Schadenfreude and Ted Stevens' Conviction

I know that a lot of you out there are jumping with joy at the news of Ted Stevens' conviction today. There are reasons to feel good if you've believed he's guilty or arrogant or if you're working for Mark Begich.

Taking pleasure in another person's suffering is a universal emotion. The German's have a word for it - Schadenfreude.

But watching a man go down, a man who like all of us has flaws, yet also worked most of his life to help his state using the talents he had, shouldn't bring anyone joy. We're all imperfect. We all will have times of grief. And I imagine most of us would like a little slack from others at that time.

Is it possible to mix the feelings of triumph and sadness? To feel good about the carrying out of justice and bad about the personal fall of Ted Stevens? Ted Stevens' recent statements don't make it easy to feel sympathetic. He seems completely defiant. ABC reports him saying today:

"I will fight this unjust verdict with every ounce of energy I have," Stevens said. "I am innocent. This verdict is the result of the unconscionable manner in which the Justice Department lawyers conducted this trial. I ask that Alaskans and my Senate colleagues stand with me as I pursue my rights. I remain a candidate for the United States Senate."

Yet his reaction - his total cluelessness of why he was on trial - is part of the sadness.

Philosopher John Portmann seems to make distinctions similar to mine above, at least as described by Perez Zagorin reviewing Portmann's book, When Bad Things Happen To Other People.

[Zagorin's voice] Persons with a well-developed moral sense who experience schadenfreude are apt to feel a certain amount of shame and unworthiness at being possessed by this emotion even momentarily. Is it not mean-spirited and detestable to be glad when bad luck or adversity strikes someone else, even an enemy or rival, and much more so in the case of a friend? . . . Portmann, however, would relieve us of some of our guilt on this score by means of various distinctions. He believes that schadenfreude is rational and therapeutic in certain circumstances, and makes the important point that it can include a sense of justice when we regard the bad things that happen to people as deserved punishment for their actions. He strives consistently to distinguish between pleasure in the justice of someone's suffering and pleasure in the suffering itself. [emphasis added.]

That's what I was doing above - trying to make distinctions between different aspects of the event. Happiness over the fact that the high and mighty are brought to justice just as the powerless are, seems perfectly normal and justified. Pleasure over the suffering of a fellow human being, in this sort of situation, while also perfectly normal, is probably less justified. Perhaps age softens the edges of righteous indignation, makes me more sensitive to the pain of an octogenarian ending his previously distinguished career this way; allows me to feel comforted that justice has been done, but saddened that a man of such intelligence, drive, belief in his own causes, should have strayed onto this path.

Zagorin is not so charitable to people who take pleasure in others' pain.

This distinction, though, is psychologically so difficult to sustain that I would guess that the two sorts of pleasure continually merge. In an example mentioned by Portmann, the blessed in heaven, according to the great theologian Thomas Aquinas, both see and rejoice in the torments of the damned. This conception, which astounded Nietzsche by its cruelty, is schadenfreude at its highest, and it confirms my opinion that a God who inflicts eternal punishment on his creatures is one of the most wicked and immoral ideas the Christian religion ever introduced into the world. It is also among the reasons that make me question whether, despite Portmann's lucid arguments, schadenfreude can ever be a healthy and justifiable emotion and is not simply a base and nasty feeling which we should do our best to resist and overcome.

It seems to me reviewer Zagorin is incapable of accepting the ambiguities that Portmann suggests. "Base and nasty" seem pretty judgmental terms on his part as well. Should we be condemning those who take pleasure in Stevens' plight as strongly as we would condemn someone who has abused his position of power? My belief is that only when one is completely accepting of one's own self, can one feel truly charitable toward others who are in distress, particularly those who have gotten there through their own actions. Charity towards those less fortunate can easily stem from an unconscious relief that it is them and not me, and helping them can be a self satisfying demonstration of one's superior circumstances. (Before you attack on that one, look carefully at the word 'can' in that sentence. It doesn't have to be that.) Charity toward someone who has brought it onto himself is much harder, but probably a purer form of charity.

If Obama supporters really want change, we are going to have to talk to McCain supporters, find common ground with them, understand their fears and hopes, and fashion policies that allay rather than inflame those fears. It's not about winners and losers. If we don't change that dynamic, then it is business as usual. Dancing gleefully over Stevens' conviction makes more unlikely Obama's chance of bringing Americans together. It only salts the wounds of Stevens' supporters who will wait until they can get their revenge. And Democrats in power will fall victim to the same sorts of ego imbalances that have afflicted Republicans and give those now out-of-power folks their opportunities to enact that revenge.

Taking great joy over Stevens' fall also excuses us from our complicity in

• electing him over and over again
• greedily taking all the goodies Stevens has sent our way from DC
• not taking action to change the system which ensures that lobbyists gain enormous power over legislators because of the need for campaign money

So, my concern about Schadenfreude is not simply a moral one, but much more a practical concern.

• First, let's not heap scorn on Stevens as a way to excuse ourselves, voters in a democracy, from our own share of the blame in accepting this corrupt system we have. ("What can I do, I'm only one person?" is not an excuse. What did you try to do? How quickly did you give up?) We have to be involved because legislators who fight the system - look at Ralph Nader - do not get elected.
  
• Second, if the people of the United States cannot talk to each other with respect and understanding, Obama's possible presidency won't accomplish anything of lasting importance.