I'm trying to pull together points about the new Texas anti-abortion law. You can see the law itself here. I'm not going to discuss the issues related to whether women should have access to abortion, whether the religious and other arguments about when life begins or that abortion is murder. I will assume here that abortion is not murder and the women have the right to end a pregnancy. I'll only mention this once the hypocrisy of arguing for the right not to wear a mask or not get a vaccine during a pandemic, while arguing that women do not have the right to decide, with their doctors, if they should get an abortion.
OVERVIEW
- Parts of the new Law
- Parts of the dissents by Supreme Court Justices
- Sotomayor
- Breyer
- Roberts
- My thoughts of steps to be taken to aid women needing an abortion. [This will be a second post. There's more than enough in this one already.]
PARTS OF THE NEW TEXAS LAW
Note there are different parts of the law - not clearly indicated that way in the law - that cover different aspects:
- specific details of the prohibition of abortion and conditions
- discussion of previous abortion laws and their continued existence
- manner of prosecution (not by state or governmental officials, but by private citizens)
- damages to be paid for violation of the law, including attorney fees, etc.
- lots of legal posturing to prevent court nullifications of the law (This is not necessarily a bad thing in and of itself. Certainly laws that opponents of this law might favor are also crafted so they withstand court scrutiny.)
- severability language - that says if one part of the act is ruled unconstitutional, that part will be thrown out but the rest will stand
- long lists of what doctors must report about abortions they perform
I'm just going to give some examples of what the law actually states. You can go to the link to see the whole statute. Parts of the statute pasted in without spaces for some lines. I've tried to fix those, but I may have missed some. It begins like this:
AN ACT
relating to abortion, including abortions after detection of an unborn child’s heartbeat; authorizing a private civil right of action.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: SECTIONA1.AAThis Act shall be known as the Texas Heartbeat
Act.
SECTIONA2.AAThe legislature finds that the State of Texas never repealed, either expressly or by implication, the state statutes enacted before the ruling in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),that prohibit and criminalize abortion unless the mother’s life is in danger.
(7)AA"Unborn child" means a human fetus or embryo in any stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.
Throughout the bill, the cross out the word "fetus" and replace it with "child." And here they are saying it is a "child" immediately at fertilization.
Sec.A171.205.AAEXCEPTION FOR MEDICAL EMERGENCY; RECORDS. (a)AASections 171.203 and 171.204 do not apply if a physician believes a medical emergency exists that prevents compliance with this subchapter.
So there is an exception to prevent a medical emergency. It requires extensive paperwork detailing all the conditions the doctor must consider.
Sec.A171.208.AACIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OR AIDING OR
ABETTING VIOLATION. (a)AAAny person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who:
(1)AAperforms or induces an abortion in violation of thischapter;
(2)AAknowingly engages in conduct that aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion, including paying for or reimbursing the costs of an abortion through insurance or otherwise, if the abortion is performed or induced in violation of this chapter, regardless of whether the person knew or should have known that the abortion would be performed or induced in violation of this chapter; or
(3)AAintends to engage in the conduct described by Subdivision(1)or(2).
(b)AAIf a claimant prevails in an action brought under this section,thecourtshallaward:
(1)AAinjunctive relief sufficient to prevent the defendant from violating this chapter or engaging in acts that aid or abet violations of this chapter;
So anything anyone does to help someone abort a fetus with a heart beat is now illegal. If you drive someone to the clinic (even if you don't know if there is a heart beat or not). If you help pay for the abortion, including insurance companies, you are violating the law. What I'm trying to find here is clarification of whether helping to get an abortion outside of the state of Texas would also be illegal. I suspect not, because the language is always "in violation of this act" and 'this act' doesn't forbid abortions outside of Texas.
[UPDATE Sept 3, 2021 2pm: Constitutional Attorney Lawrence Tribe says, in a Guardian piece, taking someone out of state would also be a problem:
"Worse still, if women try to escape the state to access abortion services, their families will be on the hook for offering even the smallest aid. If friends or family of a woman hoping to terminate her pregnancy drive her across state lines, or help her organize money for a plane or bus ticket, they could be liable for “aiding and abetting” a now-banned abortion, even if the procedure itself takes place outside Texas."]
S.B.ANo.A8 (2)AAstatutory damages in an amount of not less than $10,000 for each abortion that the defendant performed or induced in violation of this chapter, and for each abortion performed or induced in violation of this chapter that the defendant aided or abetted; and
(3)AAcosts and attorney’s fees.
(c)AANotwithstanding Subsection (b), a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection(b)(2)in a previous action for that particular abortion performed or induced in violation of this chapter, or for the particular conduct that aided or abetted an abortion performed or induced in violation of this chapter.
(d)AANotwithstanding Chapter 16, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, or any other law, a person may bring an action under this sectionn ot later than the sixth anniversary of the date the cause of action accrues.
The section above talks about financial penalties. Note - people can snitch on someone for up to six years after an abortion has been performed.
(e)AANotwithstanding any other law, the following are not a defense to an action brought under this section:
(1)AAignorance or mistake of law;
(2)AAa defendant’s belief that the requirements of this chapter are unconstitutional or were unconstitutional;
(3)AAa defendant’s reliance on any court decision that has been overruled on appeal or by a subsequent court, even if that court decision had not been overruled when the defendant engaged in conduct that violates this chapter;
Note that section (3) here says that if a court ruled against the law and then later that was overturned, a doctor who performed an 'illegal' abortion during the time after it the law was suspended and before that suspension was overruled, would be liable. That means even if there are stays and court cases suspending the law, doctors could be sued if they are later overruled. EVIL.
(f-1)AAThe defendant has the burden of proving an affirmative defense under Subsection (f)(1) or (2) by a preponderance of the evidence.
(g)AAThis section may not be construed to impose liability on any speech or conduct protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, as made applicable to the states through the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth
As I've said, I'm not an attorney, but how can you just declare that this law does not violate the First Amendment. They seem to be saying that if I tell someone where to get an abortion after a fetal heart beat, it's NOT a violation of the First Amendment to punish me for my speech. (If they argue that this is because the law saves lives, then how is that different from disinformation about COVID?)
SUPREME COURT DISSENTS
I'm just going to give sections of the dissents. You can see them in their entirety here. I've bolded some sections I thought particularly noteworthy.
Sotomayor's dissent:
"JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
The Court’s order is stunning. Presented with an application to enjoin a flagrantly unconstitutional law engi- neered to prohibit women from exercising their constitu- tional rights and evade judicial scrutiny, a majority of Justices have opted to bury their heads in the sand. Last night, the Court silently acquiesced in a State’s enactment of a law that flouts nearly 50 years of federal precedents. Today, the Court belatedly explains that it declined to grant relief because of procedural complexities of the State’s own invention. Ante, at 1. Because the Court’s failure to act rewards tactics designed to avoid judicial review and in- flicts significant harm on the applicants and on women seeking abortions in Texas, I dissent. . ."
The Act is clearly unconstitutional under existing precedents. See, e.g., June Medical Servs. L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judg- ment) (slip op., at 5) (explaining that “the State may not impose an undue burden on the woman’s ability to obtain an abortion” of a “nonviable fetus” (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992); internal quotation marks omitted)). The respondents do not even try to argue otherwise. Nor could they: No federal appellate court has upheld such a comprehensive prohibition on abortions before viability under current law.
The Texas Legislature was well aware of this binding precedent. To circumvent it, the Legislature took the extraordinary step of enlisting private citizens to do what the State could not. The Act authorizes any private citizen to file a lawsuit against any person who provides an abortion in violation of the Act, “aids or abets” such an abortion (in- cluding by paying for it) regardless of whether they know the abortion is prohibited under the Act, or even intends to engage in such conduct. §3 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §171.208). Courts are required to enjoin the defendant from engaging in these actions in the future and to award the private-citizen plaintiff at least $10,000 in “statutory damages” for each forbidden abortion performed or aided by the defendant. Ibid. In effect, the Texas Legislature has deputized the State’s citizens as bounty hunters, offering them cash prizes for civilly prosecuting their neighbors’ medical procedures.
The Legislature fashioned this scheme because federal constitutional challenges to state laws ordinarily are brought against state officers who are in charge of enforcing the law. See, e.g., Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U. S. 247, 254 (2011) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)). By prohibiting state officers from enforcing the Act directly and relying instead on citizen bounty hunters, the Legislature sought to make it more complicated for federal courts to enjoin the Act on a statewide basis.
Taken together, the Act is a breathtaking act of defiance—of the Constitution, of this Court’s precedents, and of the rights of women seeking abortions throughout Texas. But over six weeks after the applicants filed suit to prevent the Act from taking effect, a Fifth Circuit panel abruptly stayed all proceedings before the District Court and vacated a preliminary injunction hearing that was scheduled to begin on Monday. The applicants requested emergency relief from this Court, but the Court said nothing. The Act took effect at midnight last night.*
Today, the Court finally tells the Nation that it declined to act because, in short, the State’s gambit worked. The structure of the State’s scheme, the Court reasons, raises “complex and novel antecedent procedural questions” that counsel against granting the application, ante, at 1, just as the State intended. This is untenable. It cannot be the case that a State can evade federal judicial scrutiny by outsourcing the enforcement of unconstitutional laws to its citizenry. Moreover, the District Court held this case justiciable in a thorough and well-reasoned opinion after weeks of briefing and consideration. 2021 WL 3821062, *8–*26 (WD Tex., Aug. 25, 2021). At a minimum, this Court should have stayed implementation of the Act to allow the lower courts to evaluate these issues in the normal course. Ante, at 2 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting). Instead, the Court has re- warded the State’s effort to delay federal review of a plainly unconstitutional statute, enacted in disregard of the Court’s precedents, through procedural entanglements of the State’s own creation.
The Court should not be so content to ignore its constitutional obligations to protect not only the rights of women, but also the sanctity of its precedents and of the rule of law.
I dissent.
Robert's Dissent
"CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE BREYERand JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
The statutory scheme before the Court is not only unu- sual, but unprecedented. The legislature has imposed a prohibition on abortions after roughly six weeks, and then essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the populace at large. The desired consequence appears to be to insulate the State from responsibility for implementing and enforcing the regulatory regime. . ."
Breyer's dissent
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
The procedural posture of this case leads a majority of this Court to deny the applicants’ request for provisional relief. In my view, however, we should grant that request.
I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN. Texas’s law delegates to private indi- viduals the power to prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion during the first stage of pregnancy. But a woman has a federal constitutional right to obtain an abortion dur- ing that first stage. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 164 (1973). And a “State cannot delegate . . . a veto power [over the right to obtain an abortion] which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercis- ing during the first trimester of pregnancy.” Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 69 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, we have made clear that “since the State cannot regulate or pro- scribe abortion during the first stage . . . the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person . . . to prevent abortion during that same period.” Ibid. The applicants persuasively argue that Texas’s law does precisely that. . . "