Maybe Vietnam Is The Wrong War For Afghanistan Comparisons

 We keep hearing that Biden has ended the US's longest war.  Technically that's true, but also technically, the Korean War isn't over.  There's never been a peace treaty.  And the US has about 28,500 troops still in Korea, some 60 years after the active shooting war is over.  

There are 80,000 US troops stationed in Japan.  

And 35,000 more in Germany.

What's different about Germany, Japan, and Korea from Vietnam and Afghanistan?  First Germany and Japan.  Both were soundly defeated in WWII.  Germany was divided by the Soviet Union, the US, France, and England.  The Soviet Union, which controlled East Germany, was seen as the biggest threat to West Germany.  

Japan was also soundly defeated and ruled by the Allied forces, though effectively headed by General Douglas MacArthur.  A democratic Constitution for Japan was created under MacArthur's leadership.  Japan's two greatest adversaries were neighboring China and the Soviet Union.  Again, the US presence served as protection for the severely battered post-WWII Japan.  

South Korea was threatened by North Korea supported by the Chinese.  The US helped keep the North Koreans and their Chinese allies from taking over South Korea.  

In all three cases, the US was seen as a military protection from outside invasion - China in Korea's case, the Soviet Union and China in Japan's case, and the Soviet Union in West Germany's case.  

In contrast, both in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the US was supporting a government that was more aligned with foreign powers.  Vietnam had recently gotten rid of the French colonial rulers.  The US came in backing the Catholic French colonial Vietnamese against the indigenous Buddhist Vietnamese.  

In Afghanistan, again, the Kabul government was aligned with the US against Afghan groups - Taliban and local tribal leaders.  It's more complicated than that, of course, but basically the Muslim nation was fighting a basically Christian outside force.  

In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, there was outside support for the North Vietnamese and the Taliban, but it was to oust was was seen as an occupying force from the West.  

So in the cases of Vietnam and Afghanistan, the US military was fighting a war, far away from home, in a country they knew little or nothing about.  They didn't speak the language and needed interpreters or locals who spoke English to communicate.  They couldn't tell their friends from their enemies.  Their opponents were fighting for their homeland and to expel the invaders.  

Perhaps this is one of the key lessons we should have learned.  We can support countries that see us as allies against their fight against a feared enemy.  We oughtn't, otherwise, be outsiders picking a side in a civil war, especially in countries we (the average US citizen and the soldiers) know little or nothing about.  

And, of course, we should not assume that what happens us in the future will be exact matches to what happened in the past.  We must be careful to choose our models carefully and to weigh various factors.  

And the world has to figure out how to protect humans from their own ruthless rulers.  It's all very thorny and no one emerges unscathed.  

Afghan Corruption Got Lots Of Help From US

[I'm just writing notes today.  Consider this jotting down thoughts before other things interfere.]

Lots of commentators are listing corruption in the Afghan government and army as one of the major causes for the rapid collapse of the government.  

Westerners seem to wear one-way glasses when it come seeing to corruption.  "Poor" "third world" countries are seen as rife with corruption compared to Western countries.  

I would argue it's like alcoholism among the homeless and poor and among the middle and upper classes.  Homeless alcoholics are drunk in public while people with more money do a better job of hiding their alcoholism.  

I just want to point out that Western corruption in Afghanistan probably dwarfed local corruption.  

Some examples:

From a SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.)

"Gallery of Greed

 U.S. reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, or any other conflict zone, face the constant threat of criminal conspiracies among personnel who rotate in and out of theater, infecting their successors with the virus of corruption.

 Over the past five years, SIGAR’s Investigations Directorate has uncovered and detailed a classic example of this threat—an extended, widespread, and intricate pattern of criminality involving U.S. military personnel and Afghan contractors at the Humanitarian Assistance Yard (the Yard) at Bagram Airfield near Kabul, Afghanistan.

 In June 2012, SIGAR investigators following leads uncovered an unusual pattern of suspect criminal activity at the Yard. They found traces of criminal activity affecting inventories, accounting, issuance of supplies, payments, and contract oversight at the Yard, which serves as a storage-and-distribution facility for millions of dollars’ worth of clothing, food, school supplies, and other items purchased from local Afghan vendors. U.S. military commanders provided those supplies to displaced Afghans as part of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) to meet urgent humanitarian relief needs for the Afghan people."

From The Marketplace:

"At just short of 20 years, the conflict in Afghanistan was America’s longest war. More than 2,000 U.S. service members were killed there. The U.S. spent billions over the years to sustain its troops in Afghanistan and hired military contractors to feed and house them.

Those contractors profited the most from the war, but those systems can lead to fraud and waste. The U.S. military relied on contractors like KBR and DynCorp International for all sorts of things in Afghanistan.

“For cooking, for driving, for delivering supplies — they were used across the board,” said Linda Bilmes, who teaches public policy at Harvard. She said that, sometimes, the Pentagon had so-called no-cost deals with contractors. Whatever a project cost, the government would pay.

“The whole system was set up in a way to enable contractors to rip off the government,” she said."

From the Daily Beast:

"America has spent at least $2.3 trillion in Afghanistan, but very few know that because the U.S. relied upon a complex ecosystem of defense contractors, belt-way banditry, and aid contractors. Of the 10-20 percent of contracts that remained in the country, the U.S. rarely cared about the efficacy of the initiative. While corruption is rife within Afghanistan’s government, the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction repeatedly alleged bewildering corruption by American firms and individuals working in Afghanistan. In many cases, American firms even defrauded Afghans. A military member of the International Security Assistance Force explained to Carlotta Gall: 'Without being too dramatic, American contractors are contributing to fueling the insurgency.'”

Here's a Treasury official, reported in the Washington Post,  questioning an American consultant working with Kabul Bank for three years about the bank:

"A second unnamed Treasury Department official told government interviewers that soon after he arrived in Afghanistan in the summer of 2010, he met with an American who had been working on contract as a consultant to Afghanistan’s central bank for at least three years. The U.S. official wanted to know more about Kabul Bank, which unknown to both of them was on the verge of failure.

“We had an hour-long conversation,”  the official said. 'I asked him, do you think this is a financially sound bank? He said, ‘Yes.’ And literally 30 days afterward, the whole house of cards came down. This was one of the biggest misses in my career. A $1 billion bank collapsed, and the U.S. adviser swore to me it was financially sound.'”

You know this consultant was making a ton of money plus expenses that probably were well above the average US income.   His job, it would seem, was a scam itself.  

This shouldn't come as a shock to anyone.  No giant expenditures happen in Washington unless there are lobbyists pushing hard for it.  And war lobbyists are among the most effective.

Afghan citizens had to choose a path that would keep them safe from the Taliban and from the US backed government.  Supporting the government made them targets for the Taliban.  Supporting the Taliban made the targets for the government and the US.  For many of them, their petty acts of what we would call corruption, was how they managed to feed their families and stay alive.  

For American contractors it was a way to make huge profits.  

And is there anything more corrupt than the Sackler family working a deal in Bankruptcy Court to make it impossible for them or many other individuals or companies to be prosecuted for all the opioid deaths they caused?  Just because they can pay $4 billion and still have more than that left over?  That's the same kind of deal Jeffrey Epstein worked out with the Alexander Acosta, who then became Trump's Secretary of Labor.

Afghanistan Takes Over NPR's Morning Edition, With Brief Nod To Haiti Earthquake

Afghanistan has been a disaster waiting to happen for the last 19 years or so.  The English has to give up and leave Afghanistan and then later, so did the Russians.  

The US didn't learn from these examples, or from Vietnam.  We think of ourselves as exceptional and above history.  

Now NPR is struggling to figure out what is happening today. The line up of stories today was pretty much all Afghanistan, plus two segments on the Haitian earthquake.  It's what you'd expect of coverage in the middle of a crisis - lots of random comments, some blame game activity, and lots of opinion, most of it focused, without context, on right now..  The basic impression is disaster, failure, catastrophe.  

Of the NPR segments I heard two people who seemed, at least in part, clear headed:

• Former U.S. Ambassador To Afghanistan Comments On Developing Situation In The Country Ronald Neumann served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007   He said, in various ways, "I really don't know enough to say."  That's probably what many others should have said more.  He also said that Biden's decision to pull out was a correct decision, but the execution of that decision has been absolutely disastrous.  I think that's probably the clearest and most accurate assessment I heard.  

KEITH: The Biden administration has essentially indicated they don't see this as all their fault. You know, this was two decades in the making. The Afghan military was trained by the U.S. and equipped. And in a way, it's like President Biden does not want to own this. Do you think that that is possible?

NEUMANN: Short answer is no. The long answer is you need to distinguish between the decision to withdraw, which I didn't like but is arguably correct, and the manner of implementation, of execution of that decision, which has been an absolute disaster from beginning to end. They could have taken more time. They had no plan how to support the Afghan military that they were leaving. We built an air force that depended on contractors for maintenance and pulled the contractors. Supply system - ditto. And we profoundly shocked the Afghan army and morale by pulling out and pulling our air cover when we trained them.

[I'd note that Neumann served as the Ambassador to Afghanistan under Bush/Cheney.] 

But the US has been training the Afghan army for 20 years.  How we're getting out is, the problem, but is there a different exit available.  Neumann complains that we pulled out the contractors who maintained the equipment.  Should we have left them in there?  Many of them were highly skilled whites from around the world.  Others were low skilled laborers hired on the cheap from poor countries.  Why hadn't we trained Afghans for those positions?  Surely in 20 years we could have.  There are many highly educated Afghans.  They aren't incapable of learning those skills.  

The specific disaster he and others are speaking of is the failure to get out all the interpreters and others who helped the US.  And all the women who are in jeopardy of a Taliban patriarchal dictatorship.  But the Trump State Department and Homeland Security had been holding up those visas for years.   Biden announced, in the end of June, that he was relocating tens of thousands of Afghans out of the country.  But bureaucratic obstacles have held many of these up.  

But realistically, how many Afghan women would the US take and how long would that take?  My sense is that this was a disaster that was going to happen eventually and up to now, no president was willing to let it happen on their watch.  

If, indeed, the women of Afghanistan have the most to lose from the Taliban, maybe the US should have trained an all women Afghan army that would have fought as hard as the Taliban.  

But maybe even that wouldn't have been enough.  

The other interview that I thought made the most sense was an Army vet. Mike Jason.

• A Vet Formerly Deployed In Afghanistan Shares His Perspective On The Chaos In The Country   -  "JASON: We're all trying to process that, right? Like, 20 years - $89 billion, 300,000-some odd Afghan security forces. How is it collapsing as we watch? And so all I can write is my own little corner of the global war on terror. You know, Afghanistan - righteous anger and indignation over the 9/11 attack. And we went in with a light footprint and took the country over, like, lightning quick. And then what? What was the next step? And all of a sudden, we turn around, and two years later, we're in Iraq, and resources start flowing over there.                    And the question is, what was the strategy and policy for what the military should be doing with regard to security forces in both theaters? We didn't fight a 20-year war. We fought 20 individual wars incoherently, kind of without a policy strategic direction. So at the same time, the Afghans who are the recipients of this training, advice and equipment also know the clock is ticking and making their own calculus for their own safety and the safety of their families, while never really tackling, you know - all this cash is flowing in, the corruption, the drugs, the morale, the logistics. Why weren't we able to ever address these really problematic institutional issues?                  We voted - we, the American people - we voted for four sequential administrations that campaigned on getting out of this operation. The intent was clear. But I look back on the presidential debates over the last several elections. I mean, Afghanistan may have gotten seconds or minutes of debate. It was always in the background. But why didn't we debate it more? Why didn't we discuss it more forcefully? Why didn't somebody make the case to the American people clearly and forcefully why we should stay or go and why the sacrifice is or is not worth it?"

His take makes a lot of sense to me, as a former Peace Corps volunteer, who knows how much being able to speak to the people in their own language matters. It means you don't have to depend on interpreters, and it means you have a much better understanding of the culture and the differences between yours and theirs.  Your struggle with their language means you understand your own ignorance and appreciate when they speak your language much better than you speak theirs.

I also did research in China, using my own Hong Kong students to help me out with interpretation.  They would tell me when the official translation was not what the Chinese speaker had actually said.  They told me about unspoken cues such as when the Chinese speaker's response was a non-sequitur:   it meant, "Drop this line of questioning because I don't want to answer these questions."  My students even took advantage of my foreignness and apologized for my ignorance and sometimes were able to get answers they themselves, because of culture, would never had asked.  In other situations I had just one Hong Kong student acting as my interpreter and I could negotiate with him to ask the question a different way that sometimes gave us break throughs.  I learned a lot about the politics of translations. Interpreters are human beings with egos.  My students had to be sure they were respectful to the official interpreters and avoid making him look bad.  And my Peace Corps experiences in Thailand helped me understand that I knew nothing and which made it easier to be humble and respectful. 

I'm sure, from the fervor some US vets are showing in their efforts to get their Afghan interpreters out of the country, that many of them, if not most, had very close bonds with the interpreters.  But I also suspect there were interpreters whose motivation for being their friend was a visa to the US, while others were passing on information to the Taliban.  We all want to be liked and even knowing the culture and language, we get taken in by people who see us as a ticket to their freedom - whether that be financial, political, or professional.  

We Didn't Learn From Vietnam

The basic justification for getting into Vietnam was the Domino Theory, based on how the Soviet Union took over the countries of Eastern Europe after World War II.  The politicians and the military leaders in the 1950s and 1960s had been part of WWII and didn't want to repeat the mistake of trusting the Soviet Union.  Thus we had to hold Vietnam lest China and the Soviet Union use Vietnam as the stepping stone to take over the rest of Southeast Asia.  One domino falling after the other.  

It was the wrong model.  In Vietnam we were fighting a battle of independence from colonial masters.  The French threw in the towel, but the US stepped in to take France's place.  The US backed the Catholic (learned from their colonial conqueror) faction in the South and spent years trying to train the ARVN- the South Vietnamese army - so it could defeat the North.  In that war, we had a conventional military mentality fighting against an army that used guerrilla tactics.  The US troops never really knew who was one of our Vietnamese and who was one of theirs.  We were fighting on Vietnamese land against an enemy that wanted to rule its own country.  We were supporting the remnants of the colonial rulers.  And we had the same problems with corruption because of the massive amounts of supplies and money coming into the country.  

You'd think that the military and political leaders - again, many of whom had fought in Vietnam - would have learned from that war.  But again, we went into a country that had thrown out two world powers - first the British and then the Soviet Union.  Again, most of our soldiers knew nothing about Afghan culture or language.  Again, there was an assumption that "the greatest country in the world" knew better.  There was an assumption that modern weapons would defeat a guerrilla army.  

A couple aspects of Afghanistan today are quite different from Vietnam in 1975.

• Afghanistan has been fought with an all volunteer army and extensive use of contracted labor.  Since only those who wanted to serve (or saw the military as a way to get a job and education), the rest of the country could ignore the war.  With all 18 year old men eligible to be drafted, the anti-war movement had a much more vocal and aware support to end the war.
• In Iraq and Afghanistan, the military had more control over what battle field footage the US public saw in the evening news.  Embedding journalists with units had much different results than the way journalists and photographers were assigned in Vietnam.  (See Embedded Journalism and the Forward of The Military and the Media 1962 - 1968)
• As Kabul falls, modern technology - phone cameras and social media - mean that we're seeing civilian created content and people are talking by phone live today and putting video on social media.  For Vietnam we only saw or heard what the news media offered us.  

Finally, Jason mentioned $89 billion.  There's another way to look at this war. 

💯As @attackerman has written, the GWOT was a historic transfer of public wealth to private hands. https://t.co/YqgFW2PF1K

— Jacob Silverman (@SilvermanJacob) August 14, 2021

"While America has the watch, the Taliban have the time" Thoughts On Afghanistan

[US consumers of news get lots of click-bate photos and headlines, but very little depth on any topic. This post offers a peek at the complexities involved in predicting the future of Afghanistan. ] 

I was going to sort out my thoughts on the US pulling all troops out of Afghanistan.  What exactly did I know, not know?  What do I think the likely consequences might be for the people of Afghanistan, the US, and the power dynamics of Central Asia.

My basic sense was that Afghanistan is likely to be taken over by the Taliban - that an extreme male oriented version of Islamic law would be imposed and those associated with the US would be assassinated, 

This would lead to lots of headlines blaming Biden for 'losing Afghanistan,' losing face for the US internationally, and give the Republicans one of their most effective weapons for the 2022 and 2024 elections.  

So I outlined those ideas, including the context that I didn't think would be included - that already England and the USSR have tried to take control of Afghanistan and eventually withdrew.  That others - particularly Afghanistan's neighbors - would work to keep Afghanistan stable and safe for them, as well as developing more extensive beneficial relationships between their countries.  I also saw come comparisons with our war in Vietnam and the kinds of rhetoric used when it was clear we had lost and were going to withdraw.  

Then I started googling to find out more about the interests and relationships Afghanistan has with its neighbors.  

After reading a number of articles on Afghanistan's relationships with its neighbors, my outlook is more hopeful.  The people of Afghanistan have suffered a great deal over the last 40 years - including the Taliban.  The US' departure may give the Taliban the symbolic victory they need to work more cooperatively with the Afghan government, and more importantly, with neighboring governments.  

Iran and Pakistan have vested interests in a friendly Afghanistan.  Iran's Shi'a government has serious issues with the Sunni Taliban.  But all the countries in the region have interests in regional infrastructure - roads, power, communications, trade.

Most significantly, China's been aggressively building a road to Pakistan as well as infrastructure projects in Africa, and trade agreements with Europe.  China's border with Afghanistan is the smallest, but China's power and expansionist interests the largest.  

While some of the terror people expect when the US pulls out completely may happen, I suspect the long term outlook for Afghanistan is not so grim.  China will spread its largesse among the Taliban and the Afghan government in exchange for a more secure country and an extension of their  Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and their China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).  

No matter what actually happens, we can count on the GOP to focus on the worst aspects.  But if they don't have any real issues with Biden, they would fabricate some fantastic tales.  

So here is my original outline and below are some links you might find interesting.

These are thoughts about the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.  

1. The GOP will try to use Afghanistan to defeat Biden in 2024.  Even though the GOP is not too interested in women's rights in the US, they used women's rights as one of the reasons to go into Afghanistan and defeat the Taliban. We will see images and stories after the US pulls out completely of assassinations, of girls being barred from schools, of imposition of Taliban rules like before US troops entered the country.  
2. The stories we won't hear 
1. A serious evaluation of why, after 20 years, the Afghan government couldn't defeat the Taliban.  
2. What would likely happen in Afghanistan and the cost to the US if we stayed and continued our 'nation building'
3. Calls for US troops to intervene to help the millions of people around the world whose lives are as difficult, as at risk, or worse, in other countries (remember how Trump helped the Syrian people?)
3. Stories we may hear:
1. How the British and Russians both withdrew from Afghanistan, unable to defeat local resistance.
2. How our initial goal was to get Al Qaeda and bin Laden, not to do democracy building
3. How getting into war is easier than getting out of it
4. How this is a humiliating defeat for the US
5. How Vietnam was also a humiliating defeat for the US, but eventually has become a thriving country, doing much better without us, even though we portrayed the Communist North as evil demons
6. How Afghanistan is not Vietnam 
4. The biggest irony, I think, is that the corruption we hear about in the Afghan government is, if not the result of, certainly greatly magnified, by the billions of dollars of US money and weapons and contracts that have flooded the country.  For those in a position to scoop up some of that largesse, it was an irresistible opportunity to make one's fortune, with hopes to leave when the spigot got turned off.  
5. Likely outcomes of leaving
1. The initial outcomes will favor the Taliban, 
2. The opposition to the Taliban, without the cushion of US money, will either be killed, flee the country, or take on the Taliban more seriously and without the fighting over US money
3. Neighboring countries (there are six - can you name them? Three were part of the Soviet Union which no longer has a border with Afghanistan.  See map below) will begin to adjust their Afghan policies when the US is gone and exert influence to protect their own interests such as
1. those who supported the Taliban because they were fighting the US will likely have a strong influence on the Taliban and/or withdraw their support
2. concern for radical religious beliefs destabilizing their own populations (Taliban are Sunni Muslims. Iran are Shi'a)
3. protect their borders 
1. stem tide of Afghan refugees coming over their borders
2. prevent military threats
4. exploit minerals and develop infrastructure projects and other economic opportunities  in Afghanistan
5. make deals to export their products to their nearest neighbor

US voters have short term memories.  Pulling out in 2021 gives Biden three years for this action to be lost in the flood of events that will occur between now and the election.  There may even be glimmers of good news to emerge from Afghanistan - but I think that will take longer.  

Source:  Geo Politics of South Asia and MENA

Don't miss the tiny, but significant border with China.  

Some interesting background:

Iran's Influence on Afghanistan (June 23, 2020) Middle East Institute - SourceWatch lists MEI's biggest funders as the world's major oil companies.

Iran-Taliban Growing Ties - What's Different This Time? (Feb 16, 2021)  The Atlantic Council - Media Bias/Fact Check says it's factual with a center-right bias.

Iran's Influence in Afghanistan (2014) Rand Corporation - AllSides rates Rand as "Leans Left" (Note, this was before Trump was seen even as a viable candidate)

No-Win War:  The Paradox of U.S.-Pakistan Relations in Afganistan's Shadow - Event Recap - (May 11, 2021) Wilson Center - MediaBias/Fact check rates Wilson Center between "least biased" and "left of center"

The headline quote of this post comes from this article and is attributed to Zahid Hussain quoting a Taliban leader

How Qatar came to host the Taliban (2013) BBC - Interesting background on how the Taliban leaders came to have their headquarters in Qatar.

Turkmenistan:  The Afghan connection (Jan 12, 2021) Eurasianet   Media Bias/Fact Check gives Eurasianet a high rating in factual reporting and a slightly left of center bia.Gives a sense of the kinds of issues  and projects that connect the two countries - particularly infrastructure projects. 

China Has a BIG Plan for Post-U.S. Afghanistan—and It’s Worth Billions: Beijing just can’t wait for the U.S. to get out of the way.(July 4, 2021) Daily Beast

Who are the Taliban? ( July 1, 2021) BBC

Will Turkey take over at Afghanistan's main airport?   (July 9, 2021)  Al Jazeera - Al Jazeera, like the Taliban, are headquartered in Doha, Qatar.

If China does move into the vacuum there are many possibilities.

• The GOP will trumpet how Biden 'lost' Afghanistan to China, as they did about losing Vietnam to the Communists and earlier, how Truman 'lost' China.  Of course, the US never 'had' any of those places to lose in the first place.
• The Afghan resistance to foreign rulers has been impressive.  They may quickly find China to be one more foreign nation trying to exploit them.  And they know how China is treating their fellow Muslims the Uighurs in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, which has China's tiny border with Afghanistan.  
• Tired of 40 years of war, the Taliban (they fought under other names before they became Taliban) may be ready to use the US withdrawal to declare victory and enjoy peace.  Though fighting is the one activity they are really good at and so may be more comfortable in that, and they may see this as their turn again to rule Afghanistan.