[This is Part 1 of three posts on the narratives surrounding a Supreme Court nomination.
Part 2 will be on narratives about political strategy and Part 3 will be narratives about race.]
We generally understand Winston Churchill's
“History is written by the victors” to mean that those who prevail, get to select which facts to highlight and how to interpret them as they tell the story of how they (now 'the good') defeated 'the evil ones.'
But who is writing the present? Well, everyone is trying. We are all competing to have our narratives accepted as official reality.
In most situations, there are an enormous number of facts and a smaller number of competing narratives (or theories or stories or interpretations) which try to organize and explain the facts. The difficulty is in figuring out which of the facts are significant and which of the narratives best fit the facts. Our inclination is to make the facts fit our own favored narratives (the stories we
want to believe) rather than finding or creating narratives that more accurately explain the facts. When politicians do this - try to create the right narrative for political gain - we call it framing or spin.
So, what are the narratives around the appointment of a Supreme Court Justice these days? In our heads are all the stories we've ever heard or thought of. Outside our skulls is the world where things are happening. We talk about 'facts' as though they are 'true' events. But who filters the facts before we get them? Obviously, events we don't witness first hand, are filtered by others - friends, family, news media, bloggers, etc. And even events we witness are filtered by our brains. Physically we can't take in and record every fact we witness. (Can you describe exactly what the last person you spoke to was wearing, down to the buttons?) And those stories in our heads I mentioned above also filter in and filter out what we think is important. (The buttons probably weren't important and not special enough to have attracted your attention.)
So how do we swim through all the facts and all the spin to find the narratives that most closely mimic what's happening outside of our heads? The best way I know, and it is inadequate, is to try to become conscious of the narratives. Usually they are working without us paying any attention, like doormen deciding which facts and ideas can come in and which can't. So, if you try to be conscious of the narratives you and others are using, then you take a giant step forward in figuring out what is happening.
So what narratives are being used concerning the decision to select and then approve of a Supreme Court Justice?
Constitutional NarrativeThe
US Constitution, Article II, Section 2 says:
He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. [emphasis added]
Supreme Court Justice NarrativesHere's the
generic narrative of a Supreme Court nominee we tend to learn in school:
The President will nominate someone who has performed exceptionally well in the field of law AND whose political leanings, while aligned with those of the president, are also not too distant from those of the population.
Bonnie Goodman at HNN offers an example of the second part of this narrative in regard to Ruth Bader Ginsburg's confirmation hearings:
Sen. William Cohen (R-Maine) stated bluntly that the nominee's ideology was rightly a matter of concern. But Cohen suggested during the hearings that judicial ideology should be used only to determine if the nominee's philosophy is "so extreme that it might call into question the usual confirmation prerequisites of competency and judicial temperament." [emphasis added]
This issue of 'so extreme' in modern times came up with the nomination of Robert Bork. One narrative says that Democrats made judicial ideology an issue by rejecting Bork. A counter narrative says Republicans made it an issue by nominating a candidate whose ideology was so extreme. (Of course, saying that he was extreme is also a narrative, an interpretation of the facts.)
As you can see this is already getting tricky. How do we know what's extreme? We do have opinion polls, but the law isn't about voting and popularity. The Constitution is supposed to protect the basic rights of all humans even if the majority doesn't support them. Judges are supposed to decide based on the law, even if the decision isn't popular. They get lifetime appointments so they can resist pressures to vote a certain way.
It would seem pretty simple to interpret "
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . .
Judges of the supreme Court," but we're already finding problems. "Advice and consent" seems pretty straightforward. The President did talk to lots of Senators before nominating Ms. Sotomayor and soon they will be able to consent or not. But what is an appropriate basis for that consent?
That gets us back to the statement above about legal competence and political leanings. While we could debate all this, I won't spend much time on legal competence. That seems the easiest, though, if someone didn't go to Yale or Harvard, can they fit the prevailing narratives of "legally competent"? What about someone who hasn't been a judge already? Etc.
If judges are supposed to make decisions based on the law, why even mention political leanings? Well, because the President and the Senate are all politicians and because the Supreme Court is the third branch of the government. The judges aren't elected, but they are appointed and approved by elected officials. So we have to consider politics.
And also, 'political leanings' is another way to allude to the kinds of narratives people have in their heads. These political leanings are predispositions to consider some things more important than others - the right to own a gun as more important than the possibility of misusing the gun, or upholding international law about torture as more important than potential security risks.
Above I offered a generic narrative of a supreme court nominee. Let's expand that now from just the nominee's characteristics to how the nominee should behave if approved.
There are two well articulated narratives about how a Supreme Court Justice should behave.
Wikipedia, in a post on Judicial Activism offers:
Judicial activism is a philosophy advocating that judges should reach beyond the United States Constitution to achieve results that are consistent with contemporary conditions and values. Most often, it is associated with (modern) liberalism that believes in broad interpretation of the Constitution which can then be applied to specific issues.
Judicial restraint is the counterpart to judicial activism and is advocated by thsoe [sic] who believe that democracy will thrive if judges defer to the democratic process and stay out of policy debates. So, judicial activism is not necessarily an ideological concept. Some trace the history of judicial activism back to the loose constructionist approach of Alexander Hamilton, who believed that broad wording of the Constitution was meant to enable, not inhibit, various government actions.[1]
But this Wikipedia article is marked with warnings such as:
- Its neutrality is disputed. Tagged since December 2008.
- Its neutrality or factuality may be compromised by weasel words. Tagged since November 2007.
- It is in need of attention from an expert on the subject. WikiProject Law or the Law Portal may be able to help recruit one. Tagged since May 2009.
- It may contain inappropriate or misinterpreted citations which do not verify the text. Tagged since December 2008.
So we even have to consider that Wikipedia entries are also influenced by the narratives of their writers.
Adam Cohen, in a recent
NY Times editorial, uses Britain's Supreme Court of Justice's decision that a Pringle is indeed a potato chip (and thus Proctor & Gamble owes $160 million in taxes) to give his own interpretation of activist judges:
Conservatives like to insist that their judges are strict constructionists, giving the Constitution and statutes their precise meaning and no more, while judges like Ms. Sotomayor are activists. But there is no magic right way to interpret terms like “free speech” or “due process” — or potato chip. Nor is either ideological camp wholly strict or wholly activist. Liberal judges tend to be expansive about things like equal protection, while conservatives read more into ones like “the right to bear arms.”
(Note that Cohen calls conservatives "strict constructionists" a term that seems more radical than Wikipedia's term "Judicial Restraint.")
(If someone were
really a strict constructionist, could one argue that since the Constitution says "he" for President, that women can't be President?)
Let's try again for a narrative about a good nominee:
The nominee would be a person who would assume office with the goal of interpreting cases according to the law. Where the law is not completely clear, there will be some interpretation that is influenced by the new justice's life experiences. Candidates should not be coming to the court with the goal to change the direction of the court and the law. However, some cases raise issues not clearly addressed by the law or the Constitution. New technology raises questions that were often not addressed by the Constitution. Judges then must interpret how the words of the Constitution should be applied to, say, surveillance of email. Essentially new law must be created.
My 'neutral' (some might dispute its neutrality) narrative above tends to say that when possible (if the laws and Constitution are clear about the situation in the case before the court), judges should practice judicial restraint. But when the case isn't clear cut, they will need to be a bit activist. They will be required to use their own narratives, to interpret the law or Constitution. Of course if all the justices have the same narratives, they will come to similar conclusions.
And with eight males and one female, to the extent that males and females experience the world differently, we can see that female (slightly over half the US population is female) narratives are somewhat lacking on the Supreme Court.
I'm not an attorney. I don't claim any special expertise in this process of choosing a Supreme Court Justice. But I did want to step back a bit from the rhetoric and focus on the narratives that are being used in the hope that others might begin more easily to recognize them for what they are: interpretations of reality, but NOT reality.
In
Part 2 I'll look at narratives about political strategies for approving or rejecting Supreme Court nominees, which will include how actors use narratives to support and oppose candidates. In Part 3 I'll look at narratives around race and Supreme Court nominees.
A lazy run in the warm weather today. Caught at the light, took a picture of this poster for the ordinance scheduled to be voted on Tuesday at the Assembly meeting. At least that was my assumption. I sent an email to one of my Assembly reps last week - Dan Coffey - asking how he planned to vote and whether he was still listening to constituents on it. Haven't heard anything back. My other rep is supporting it.
Then on to the bike trail.
This evening we biked over to meet friends for dinner and passed the fence that surrounds Mcglaughlin Youth Center. Sounds so wholesome, but if it were that wholesome, it wouldn't have this razor wire to keep the youth inside.
CARBONATOR
