Showing posts with label constitution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label constitution. Show all posts

Thursday, April 14, 2022

Alaska Redistricting Board: A Critical Look At Budd Simpson's Arguments Supporting Option 3B [UPDATED]



There's so much to write about following the Redistricting Boards 3-2 vote to approve Option 3B, the plan written by Randy Ruedrich and approved by the three Republican appointed Board members against the vehement objections of the two Board members who were appointed by people not affiliated with a political party in Alaska.  

In this post I'm going to go through Board Member Budd Simpson's reasons for supporting Option 3B.  His explanation was by far the best of the three explanations by the majority.  But first, let me give a little bit of background of the districts in question.  

[Let me first note and apologize.  I'm going to use the House numbers and Senate letters used in the November proclamation plan map.  Some of these got changed yesterday, but I think it would be more confusing if I used the new numbers.  For the points I'm making here, it doesn't matter.]

Both Options 2 and 3B paired north and south Muldoon districts.  That was what the Court pretty much told them to do.  

But that left D22 (Eagle River) orphaned.    Option 2, as I see it, had the most obvious pairings.  It joined districts that had been split apart right through neighborhoods.  Let me show you what I mean:



  

District 9 is a huge district that runs down Turnagain Arm to Girdwood and then on down to Whittier.  But in town, it connects to D10 via the Seward Highway and neighborhoods east of the highway. Neighborhoods along the coast line.  You can see that clearly in this map.  

These two districts were paired in the original map approved in November and in the Option 2 map.  





The two Eagle River districts are also large and cover lots of unpopulated land in Chugach State Park.  But the two districts 22 and 24 have closely joined populations near ER Valley and along the Glenn Highway.  They fit like puzzle pieces.  Neighbors nearby.  

Option 2 put them together in one Senate seat.







And D24 (this map just shows part of the off-base portion, which is attached to the JBER portion.  You can see Fourth Avenue is split in half.  The olive part is in D23, the purple in D17.  D23 also includes parts of Mountain View and goes east to Bartlett High School. Again, people across the street from each other are in different districts.  Reconnecting them in a Senate seat makes perfect sense to me.  That's what Option 2 did.



But when you pair them the way Option 3B does, you're connecting not the communities that have been split, but wilderness.  Below is a larger view of part of D9 and D10.  Option 3B splits them and pairs D9 with D22.  Across the uninhabited (by people) Chugach State Park.  To get from a populated area in D9 crossing the "contiguous" border" to a populated area in D22, you have to walk across mountain ranges and river drainages  - probably about 10-15 miles.  Eagle River Valley is not on this map, it's further north in the yellow part.  To get to the people in D10, many people in D9 could just walk down the street.  Just the same as between the two ER districts and downtown and Government Hill/JBER.  

But not between D9 and D22.







The same is true on the JBER side of D23 that connects to D24.  Wilderness.  The olive district is 23, the brighter green is 24.  

As many people testified, people in D9 would have to drive through four or more other house districts to get to the district they're paired with.  The same is true for people in districts 23 and 24.




I'm putting these maps here so it's clear that Option 3B is not the most obvious, the most natural pairing of house seats.  It would seem that the burden should be on the proponents to demonstrate why 3B is the better choice.  


At Wednesday's meeting each member of the majority did lay out their reasons in quite  bit of detail. The court had faulted them for not doing that last time.  Will the judge accept member Simpson's definition of  'reasonable'?   In his deposition he was asked for a definition and he said it meant you had a reason.  Does it have to be a good reason?  Apparently not.  

I was at the Legislative Information Office and took notes on my laptop.  (Only members Bahnke and Borromeo were also in the LIO.  The others were there by Zoom.)  Budd Simpson doesn't speak a lot and when he does, he speaks fairly slowly.  I mention that because that makes it easier for me to keep up with him.  Simpson's arguments were also the best of the three.  So, below are his words in black (as close as I could catch them) and then I comment in red.  


 

Budd Simpson's explanation of why he voted for Option 3B


Simpson:  Interesting to me between option 2 and 3B, there are a number of things in common.  Both options only change four districts.  A reasonable number.  Both independently came up with solution that only changes four districts.  Gives credibility to both.



They didn’t “both independently come up with a four district solution.”  First, there was only the Bahnke plan - Option 1.  Option 1 was the alternative plan that was proposed last November that had different Senate pairings throughout Anchorage from the pairings that were in the adopted plan, which was later ruled unconstitutional.  

Then the East Anchorage plaintiffs submitted a proposal to adopt another plan.  This would become Option 2.

Option 2 followed the rules of the Court to the T.  It only changed four districts and left the other four as member Marcum had paired them in the Proclamation Plan.   Meanwhile, the Ruedrich Plan was submitted.  It changed more than just the minimum number of districts affected by making the court corrections.  


Then Borromeo and Bahnke moved to withdraw Option 1 and just go with Option 2.  They did this because they recognized Option 2 more closely followed the Court’s orders which were to make other changes only if necessary because of taking apart D22 and D21.  (ER and Muldoon)


It was only then that Ruedrich submitted an amended plan which also limited the changes in Anchorage.  


So, this wasn’t independent.  The Republicans saw that their plan would be less likely to meet the Court’s approval if it had more changes than Option 2, so they then changed their map and Option 3B was born.  


Both dealt with Senate D to join 20 and 21 - best solution probably.  Also leave in place the pairings districts 11 and 12 and 15 and 16.


The Court specifically said to fix D 21 and talked about  keeping the Muldoon community whole.  The most obvious way was to connect it to 20.  


Left with ER Chugiak, S Anchorage Hillside,   JBER Military,  and Downtown.  

Bear with me as I . . . Whether we pair 17 and [this must be 23, but my notes had something else] or 23 and 24 - Military and Chugiak.  How you decide those two options, drives what happens with ER 22 and south side of Chugiak.  


He sets this up with a false starting point. 


Why is the choice 17 and 24 or 23 and 24?  We should start with the new orphan district 22, that is left over after putting 21 with 20.  And the most obvious pairing is with the other half of ER - the two districts are a unit.  The house districts split them neighbor from neighbor, the Senate district can repair that split.  


How does Hillside come into the picture?  The first question is after separating 22 from 21, what do we do with 22?  The most obvious pairing is with 24.  Lots and lots of evidence for this.  But the Republicans on the Board want to keep Chugiak/Eagle River (24) paired with JBER/Government Hill (23) because that will pick up an extra Republican Senator.  So they make keeping 23/24 together the only option.  


When you make a decision you have fewer other options to choose from as you go forward.


As to motion for Option 2 - I find the pairing of 23 and 24 ER and Chugiak the more compelling solution.  Pairing JBER with downtown overlooks a conflict of interest and opens us to a challenge to that constituency.  Chugiak has developed as a bedroom community for the military families.  They send their kids to middle school and high school there.  That testimony was compelling to that pairing.


Lots of false assumptions here.  What conflict of interest is there with pairing JBER with Downtown?  And why do you refer to D23 as JBER.  Yes, 2/3 of the population lives on JBER.  But 1/3 lives in downtown adjacent areas.  The Board already paired JBER with downtown in the House district.  To say pairing JBER and downtown is a problem now, overlooks the fact that the Board already paired them.  

In fact, the Board split downtown along 4th Avenue when they created D23.  Right in the middle of downtown Anchorage.  And although the downtown parts of 23 only have 1/3 the voters of the JBER section, more downtown people actually vote than JBER people in that district.  I haven’t gotten all the details (and nor has the Board), but a significant percent of the population of JBER are actually residents of other states, only in Anchorage for their rotation.  

A former East Anchorage Rep testified that ER high school wouldn’t exist without JBER.   But another person testified with data that showed  ASD students who had JBER addresses actually came out this way: [UPDATE April 16 - I realized I described these numbers incorrectly.  Here's the description from Denny Wells:  

"JBER High School boundaries are not included in maps from the Anchorage School District, but if you look up JBER addresses via the Anchorage School District School finder, you will see that addresses in the Richardson portion of the base, accessed via the Richardson gate, are zoned to Eagle River, while the

addresses in the Elmendorf portion of JBER accessed via Government Hill, Boniface, and Muldoon gates are zoned to Bartlett. The Downtown and Government Hill portions of District 23 are zoned to West High School. In total, in district 23, the populations in the various High School boundaries are these:"]


Bartlett High School (inside District 23) – 8733 people

West High School (inside District 17) – 4802 people

Eagle River High School (inside District 22) – 4488 people


More JBER students go to West High School - in District 17 “the Downtown District” according to Simpson, than to Eagle River.  And twice as many go to Bartlett which is in D23!  So this argument is bogus.  The data was actually in the testimony but Simpson either decided to ignore it or didn't read it.    We don't have this data.  It's something the Board should have looked up before jumping to their conclusions.  (And I should have been more careful when I put the numbers up.]


And then, let’s check on how many students from the Hillside go to ER high school or vice versa.  Probably close to zero.  But no one mentioned those numbers.  Why are these issues relevant to one pairing but not the other. 

Further, if you look at the demographic data of people living on base and the downtown off base parts of District 23, they are quite different from D24 - income level, types of homes, ethnicity.  But Simpson doesn’t pay attention to any of that.  Just like they ignored those difference between D22 and D21 in the original plan.  


Heard the argument repeatedly that under the court ruling that ER should be with Chugiak.  Not what the court said.  ER was done at the expense of Muldoon.  Order told us to reconfigure District K, but didn’t say anything about L.  The plaintiffs asked that as part of their relief. But the court didn’t grant that.  Court told us to repair the problematic part of DK and both options made that repair.  That should be sufficient to meet the intent of the court.  


The court rulings  didn't say anything about District 9 or 10 either.  The court also was concerned about political gerrymandering.  And the only explanation that make sense out of these pairings is that it gives ER and the Alaska Senate one more Republican Senator.  


If ER paired together or split, either way does not happen at the expense of Muldoon, because Muldoon is taken care of in both versions.


As far as the pairings, there’s no real advantage either splitting or dividing them.  The house districts were approved.  They are all in the MOA and all contain the same people.  There will be 37,000 in it and all get a vote and have a Senator and representative. 

Districts 23 and 24 is a pairing already in place.  Under option 3b, that isn’t changed.  If there are folks who have thought about running or not running, that stays in place and there is less to change.


But Districts 9 and 10 were also already paired and neither of them have populated areas that are anywhere near the populated areas of D22. But D10 has  an adjoining neighborhood to 9 and the Seward  Highway runs through them.  Just as the Glenn Highway runs through D22 and D24.  People in one district live across the street from people in the other district.  But pairing 22 rips them asunder and has the same detrimental effects Simpson ascribes to splitting 23 and 24.  Only in the case of 9 and 10, the effects are real.

The most obvious pairing is the two house districts that are in Eagle River.  There was testimony by at least two people that identified all the organizations that call themselves “Chugiak Eagle River”.  Nobody talks about the Eagle River Glen Alps community.  Both districts 22 and 24  are part of the EagleExit movement.  If you put ER back together with ER as Option 2 does, then you can also repair the splitting of downtown along 4th Avenue.  




That leaves us to pairing of 22 and 9 and there has been a lot of testimony and discussion on that on both sides.  When making the  pairing described for JBER and ER, that leaves us with 22 with no place to go except 9.  That just flows naturally from the 23/24 decision



Slick.  The only reason that leaves us 22 and 9 is that you magically decided that the JBER/Government Hill district had to be paired with 24.  You never give us a direct comparison between  22/24 Senate seat versus 22/9  or versus a 9/10 Senate seat.  The far more natural pairing was ER with ER/Chugiak.  And then the logic would be the only “natural pairing” would be JBER/Government hill together with downtown, which then matches the puzzle pieces of Fourth Avenue.  




.  Most discussion about contiguity and the concept of ‘nearly as practicable’ has been discussed.  The concept has been misconstrued a lot of the mite in those discussion. Practicable means possible or able to be done.  The way used in constitution it doesn’t mean you have to have the best pairing, but rather as an exception, when you have two districts that aren’t touching.  Intended as an exception of the contiguity rule.  Not the best, most compact whatever.  The pairing of house districts is not the same rule as for house districts.  While we have fought to find pairings to have reasonable rational standard, there is nothing wrong with the pairing of 9 and 22.  They are contiguous.  They have a 35 mile border.  Two districts SEI and demographically similar in many ways.  And of course are included in MOA and therefore are legally SEI base on precedent.  People mentioned you had to drive out of the district.  The concept of transportation contiguity debunked as constitutional requirement.  Contiguity question is a visual, binary question.  Look at map, these are contiguous, they touch.  We heard the concept of false contiguity brought up and my name was invoked.   What I brought up was what community of Skagway Borough, they used water where nobody was and went around the main part of Juneau.  It was not compact.  And that ended up prevailing and the false contiguity rejected.  9 and 22 have 35 miles of real contiguity.


Continuity works for him when he wants it to but not if it isn’t in his favor. Am I stretching it?  Possibly, but surely not as much as he's been stretching things.   The courts have clearly said contiguity over water works and compactness IS NOT a criterion for Senate districts.  Contiguity has been a key issue in the 3B map because it is the only Constitutional requirement for Senate districts.  


There’s no question that the two districts (9 and 22) are geographically contiguous.  But by using that boundary, the 3B map is breaking apart two districts that connect neatly through streets and neighborhoods for two districts that are, as people testified, 15 to 87 miles (I think) apart by road.  


It’s been interesting how the advocates for this map have talked about all the similarities between the populations of these two districts.  Simpson even does it with D23 and D24 even though at other times they turn around and tell us that all of Anchorage is socio-economically integrated, so none of that really matters.  Nor does the alleged military connections between JBER and Chugiak/Eagle River matter.  Again, he’s using one line of logic when it suits him and saying it doesn’t matter when it doesn’t suit him.  Swapping out criteria for convenience or merely changing their weight, has been something the Board - particularly the majority - has done since they started making maps.     


A key question here is whether the Courts will accept the 35 miles of cross roadless state park to connect two distant neighborhoods in the state’s most populated borough.  Even when there are much more obvious options where pairing is like putting together two matching puzzle pieces that neatly connect neighborhoods, connect neighbors who live across the street from each other.  


The courts use different deviation standards for cities and rural areas and they stretch socio-economic matches more in rural areas, and compactness in rural areas has a different standard too.  The nature of Alaska’s geography makes those compromises necessary.  But it’s not necessary to do that in rural areas.  The courts could take the easy path and say, yes they are contiguous, end of story.  Or they could ask why the three most obvious pairings - obvious because neighborhoods are split into two house districts - are abandoned for this technically complying, but really meaningless pairing.  Will they ask if there were better options?  If they do, these pairings will be thrown out.  If they say, as they did in the Skagway case,  it’s constitutional and we won’t substitute a ‘more constitutional’ pairing, they’ll leave it be.  


But there are other considerations which Simpson brings up next. 


Finally I want to address the charge of partisan gerrymandering.  Two Republican senators and a member from Gov. Dunleavy’s admin spoke out against Option 3B.  I’m an appointee of the Governor and I’m lined up with Option 3B.  If Option 3B is a naked partisan attempt, then why did Reinhold and Holland argue against it.  They think something in Option 3B harms them.  That goes against the argument that it attempts to protect or enhance Republican attempts.


This was a clever ploy, I admit.  If two Republicans disagree, then ipso facto, it’s not partisan.  Unless logic matters.  


Partisan gerrymandering would be the other reason for the courts to overrule Option 3B.  On its face, if you knew nothing else, the idea that several prominent Republicans objected to this map proves it’s not partisan might make sense.  But let’s also remember that this is the map drawn by Randy Ruedrich, Alaska’s most practiced Republican strategist and mapper for the last 30+ years.  He’s a former head of the Republican Party.  Nobody is even hiding this.  


Let’s also remember that political parties have competing factions as well.  Lora Reinbold, the Senator from ER opposed this pairing because, presumably, it pits her against the Republican Senator on the Hillside.  But Reinbold is one of the wild Republicans who thumbs her nose at the governor.  She’s someone that would be nice for the Governor to get rid of and replace with a more controllable Republican.  And ER will elect a Republican, there’s no doubt. Sen Holland doesn’t always follow the governor’s orders either, but again, Hillside is a reliably Republican area.  Pitting these two together doesn’t risk losing a Republican seat. It simply might replace an unreliable Republican with a more pliable one.  But pairing Chugiak/ER with JBER/Government Hill, insures an extra Republican seat.  But is Reinbold really just protecting her seat?  Is it possible she knows that Eagle River just naturally belongs as one community?  After all, if 22 and 24 were joined, then she'd get another fiery Republican opponent.  I'm not sure whether Jamie Allard lives in 22 or 24, but she worked hard for Option 3B.  Maybe she doesn't want to run against Reinbold.   


The judge said they couldn't have the 22 and 21 pairing.  But they are going to cling to the 23/24 pairing.  That is political gerrymandering.  And again, what the three Republicans on the Board call the “JBER district” is actually one third downtown-ish Anchorage - and that southern edge of the district fits neatly with the rest of downtown where it was split right along Fourth Avenue.  So, this is an empty argument about partisanship.  Ruedrich doesn’t draw maps that don’t give Republicans an edge.  He plays to win.  They weren’t even subtle about this.  


I’d also note that the majority here ignored the testimony of the two sitting Senators from the districts they are pairing - people who in other situations they would give great deference to - and they are also ignoring  two other past Senators, all of whom say Eagle River should be paired as one Senate seat.  It’s a neat trick to turn around and say this proves they are not partisan. The fact that they are ignoring the testimony of four Senators who have represented this area shows how much they need to keep the 24/23 pairing.  


The most partisan is the proposed pairing of JBER and downtown.  This would diminish the voice of our valued military personal.  I can’t accept that.  I will vote for 3B.  


Oh please.  First, as I’ve said above, this is a seat whose population is 2/3 on JBER and 1/3 urban neighborhoods directly attached to downtown.  One side of Fourth Avenue has been put in one district and the other half in another district. Joining them in a Senate seat makes perfect sense.   Meanwhile the JBER part of the district has no neighborhoods that connect it with D24 - just woods.  


Then Simpson plays on patriotism and our natural admiration for the military. Let’s get the statistics - how many of the military living on JBER are even Alaska voters?  How many vote in other states?  The 1980 Redistricting Board spent a lot of time deciding whether they should even count the Military personnel who were actually residents of other states.  In the end, they included them because they couldn’t figure out how to accurately count them.  That’s all described in detail in the Hickel decision.  


And, as pointed out earlier, more JBER students go to D17’s West High School than go to ER High School.  And twice as many go to Bartlett which is D23.  Because as people have testified, people on JBER are connected to the neighborhoods near the Muldoon and Government Hill exits.  


I’d also point out here that the military is one of the best represented groups in our State legislature and they receive more special benefits than probably any other group of people.  I’ve spelled this out here.   There’s no chance that the military personnel will be diminished in Juneau no matter what district JBER is paired with.  This is a very red herring.  


As the judge weighs political gerrymandering in this case, I'd point out that the Board had no problem dispatching the Cantwell issues.  They all worked easily on it and agreed quickly. No one had a stake it the outcome and the Court's directions were clear. They also complied  with half of the judge's instructions for fixing Senate seat K - pairing north and south Muldoon.  But like with the original pairings of D22 and D21 there was no compromise.  There was acrimony. No one said anything like, "You guys are really upset.  Let's see if we can work something out."  


Instead, it was basically, we have three votes and you have two votes.   You don't act that way unless you have a very specific objective you need to achieve.  There was nothing in what Simpson said that would justify the callousness of the final vote.  There was a mission on the part of the Board majority.  And as one testifier pointed out, there is nothing to lose.  They were able to power this past a very adamant minority and it either gets accepted by the Superior Court or not.  If not, they will appeal it.  They don't have to pay for the attorney.  And if they lose at the Supreme Court level, they have no personal liability.  They will be patted on the back and rewarded by their party colleagues.  But probably not in ways that the public will see.


Simpson spoke at other times at the meeting, but this was the argument he laid you for voting for 3B.  The judge said the Board members' personal preference should not trump overwhelming public opinion.  While this was an organized narration of reasons, most were assertions that were not backed up by facts and are more about giving the Judge reasons  - even if their shaky at best - for choosing Option 3B.  The reasons of Marcum and Binkley are much looser than Simpson's.  Marcum is the Chief Executive Officer of the Koch affiliated Alaska Policy Forum whose goals are to pass legislation that favors a libertarian view point.  She truly believes that getting more Republicans in the Senate is one of her missions.  


I'll try to put up the Marcum and Binkley testimony, but no promises.  

Sunday, February 06, 2022

Redistricting : "Socio-Economic Integration" In Hickel v Southeast Conference

I wanted to do a post suggesting the Alaska Supreme Court rethink their rulings on Socio-Economic Integration.  Then I went back and read all of Hickel v Southeast Conference.   I'll lay out my argument at the end of this post, but first let's look at what the Court has actually said about socio-economic integration.   I think they probably have it right. 

I want to start with what we heard at the Board meetings.  

If you listened in to Alaska Redistricting Board meetings, you would think that all the Supreme Court has said about socio-economic integration (SEI) was this:  

Everything within a borough or city boundary is SEI.  

We heard that over and over again.  That's why south Muldoon and Eagle River can be paired.  Or why community councils districts in Anchorage don't matter.  They're all socio-economically integrated.  That was Board attorney Matt Singer's constant refrain when it came to SEI.  Member Marcum repeated it regularly until she started using SEI to justify pairing  Eagle River and Muldoon even though they are both within the Borough boundaries. 

What Board Attorney Singer Told The Board

We don't know what Singer told the Board about past cases on August 23, 2021 because it was in Executive Session.  What he said in public prior to that was (2.28-2:31 on video)

"We'll be meeting in Executive Session to review my legal memorandum and opinion and under Alaska law, law legal opinions are privileged and the reason for attorney-client privileges is to be able to have confidential discussions and for me to give my best legal advice.  What we'll be reviewing are things available to, my opinions are confidential but I can review for the public the key places where members of the public are interested can go to look at the information that will guide the Board's decisions, so 

Article 6 of the Alaska Constitution, specifically section 10 dictates the  timing for this process and many of the substantive requirements for the Board to consider are also in Section 6 of the constitution.  And then, in addition, the Alaska Supreme Court each time there's been a redistricting process there's been litigation.  Through that process the Alaska Supreme Court established what I call a set of guardrails or guidelines for the redistricting board, that include the process by which this must be done, and direction for things like deviation  of population, how the Voting Rights Act should be considered in light of Alaska's Constitutional requirements.  And also the Alaska Supreme Court Decisions have come out each of these ten year periods are another source of information for the public.  Those are available, there are public websites,  Findlaw.com is one.  The public can search those cases from the Alaska Supreme Court that deal with our redistricting process.  Without getting into my confidential advice, the public should understand we'll be guided here by the Constitution and the Alaska Supreme Court and that's all information that's available to you and we invite the public to read along and follow along as the Board makes decisions."  

Next member Borromeo moved: 

I move we transition into ES 44.62.3 Subsection 4 Matters that involve consideration of records that are not subject to public disclosure and I want to note for the record that no action will be taken in Executive Session

Last time I looked, the Alaska Constitution and the Supreme Court decisions are all documents in the public record.  But Singer has a broad sense of Executive Session.   At one point he said something like, "You can't go in and out of ES because you say something that isn't protected."  

I did a whole post on attorney-client privilege because it's come up in this trial.

Well, actually you can and it's what the law requires.  It's just not as convenient. You have to plan better.   I'm not  completely sure how what he tells the board about his opinion is confidential here.  

From Governor Dunleavy's Memo on the Open Meetings Act

What effect does attorney client privilege have in dealings between a public entity and its attorney?

Executive session procedure requires that the reason for calling the executive session is clearly stated. The attorney- client privilege exemption to the Open Meetings Act is limited to matters where public interest may be injured. This might include how to avoid legal liability, litigation strategies and candid discussion of facts, a proposed settlement conference, and a conference on a decision to appeal.

The emphasis is on "where matters of the public interest may be injured.  All the other examples MIGHT be reasons, are NOT automatically exempted.  There were no litigants at the time, what sort of legal liability strategies would he discuss other than 'obey the law' at this point?  There was no settlement to discuss.  

This was his interpretation of these documents which would be useful for the public - which the Board represents - to hear.  Especially for those third party map makers that Peter Torkelson had just said were important to the process before this.  [I'd note that while doing this post, I found a page on the Board's website that lists all the Constitutional language as well as Hickel v Southeast Conference language and links to the cases.  While I prowled the Board's website regularly over the last year, I don't recall seeing this page. Got to it googling Hickel v Southeast Conference.  I'm guessing Board Executive Director Peter Torkelson at some point put this up - after this August 23 board meeting.  Peter was relentless about giving the public as much information as possible.]

I'd note that Michael White, the attorney for the previous redistricting board did publicly discuss, on March 17,  2011, what the constitution and the prior court cases had said.  Singer didn't even give the public a list of the names of the cases.  

Misuse of executive sessions has been mentioned as an issue in these lawsuits.


But let's move forward.  

In reviewing Hickel v Southeast Conference I found the Court to be much more subtle about what Boards need to consider than "All parts within a Borough boundary are SEI."  

Here's the section of the decision that focuses on SEI (though it comes up frequently in other parts of the decision as well.)

3. Socio-economic Integration.

In addition to preventing gerrymandering, the requirement that districts be composed of relatively integrated socio-economic areas helps to ensure that a voter is not denied his or her right to an equally powerful vote.

This is a fundamental part of the Valdez and Skagway cases.  That the Board's map dilutes the power of the Valdez and Skagway voters by putting them into districts where they are a small minority among people who do not share their interests in crucial issues that they would like their legislator to support.  I'd say it's a critical part of the East Anchorage case, but that case was hardly argued at all in public and Holly Wells didn't have things lined up as neatly as Brena.  In part that was because she went first and because much of the evidence she was hoping to get wasn't released to the judge for review until after she presented her case.  Continuing with Hickel:

[W]e should not lose sight of the fundamental principle involved in reapportionment — truly representative government where the interests of the people are reflected in their elected legislators. Inherent in the concept of geographical legislative districts is a recognition that areas of a state differ economically, socially and culturally and that a truly representative government exists only when those areas of the state which share significant common interests are able to elect legislators representing those interests. Thus, the goal of reapportionment should not only be to achieve numerical equality but also to assure representation of those areas of the state having common interests.

Again, what was argued vigorously by Brena in the Valdez and Skagway cases.   

Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 890 (Alaska 1974) (Erwin, J., dissenting).

We have looked before to the Minutes of the Constitutional Convention for guidance in defining "relatively integrated socio-economic area." Kenai Peninsula Borough, 743 P.2d at 1360 n. 11; Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1215; Groh, 526 P.2d at 878. The delegates explained the "socio- economic principle" as follows:

[W]here people live together and work together and earn their living together, where people do that, they should be logically grouped that way.

"Do they live together, work together, and play together?" We heard that over and over in the digital courtroom.  The board conceded that Mat-Su and Valdez people don't live together, but argued that they work together (both have oil workers, but no numbers were provided).  Valdez folks said their people work on the pipeline and Mat-Su oil workers work on the slope.  So no, they don't work together.   And  to show they play together the Board argued they both hunt caribou off the Glenn Highway.  The Valdez official when asked if he hunted caribou there said he did, but with friends from the Richardson Highway area, not with people from Mat-Su.  So no live, work, or play.

3 PACC 1836 (January 11, 1956). Accordingly, the delegates define an integrated socio-economic unit as:  an economic unit inhabited by people. In other words, the stress is placed on the canton idea, a group of people living within a geographic unit, socio-economic, following if possible, similar economic pursuits.

3 PACC 1873 (January 12, 1956).

In order to satisfy this constitutional requirement, the Governor [Legislation creating a Board didn't happen until 1998]  must provide "sufficient evidence of socio-economic integration of the communities linked by the redistricting, proof of actual interaction and interconnectedness rather than mere homogeneity."

The Board regularly argued about similarities - homogeneity - and didn't offer much proof of actual interaction and interconnectedness.   

Skagway went to great lengths to describe all the work connections between Skagway and downtown Juneau, NOT the Mendenhall Valley.  Valdez did the same with their connections along the pipeline corridor.   

Kenai Peninsula Borough, 743 P.2d at 1363. In areas where a common region is divided into several districts, significant socio- economic integration between communities within a district outside the region and the region in general "demonstrates the requisite interconnectedness and interaction," even though there may be little actual interaction between the areas joined in a district. Id. (declining to draw a fine distinction between the interaction of North Kenai with Anchorage and North Kenai with South Anchorage). "The sufficiency of the contacts between the communities involved here can be determined by way of comparison with districts which we have previously upheld." Id. A district will be held invalid if "[t]he record is simply devoid of significant social and economic interaction" among the communities within an election district. Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1215.

In our previous reapportionment decisions we have identified several specific characteristics of socio-economic integration. In Kenai Peninsula Borough, we found that service by the state ferry

 7

Hickel v. Southeast Conference 846 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1993)

system, daily local air taxi service, a common major economic activity, shared fishing areas, a common interest in the management of state lands, the predominately Native character of the populace, and historical links evidenced socio- economic integration of Hoonah and Metlakatla districts with a hypothetical completely unintegrated area, as if a district including both Quinhagak and Los Angeles had been proposed. We decline to adopt petitioners' interpretation of this provision.

"Relatively" means that we compare proposed districts to other previously existing and proposed districts as well as principal alternative districts to determine if socio-economic links are sufficient. "Relatively" does not mean "minimally," and it does not weaken the constitutional requirement of integration.

B. EQUAL PROTECTION.
"In the context of voting rights in redistricting and reapportionment litigation, there are two principles of equal protection, namely that of `one person, one vote' — the right to an equally weighted vote — and of `fair and effective representation' — the right to group effectiveness or an equally powerful vote." Kenai Peninsula Borough, 743 P.2d at 1366. The former is quantitative, or purely numerical, in nature; the latter is qualitative. Id. at 1366-67.

Simpson argued that he was doing Juneau by the numbers and starting from the south end and moving north.  When he got a full district he stopped.  The fact that he had split the SEI residential neighborhood didn't matter.  He ignored the public testimony to keep the Valley whole and to move the line further south to the Fred Meyer.  Had he done this, then the inhabitants north of the Fred Meyer would have been almost exactly the same number as the Skagway, Haines, and Gustavus population.  And he could have moved them out of the Valley and back into downtown Juneau where they overwhelmingly want to be.  Attorney Robin Brena has obviously read more about socio-economic integration in these cases than just 'everyone in a Borough is SEI."   

The equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution13 has been interpreted along lines which resemble but do not precisely parallel the interpretation given the federal clause.14 While the first part, "one person, one vote," has mirrored the federal requirement, see, e.g., Groh, 526 P.2d at 875, the second part, "fair and effective representation," has been interpreted more strictly than the analogous federal provision.
13 The Alaska Equal Protection clause provides that "all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law. . . ." Alaska Const. art. I, § 1.
14 The Federal Equal Protection clause provides that "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const.Amend. XIV, § 1.
with several other southeastern 47 communities.12 743 P.2d at 1361. *47
12 We did not decide whether these characteristics were specifically necessary to pass muster under article VI, section 6 of the Alaska Constitution. Instead we merely found that a rational state policy existed in effectuating the constitutional mandate of relative socio-economic intervention. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 743 P.2d at 1361.
island
In the same case, we found it persuasive that North Kenai and South Anchorage were geographically proximate, were linked by daily airline flights, shared recreational and commercial fishing areas, and were both strongly dependent on Anchorage for transportation, entertainment, news and professional services. Id. at 1362-63.

This sounds a lot like the relationship Brena has painted into the record  between Skagway and downtown Juneau.

Respondent Southeast Conference contends that Districts 1, 2 and 3 violate article VI, section 6 of the Alaska Constitution. The trial court agreed, finding specifically that "The districts of Southeast are not socio-economically integrated and they easily could have been." We affirm this conclusion.

Again, Brena has argued this very point for Skagway.  The Board put Skagway with an area of Juneau they don't have common ties or interests, but they could have put them with downtown Juneau where they have been the last ten years and where the evidence presented shows "they easily could have been,"

There's more, but you get the point.  And the Board's mantra is there too:
As noted above, a borough is by definition socio- economically integrated. It is axiomatic that a district composed wholly of land belonging to a single borough is adequately integrated.

It's axiomatic - meaning 'by definition - because when Boroughs were set up after statehood, the law said that the people in the boroughs should have the same interests.

From Justia Law - 2001 (Alaska) Redistricting Cases - A more recent case seems to be the source of the Board's mantra:

House District 18 is sufficiently socio-economically integrated as a matter of law because it lies entirely within the Municipality of Anchorage.[8] 

 footnote 8:

"[8] See In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d at 146 ("Anchorage is by definition socio-economically integrated."); see also Hickel v. Southeast Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 52 (Alaska 1992) ("[A] borough is by definition socio-economically integrated."); id. at 51 (quoting AS 29.05.031) ("By statute, a borough must have a population which `is interrelated and integrated as to its social, cultural, and economic activities.'")."
The point is that when the statue that created Boroughs it defined them as  'integrated as to [their] socio, cultural, and economic activities.'  That appears to be why the Court has said everything within a borough 'by definition' is SEI.  In a recent post I went on to look at the statute.  You can follow that discussion here.


The court does talk about people in a Borough boundary being SEI (socio-economically integrated). At one point "sufficiently" so they could be in a district together.  I didn't see anything that wouldn't accept a different set of boundaries for a  districts within a Borough because the new district was MORE socio-economically integrated than another.

The Court has put a lot of emphasis on the idea that people should be in district with people they share common interests with and who can have a legislator who will represent those interests.  
 

The discussion I wanted to have - before I read more carefully what the Court has said - is this:

No one would argue that every neighborhood in Seattle or Chicago is SEI with every other neighborhood in those cities.  When Alaska became a state, there were about 200,000 people in the whole state.  The definition of a Borough made sense at that time.* 

 Boroughs is what mattered.  But at some point Alaska boroughs/cities will become more like Seattle and Chicago.  At some point Alaska will cross the line on a continuum from" every neighborhood in a Borough is SEI with every other' to  'not all neighborhoods are not SEI within a Borough.'  

I'd argue that we can see that already in Anchorage.  The Skagway case makes that argument between downtown Juneau and the Mendenhall Valley.  Surely parts of Anchorage like Fairview and Mountain View and the Muldoon area are economically and culturally different from Eagle River and from Upper Hillside or Campbell Lake that they need different representatives to insure their vote is able to elect legislators who can fight for their issues in the legislature. 

It seems that the court doesn't  forbid taking into account neighborhood differences, but rather it allows some pairings within a Borough that might not seem to be that compatible if there are no other ways to draw a district.  But I'm guessing here.  I've learned long ago that the law has hidden traps here and there.  But I'd just raise this point - that the Supreme Court explicitly recognize that what was the aspiration for Boroughs in 1961 is not necessarily true in 2022.  I think all the language about SEI in Hickel suggests recognition of that.  


*I wondered to what extent Alaska Natives' interests were considered in those early days.  I couldn't find anything that identified ethnicity of the legislature.  However, Wikipedia tells us:
In 1958 the first senate of the state of Alaska, unanimously elected Beltz president of the first senate of the state.  [Beltz was Inupiaq from Nome]

Friday, November 12, 2021

How Do Supreme Court Justices Determine Someone's Sincerity?

The Supreme Court justices were asking questions in a  case where a condemned man wants to have his pastor pray for him and touch him while he's dying.  The lower court sided with Texas, so if the Supreme Court had done nothing, he wouldn't have been allowed to have these last contacts with his pastor. 

 The AP story reported by Jessica Gresko said they're asking questions like:

“What’s going to happen when the next prisoner says that I have a religious belief that he should touch my knee. He should hold my hand. He should put his hand over my heart. He should be able to put his hand on my head. We’re going to have to go through the whole human anatomy with a series of cases,” Justice Samuel Alito said.

Yeah, this claiming religious privilege could get out of hand. This claiming religious privilege could get out of hand.  Why, a baker might refuse to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple because it goes against his strongly held religious beliefs.  What's the difference between a religious belief and a personal prejudice?  After all, Southerners claimed the Bible supported slavery.  What if people believe that Jews killed Jesus (something I've been told on more than one occasion), do they have the right to impose the death penalty?

"Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh also expressed concerns about what a ruling for the inmate would mean for requests in the future, with Kavanaugh asking whether all states would have to offer equivalent accommodations.

What if, he asked, one state “allows bread and wine in the execution room right before the execution” or allows the minister to “hug the inmate.” Do other states have to do the same?"

I get that this question deals with setting precedents. Why are they so worried about some decency for a dying man? But maybe they should look at all claims to do or not do something based on a religious right. 

"Arguing for Texas, state Solicitor General Judd Stone II also told the justices that Ramirez’s request is just an attempt to delay his execution. Justice Clarence Thomas seemed to agree, asking what the justices should do if they believe Ramirez has “changed his requests a number of times” and “filed last minute complaints” and “if we assume that’s some indication of gaming the system.'”

'He [the prosecutor] also said it’s hard to know how a spiritual adviser might react during that time. That person could faint or stumble and jostle the IV lines, he said. “Anything going wrong here would be catastrophic,” he said.'

Really?  More catastrophic to whom?  Certainly not the person being put to death. 

Think about this.  Five of the Supreme Court Justices are Catholics and one more was raised Catholic.  All but one is strongly anti-abortion, but they have much less problem with the death penalty. It's good they are not bound to the Pope's position on everything.  The AP article says they've been less interested lately in staying executions, except when there's a religious aspect. 

The Court has already defined 'religion' pretty broadly.  From the Free Dictionary Legal Dictionary

"To determine whether an action of the federal or state government infringes upon a person's right to freedom of religion, the court must decide what qualifies as religion or religious activities for purposes of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has interpreted religion to mean a sincere and meaningful belief that occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to the place held by God in the lives of other persons. The religion or religious concept need not include belief in the existence of God or a supreme being to be within the scope of the First Amendment."


This puts a burden on the Justices to determine if a belief is sincere.  That's hard to do in any event, but the Justices never see or hear the actual person whose case is before them.  This is, in fact, moving from interpreting the law to discerning a person's sincerity.   How do you interpret someone's deeply held beliefs in the first place.

? And  for those who belong to established religions how do you determine if someone actually believes the institution's doctrines or not?  Surely we have seen examples of, say, anti-abortion voting politicians who arranged abortions for their pregnant mistresses.  For a dying man, I say, risk being wrong and let him have his last request.  So what if he turns out to be gaming the system?  He's going to die.  

Most Western,  actually most,  countries have abolished the death penalty.  But our conservative Supreme Court justices seem to have no heart.  They're hung up on the myth of all people can be rich if they just put their minds and backs into working hard.  And punishment takes precedence over empathy and kindness.  So, they have to ascertain the difference between a legitimate religious belief or being gamed by a condemned man.  

Friday, September 03, 2021

Texas Abortion Law Part I: The Law And The Supreme Court Dissents

 I'm trying to pull together points about the new Texas anti-abortion law.  You can see the law itself here.  I'm not going to discuss the issues related to whether women should have access to abortion, whether the religious and other arguments about when life begins or that abortion is murder.  I will assume here that abortion is not murder and the women have the right to end a pregnancy.  I'll only mention this once the hypocrisy of arguing for the right not to wear a mask or not get a vaccine during a pandemic, while arguing that women do not have the right to decide, with their doctors, if they should get an abortion.  

OVERVIEW

  • Parts of the new Law
  • Parts of the dissents by Supreme Court Justices
    • Sotomayor
    • Breyer
    • Roberts
  • My thoughts of steps to be taken to aid women needing an abortion.  [This will be a second post.  There's more than enough in this one already.]


PARTS OF THE NEW TEXAS LAW

Note there are different parts of the law - not clearly indicated that way in the law - that cover different aspects:

  • specific details of the prohibition of abortion and conditions
  • discussion of previous abortion laws and their continued existence
  • manner of prosecution (not by state or governmental officials, but by private citizens)
  • damages to be paid for violation of the law, including attorney fees, etc.
  • lots of legal posturing to prevent court nullifications of the law (This is not necessarily a bad thing in and of itself.  Certainly laws that opponents of this law might favor are also crafted so they withstand court scrutiny.)
  • severability language - that says if one part of the act is ruled unconstitutional, that part will be thrown out but the rest will stand
  • long lists of what doctors must report about abortions they perform

I'm just going to give some examples of what the law actually states.  You can go to the link to see the whole statute.  Parts of the statute pasted in without spaces for some lines.  I've tried to fix those, but I may have missed some.   It begins like this:

AN ACT

relating to abortion, including abortions after detection of an unborn child’s heartbeat; authorizing a private civil right of action.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: SECTIONA1.AAThis Act shall be known as the Texas Heartbeat

Act.

SECTIONA2.AAThe legislature finds that the State of Texas never repealed, either expressly or by implication, the state statutes enacted before the ruling in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),that prohibit and criminalize abortion unless the mother’s life is in danger.

Note:  They never repealed any of the unconstitutional abortion laws post Roe v. Wade and it appears from other parts of the law (which say this law doesn't not affect other existing abortion statutes) that they're hoping those old laws will come back into effect.

(7)AA"Unborn child" means a human fetus or embryo in any stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.

Throughout the bill, the cross out the word "fetus" and replace it with "child."  And here they are saying it is a "child" immediately at fertilization.

Sec.A171.205.AAEXCEPTION FOR MEDICAL EMERGENCY; RECORDS. (a)AASections 171.203 and 171.204 do not apply if a physician believes a medical emergency exists that prevents compliance with this subchapter.

So there is an exception to prevent a medical emergency.  It requires extensive paperwork detailing all the conditions the doctor must consider.  

Sec.A171.208.AACIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OR AIDING OR

ABETTING VIOLATION. (a)AAAny person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who:

(1)AAperforms or induces an abortion in violation of thischapter;

(2)AAknowingly engages in conduct that aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion, including paying for or reimbursing the costs of an abortion through insurance or otherwise, if the abortion is performed or induced in violation of this chapter, regardless of whether the person knew or should have known that the abortion would be performed or induced in violation of this chapter; or

(3)AAintends to engage in the conduct described by Subdivision(1)or(2).

(b)AAIf a claimant prevails in an action brought under this section,thecourtshallaward:

(1)AAinjunctive relief sufficient to prevent the defendant from violating this chapter or engaging in acts that aid or abet violations of this chapter;

So anything anyone does to help someone abort a fetus with a heart beat is now illegal.  If you drive someone to the clinic (even if you don't know if there is a heart beat or not). If you help pay for the abortion, including insurance companies, you are violating the law.  What I'm trying to find here is clarification of whether helping to get an abortion outside of the state of Texas would also be illegal. I suspect not, because the language is always "in violation of this act" and 'this act' doesn't forbid abortions outside of Texas.  

[UPDATE Sept 3, 2021 2pm:  Constitutional Attorney Lawrence Tribe says, in a Guardian piece,  taking someone out of state would also be a problem:

"Worse still, if women try to escape the state to access abortion services, their families will be on the hook for offering even the smallest aid. If friends or family of a woman hoping to terminate her pregnancy drive her across state lines, or help her organize money for a plane or bus ticket, they could be liable for “aiding and abetting” a now-banned abortion, even if the procedure itself takes place outside Texas."]

S.B.ANo.A8 (2)AAstatutory damages in an amount of not less than $10,000 for each abortion that the defendant performed or induced in violation of this chapter, and for each abortion performed or induced in violation of this chapter that the defendant aided or abetted; and 

(3)AAcosts and attorneys fees.

(c)AANotwithstanding Subsection (b), a court may not award relief  under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection(b)(2)in a previous action for that particular abortion performed or induced in violation of this chapter, or for the particular conduct that aided or abetted an abortion performed or induced in violation of this chapter.

(d)AANotwithstanding Chapter 16, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, or any other law, a person may bring an action under this sectionn ot later than the sixth anniversary of the date the cause of action accrues.

The section above talks about financial penalties.  Note - people can snitch on someone for up to six years after an abortion has been performed.  

(e)AANotwithstanding any other law, the following are not a defense to an action brought under this section:

(1)AAignorance or mistake of law;

(2)AAa defendant’s belief that the requirements of this chapter are unconstitutional or were unconstitutional;

(3)AAa defendant’s reliance on any court decision that has been overruled on  appeal or by a subsequent court, even if that court decision had not been overruled when the defendant engaged in conduct that violates this chapter;

Note that section (3) here says that if a court ruled against the law and then later that was overturned, a doctor who performed an 'illegal' abortion during the time after it the law was suspended and before that suspension was overruled, would be liable.  That means even if there are stays and court cases suspending the law, doctors could be sued if they are later overruled.  EVIL.  

(f-1)AAThe defendant has the burden of proving an affirmative defense under Subsection (f)(1) or (2) by a preponderance of the evidence.

(g)AAThis section may not be construed to impose liability on any speech or conduct protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, as made applicable to the states through the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth

As I've said, I'm not an attorney, but how can you just declare that this law does not violate the First Amendment.  They seem to be saying that if I tell someone where to get an abortion after a fetal heart beat, it's NOT a violation of the First Amendment to punish me for my speech.  (If they argue that this is because the law saves lives, then how is that different from disinformation about COVID?)

 

SUPREME COURT DISSENTS

I'm just going to give sections of the dissents.  You can see them in their entirety here.  I've bolded some sections I thought particularly noteworthy.

Sotomayor's dissent:

"JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

The Court’s order is stunning. Presented with an application to enjoin a flagrantly unconstitutional law engi- neered to prohibit women from exercising their constitu- tional rights and evade judicial scrutiny, a majority of Justices have opted to bury their heads in the sand. Last night, the Court silently acquiesced in a State’s enactment of a law that flouts nearly 50 years of federal precedents. Today, the Court belatedly explains that it declined to grant relief because of procedural complexities of the State’s own invention. Ante, at 1. Because the Court’s failure to act rewards tactics designed to avoid judicial review and in- flicts significant harm on the applicants and on women seeking abortions in Texas, I dissent. . ."

The Act is clearly unconstitutional under existing precedents. See, e.g., June Medical Servs. L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judg- ment) (slip op., at 5) (explaining that “the State may not impose an undue burden on the woman’s ability to obtain an abortion” of a “nonviable fetus” (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992); internal quotation marks omitted)). The respondents do not even try to argue otherwise. Nor could they: No federal appellate court has upheld such a comprehensive prohibition on abortions before viability under current law.

The Texas Legislature was well aware of this binding precedent. To circumvent it, the Legislature took the extraordinary step of enlisting private citizens to do what the State could not. The Act authorizes any private citizen to file a lawsuit against any person who provides an abortion in violation of the Act, “aids or abets” such an abortion (in- cluding by paying for it) regardless of whether they know the abortion is prohibited under the Act, or even intends to engage in such conduct. §3 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §171.208). Courts are required to enjoin the defendant from engaging in these actions in the future and to award the private-citizen plaintiff at least $10,000 in “statutory damages” for each forbidden abortion performed or aided by the defendant. Ibid. In effect, the Texas Legislature has deputized the State’s citizens as bounty hunters, offering them cash prizes for civilly prosecuting their neighbors’ medical procedures. 


The Legislature fashioned this scheme because federal constitutional challenges to state laws ordinarily are brought against state officers who are in charge of enforcing the law. See, e.g., Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U. S. 247, 254 (2011) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)). By prohibiting state officers from enforcing the Act directly and relying instead on citizen bounty hunters, the Legislature sought to make it more complicated for federal courts to enjoin the Act on a statewide basis.

Taken together, the Act is a breathtaking act of defiance—of the Constitution, of this Court’s precedents, and of the rights of women seeking abortions throughout Texas. But over six weeks after the applicants filed suit to prevent the Act from taking effect, a Fifth Circuit panel abruptly stayed all proceedings before the District Court and vacated a preliminary injunction hearing that was scheduled to begin on Monday. The applicants requested emergency relief from this Court, but the Court said nothing. The Act took effect at midnight last night.*

Today, the Court finally tells the Nation that it declined to act because, in short, the State’s gambit worked. The structure of the State’s scheme, the Court reasons, raises “complex and novel antecedent procedural questions” that counsel against granting the application, ante, at 1, just as the State intended. This is untenable. It cannot be the case that a State can evade federal judicial scrutiny by outsourcing the enforcement of unconstitutional laws to its citizenry. Moreover, the District Court held this case justiciable in a thorough and well-reasoned opinion after weeks of briefing and consideration. 2021 WL 3821062, *8–*26 (WD Tex., Aug. 25, 2021). At a minimum, this Court should have stayed implementation of the Act to allow the lower courts to evaluate these issues in the normal course. Ante, at 2 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting). Instead, the Court has re- warded the State’s effort to delay federal review of a plainly unconstitutional statute, enacted in disregard of the Court’s precedents, through procedural entanglements of the State’s own creation.

The Court should not be so content to ignore its constitutional obligations to protect not only the rights of women, but also the sanctity of its precedents and of the rule of law.

I dissent.

 

 Robert's Dissent

"CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE BREYERand JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

The statutory scheme before the Court is not only unu- sual, but unprecedented. The legislature has imposed a prohibition on abortions after roughly six weeks, and then essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the populace at large. The desired consequence appears to be to insulate the State from responsibility for implementing and enforcing the regulatory regime. . ."


Breyer's dissent

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

The procedural posture of this case leads a majority of this Court to deny the applicants’ request for provisional relief. In my view, however, we should grant that request.

I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN. Texas’s law delegates to private indi- viduals the power to prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion during the first stage of pregnancy. But a woman has a federal constitutional right to obtain an abortion dur- ing that first stage. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 164 (1973). And a “State cannot delegate . . . a veto power [over the right to obtain an abortion] which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercis- ing during the first trimester of pregnancy.” Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 69 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, we have made clear that “since the State cannot regulate or pro- scribe abortion during the first stage . . . the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person . . . to prevent abortion during that same period.” Ibid. The applicants persuasively argue that Texas’s law does precisely that. . . "