows for a full transition to a
participatory system of government as
described above.

» The Yadana consortium and other com-
panies should terminate any contracts
that require them to provide monetary
support to the military regime or that
contemplate or require the use of the
Burmese military as security forces.

» The companies should publicly con-
demn past human rights abuses and
use their influence with the SPDC,
their business partner, to press for
respect for human rights in the future,
not only in the pipeline region itself
but throughout the country.

» The companies should immediately
stop relying on the Burmese military
for any security or other services.
If alternate security measures are
taken, Chevron and its partners must
provide adequate human rights train-
ing and supervision in order to ensure
respect for fundamental human rights
(in accordance with international law
and Chevron’s stated commitment to
respect human rights).

» The companies should allow indepen-
dent third-parties with experience
documenting human rights abuses in
Burma access to the pipeline region,
without military supervision, in order
to monitor the situation. Such moni-
toring should include a mechanism
to allow local residents to bring com-
plaints to an independent body on a
confidential basis.

» The companies should provide ad-
equate compensation to all individu-
als and communities harmed by the
Yadana Project.

» The companies should demonstrate
a serious commitment to their socio-
economic program by expanding it to
include all of the villages that have
suffered adverse impacts from the
Yadana Project, and by inviting groups
experienced in documenting condi-
tions in Burma to participate in de-
veloping, implementing, and regularly
evaluating the effectiveness of, their
programs.

» The companies should support efforts
that promote transparency through
disclosure of payments to all govern-
ment and state-owned or state-con-
trolled partners.

To Chevron’s shareholders:
» The shareholders of Chevron should
support shareholder resolutions that
promote policies and practices de-
signed to improve the promotion and
protection of human rights, the envi-
ronment, rule of law, transparency,
and the rights of indigenous peoples
and affected communities to informed
consent before projects begin and dur-
ing operation phases.

» The shareholders of Chevron should
communicate their concern over the
situation in Burma, the reputational
and legal risks it poses to their com-
pany, and their wish for Chevron to
follow the recommendations outlined
above, to Chevron’s CEO and Board of
Directors.

To the Royal Thai government:
» Thailand should immediately cease
purchasing gas from the SPDC and
cease payments for such gas until the
Burmese regime respects fundamental
human rights and environmental pro-
tections and begins a full transition to
a participatory system of government
as described above. Alternatively,
Thailand should place all such pay-
ments in escrow for the benefit of the
people of Burma under a future gov-
ernment.

» Thailand should immediately require
that its state-owned company PTTEP
suspend its ongoing natural gas explo-
ration in the Bay of Bengal until the
company conducts environmental and
human rights impact assessments,
and until appropriate preconditions
for responsible investment in Burma
are in place, such as a full transition
to a participatory system of govern-
ment as described above.

» Thailand should allow safe refuge
to all Burmese refugees fleeing the
abuses there, in accordance with in-
ternational law.

» Thailand should provide legal mecha-
nisms that allow Thai companies, such
as PTTEP, to be held accountable for
their responsibility and complicity in
human rights abuses in Burma. Civil
society organizations and citizens of
Thailand should advocate for legisla-
tion to create such mechanisms.

To the United States and the world
community:
» The United States and the world com-
munity should make immediate efforts
to cut the flow of money to the Bur-
mese regime, including stopping the
Yadana Project payments and other
gas payments through targeted finan-
cial sanctions.

» The United States and the world com-
munity should condemn the abuses
committed in Burma on projects ben-
efiting multinational corporations,
including Chevron, and pressure the
companies to end these abuses and
adopt the recommendations outlined
above.

» The United States should continue
to pressure the Burmese regime to
respect human rights and the environ-
ment and begin a full transition to a
participatory system of government as
described above; the world communi-
ty, especially China, India, Korea, and
Thailand, should join in these efforts.
for complicity in abuses abroad, and
enable access to justice for survivors
of abuses abroad. Civil society organi-
zations and citizens of these countries
should advocate for legislation to cre-
ate such mechanisms.

To Daewoo and its partners in the
Shwe Project, and other gas compa-
nies in Burma: [See Complete Document
for more]

Thoughts on the Alaska Political Corruption Trials - Part I Conflicts of Interest, Undue Gain, and Improper Influence

Most people who talk about ethics tell us that public officials and administrators must avoid ‘conflicts of interest.” This is the standard mantra. I’d argue that they CAN”T avoid such conflicts. They are built into being human. There is always the potential for a conflict between our personal and professional obligations. The key is what we do about the conflict. The main potential problems stemming from conflicts of interest are:

• Undue Gain
• Improper Influence

Undue gain is perhaps easier to understand if we talk about due gain first. This is what a public administrator or elected official receives in compensation for completing the job duties in the manner set out by contract, policy, law, etc. Generally it includes monetary payment (salary, per diem, etc.), benefits (health insurance, specified leave time, etc.), and possible benefits related to the job (minor use of a copier, tuition waiver for university employees, for example). Anything beyond that is UNDUE gain - extra payments or gifts to do the job one is already being paid for, special treatment of services (free tickets, meals, etc.)

Improper Influence is also easier to understand if we talk about proper influence. Normally, when an administrator makes a decision it is based on some set of decision rules. These could be specific criteria to get, say, a building permit. They could be based on a standard or procedure established for hiring new employees. There are also more general policies and procedures for how to spend money, and rules to prevent unlawful discrimination and privacy violations. Or they could be professional standards (for engineers, attorneys, or nurses, for example) or even unwritten, but known customary procedure. As you go higher up the organization, the decisions are less concerned with individual cases and more with general policy. Policy often takes one into unknown territory and there may not be specific guidelines on how to make decisions. But there will be procedural rules that, ideally, are intended to make the process open and fair. And there are basic management standards and techniques for anticipating and evaluating things like costs and benefits. Improper influence is when you take into considerations factors that are not in the sanctioned decision making criteria, such as whether taking a certain action will benefit oneself and/or one’s friends.

So if we look at the Anderson and Kott cases, we see in the bribery and extortion convictions, that they had undue gain - money and other benefits to do what they were already being paid for by their legislative salaries and per diem. There was also improper influence. The decisions they made were colored with more than the public interest and objective analysis of the issues; they also considered what their benefactors wanted them to do. And while both Kott and Anderson argued that these were decisions they would have made anyway, since they were consistent with their ideology, it is clear that they might not have pursued their positions with such zeal, and that they might have spent more time on other issues their constituents needed.

But it isn’t simply black and white. If a contractor who wants to do business with a government agency leaves a pen with the company’s name on it after a meeting, is that undue gain? If a law firm that does business with the Municipality of Anchorage sends a fruit basket to the Legal Department in December, is that going to lead to improper influence?

Here’s where we see how conflict of interest is a basic tension embedded in our culture (and most others.) Our personal lives are ruled by values of loyalty. Family and friends take priority over strangers. We give gifts and do favors that we freely exchange with people close to us. But when we go into public office, we are expected to make decisions based on the rule of law, on equal treatment to all (rich or poor, stranger or friend). So when people from our personal lives are also involved in our professional lives we have two different standards in conflict. But even strangers we come to know through our jobs should be treated politely and with respect - as people, not as objects. There are human decencies - exchanging pleasantries and doing minor favors - that we do naturally for people we come to know.

Those with an interest in specific governmental decisions take advantage of these impulses to be friendly and helpful. There was a great deal of testimony that Tom Anderson was a naturally friendly guy, eager to help out, to please. Lots of examples. His defense attorney argued that was all he was doing for Prewitt and Bobrick. Other legislators have told me, "I can't be bought for a $10 lunch." In fact they sound like they have been personally insulted when such actions are criticized. "I have to eat. This gives me a chance to talk to my constituents while I'm eating. I'm actually giving up my time." But if we stand back and look at it in terms of improper influence and undue gain, that answer doesn't hold up. If you have to eat, why not pay for your own lunch? Just say, "Fine, let's have lunch, but I pay my own way." If they pressure you or ridicule you, they are really testing your resolve and willingness to play ball. Even if the cost of the lunch doesn't have an effect on your action, the 90 minutes of private time to tell their side of the story, to give you their facts, in private, without someone with a different view their to challenge the accuracy of their facts may well influence your vote.

Of course my argument flies in the face of what's practical. Legislators must listen to constituents, usually in private. They also listen to proponents and opponents of various legislation well before the topic comes up in on the official public chamber. But these one sided conversations mean that legislators often only hear one side of an issue. One way to counter this is to have legislators imply publicly post their work calendars so all people can see how much time they've spent talking with whom. More work? Not too much. They pretty much have to keep a calendar anyway, and logging phone calls is good business practice, and caller id makes this easier to do. Perhaps no one would even look at the information. But at least it should be discussed with an open mind.

The point is to to have legislators themselves question business as usual, to look critically at "how we've always done it" against the dangers of undue gain and improper influence.


I'm going to try to write a series of posts looking at issues relating to understanding corruption using what has come out in the political corruption trials in Alaska. The theoretical framework is based on: Steven E. Aufrecht, “Balancing Tensions Between Personal and Public Obligations: Context for Public Ethics and Corruption” in Dwivedi, O.P. and J. Jabbra (2007) Public Administration In Transition: A Fifty-Year Trajectory Worldwide, Vallentine Mitchell Publishers