Showing posts with label Supreme Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Supreme Court. Show all posts

Sunday, March 20, 2022

Ways To Make Sense Of The Redistricting Supreme Court Hearing

There is one indisputable fact that came out of the hearing on Friday, March 18, 2022.  The Chief Justice told everyone that they will have a decision by April 1, 2022.  I'm guessing it will be made before that because it's generally a good idea not to announce significant decisions on April Fool's Day.  So I have about ten days to offer my thoughts on what happened in trial prior to the decision.  

In this post I'm going to outline how I'm organizing my comments.  (It took a while to even get to this point.)

In the meantime, go look at James Brooks' overview in today's Anchorage Daily News.  With the benefit of a deadline and an editor, he's been able to write on what the trial was about.   And it's a good starting point.  I've got several false starts for posts and I'm trying to figure out where to grab hold of this story.  

Alaska Supreme Court Judges Walking Into the Chamber


Basically there are several stories.  

1.  PRACTICAL/POLITICAL:  WHAT WILL THE LEGISLATIVE MAP OF ALASKA LOOK LIKE FOR THE NEXT TEN YEARS?

There are 40 house districts and 20 senate districts (made up of two house districts each).  There were five law suits challenging the board's maps.  

  • The 'East-Anchorage' plaintiffs challenged the pairing of the South Muldoon district with an Eagle River district into one Anchorage Senate seat,  arguing the were paired this way by the Board to give conservatives in Eagle River an extra Senate seat at the expense of a district being called 'south Muldoon.'  Changing that pairing will also affect a second Senate seat.
  • The Skagway plaintiffs challenged the Board decision to put them in a House district with the Mendenhall Valley in Juneau instead of with downtown Juneau with which they are much more 'Socio-Economically Integrated'  (SEI).   SEI is one of the Alaska constitutional requirements for districts.  
Judge Thomas Matthews, the Superior Court judge who heard the challenges during round one, agreed and ruled that the Board should go back and fix these two.  The Board has appealed these decisions, so everyone is back in court to argue their points before the Supreme Court.
  • Matsu-Su and Valdez both challenged District 29 in which they were paired.  They argued they are not SEI and that the Board didn't seriously consider them until all the other districts were completed and so they just got shoved into one unconstitutional district.  
  • Calista Corporation challenged how several villages in Western Alaska and asked the court to swap some villages between the two districts. 

Judge Matthews did NOT ask the Board to make changes in these cases, but Mat-Su and Valdez both appealed the decision.

Calista is NOT appealing the decision but is arguing before the court that ANCSA boundaries should be  legitimate factors to consider in redistricting.  


2.  LEGAL:  WHAT LEGAL PRINCIPLES ARE THE ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES DEBATING/WEIGHING AND HOW DO THEY IMPACT #1 AND FUTURE BOARDS?

This is the section that is slowing me down the most.  I've got a couple of important issues on my list so far are:

  • The Hard Look Doctrine - If this came up in trial, or even Judge Matthews' ruling, I missed it.  I'm guess I took the words 'hard look' literally and just didn't know that that is a legal principle that sets up standards for the way the Board makes their decision.  Basically, as I understand this, the court is to not simply defer to whatever decision a government agency or board makes, but to take 'a hard look' at how they made it.  Both the East Anchorage and Skagway attorneys are pushing this and the judge agreed.  The Board seems to be saying this may be a standard for permanent federal agencies, but it's too high a standard for a temporary board with few staff.  

Skagway attorney Robin Brena listed key points for evaluating a decision:

      • Deliberation - have to engage the evidence before you decide
      • Transparency - have to be transparent in deliberation on why Board took decision
      • Rational - treat like situations the same.  (They can't emphasis one criterion (say compactness over Socio-Economic Integration) for one district and then switch emphasis for another)
      • Evidenciary propriety - have to explain and apply evidence before them

[I need to go back and review my notes and the video and the briefs so I get this right - the four points above are from my notes in the courtroom.]

  • The Role of Public Testimony - I think this actually falls under the Hard Look Doctrine - it seems to be relevant to all four points just mentioned.  Judge Matthews pointed out in his ruling that since the Constitution requires 60 days of public testimony, there's an implication  there that the testimony shouldn't be ignored.  The Board argues that Matthews is saying that the Board must substitute the majority of public testimony for the Board's own reasoning and that this will result in political parties packing the hearings and getting followers to send in testimony.  
  • Should ANCSA boundaries be used when making districts?  While Calista is not contesting Judge Matthews' decision, they are asking the Court to rule that ANCSA (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act} boundaries can be used in redistricting - particularly in unincorporated boroughs.  I have some questions about this, though no firm opinions.  I just don't know.  But there was only one party arguing for this and no counter arguments so I hope the judges act cautiously on this until it's clear what the impact might be.  It's important that Alaska Native voices are heard and respected by redistricting boards.  But I also have unanswered questions about the role of for-profit Native corporations in this process. 
These are the key issues I've got picked out so far, but there may be more


3.  PERSONAL:  HOW DO THE SKILLS, STYLES, MOTIVATIONS, AND EXPERIENCES OF THE ATTORNEYS (AND TO SOME DEGREE, THE JUDGES) IMPACT THE DECISION MAKING?  

This is probably the easiest category for most people to understand.  In the trial (and pre-trial) process, it became clear that the individual attorneys representing the plaintiffs and the board play a big factor in which way the decisions fall.  Without understanding these dynamics the public is missing out on a key factor that influences the decisions.  I have developed some thoughts on some of the attorneys and I want to write about this in a way that is reasoned, is backed with evidence, and isn't just a gossip session.  

I would note that throughout the trial and again Friday, the Board's attorney, Matt Singer, had to participate in every part of the trial.  He had to defend the Board in all five cases against the Board.  (Mat-Su and Valdez were paired together, but each had its own attorneys.) During pre-trial meetings, he could make a point, but then there were a bunch of other attorneys to challenge that point and to back each other up.  They all had time to think through what was said, but he was essentially 'on' all the time.  That is a heavy burden.  Intervening attorney, Nathaniel Amdur-Clark, did argue for the Board, so Singer had a bit of backup.  




Friday, March 18, 2022

ARB Chair John Binkley Chats With Me Briefly After Supreme Court Hearing

 I'm still digesting the various arguments made and questions asked by the justices.  Not ready yet to post an overview, let alone my reactions.  But I do have this bit of video I made with Alaska Redistricting Board Chair John Binkley after the trial, still in the courtroom.  



I'll let the video speak for itself.  

[Note:  I haven't posted my own videos much lately.  iMovie on my laptop changed and I just got out of practice.  It seems a bit easier than it was.  I also have really slow internet at home so uploading takes forever.  I had to go over to UAA to get reasonable internet speed to upload it. I had edited out the extra subtitles, but I must have uploaded the wrong version to YouTube.  I'll leave it up for now since I'd have to upload it to YouTube again.  Sorry.]

Thursday, March 17, 2022

Supreme Court Tomorrow At 9am: Partial Preview

My sense is that those who have been following the Redistricting Board and the Superior Court challenges won't have trouble following the arguments tomorrow.  For others, giving quick overviews here isn't easy.  I have tried to do that with some of the cases in earlier posts.  

Key information:  9am at the Alaska Supreme Court  Friday March 18, 2022 9am. Much easier (since they are limiting the gallery to 50 people) is to watch it live at www.ktoo.org/gaveland .

You can also check out the filings in the Docket here.

You particularly want to look at the Responses (Numbers 33-40).  These are the arguments of the different parties.  

33 - State of Alaska - The State isn't arguing for against the maps or the judge's decisions about the maps. The State  has two concerns here:

1.  That the precedent set by the Court regarding the importance of listening to what the public has to say ("if you didn't intend to listen to what the public said, why hold all the hearings?).  The State is making an argument that that only applies to the Redistricting Boards and not other state boards.

2.  Also, the Court's decisions about attorney-client privilege and the Open Meetings Act should also only apply to the Redistricting Board and not other State Boards.

34 - Matsu-Susitna Borough - challenged (along with Valdez) District 29 which put Valdez in with Palmer and Wasilla suburbs.  Matsu-Susistna makes its points easy to read.

  • The Court "requires remand to the Board to comply with the Constitution'
  • Agreement with the Court's finding of violations of the Open Meeting Act
  • Court was correct in its determinations regarding discovery

35 - Alaska Redistricting Board - Defending its decisions and challenging the conclusions of Judge Mathews they disagree with and supporting those they agree with

36.  City of Valdez - See comments below.

37.  Municipality of Skagway - Agreeing with the judge on public input and disagreeing with the judge that Skagway is Socio-Economically Integrated with the Mendenhall Valley.

38.  Felisa Wilson - This is the Anchorage case that challenged the pairing of the two Eagle River House seats with Muldoon in one Senate seat and JBER and downtown Anchorage in another Senate seat.  The judge ruled in their favor and the Board is challenging that.  This is a harder case to follow because it focuses on violations of principles of law such as due process, arguing that the Board went from transparent and then when it came time for Senate pairings it went opaque.  It argues that the East Anchorage plaintiffs couldn't make their case stronger because the Board withheld information until the very last minute - some of that including racial data about the voters in the Muldoon district.  As an observer of the Board and then the trial, it clearly appeared to me that the Board's strategy at the trial was to stall and delay.  See this January 19 post:   AK Redistricting Pre-Trial Hearing - Board Strategy Is Clear And Working.  

39.  Doyon Limited - Doyon led a coalition of Native Corporations in monitoring the Redistricting Board throughout the process, including creating their own proposed redistricting map.  The were pretty successful in getting all the Doyon and Ahtna villages into one district - 36.  They are here to defend District 36, particularly against Valdez' claims that the Board put Native Corporation goals ahead of the Constitutional requirements for creating the districts.  

Second reminder:  These were very quick grabs from the documents.  You can look at them yourselves for more details.  I'm sure all the attorneys would be rolling their eyes at my very brief takes.  


You can skim through these at the link.  But here's a little more depth into the Valdez case.  


Valdez - The basic argument seems to be that by committing strongly to the Doyon plan to get all the Doyon villages into one district (the new 36), the Board a) used a non constitutional criterion (getting all of Doyon together) and b) caused Valdez to be in a district that it is not socio-economically integrated with.  

Basically they say that the focus on creating a "Doyon District" resulted in a district that is not compact, not SEI (socio-economically integrated).  And the impact on Valdez was to put it into a district that had serious problems.  Thus, by using nonconktititonal criteria (getting all the Doyon villages together into D-36), the Board ended up with an unconstitutional Valdez district (29).

There's more detail, but that's the biggest argument.  And it's pretty clear that there was a lot of pressure to do that.  Doyon had a group of Native Corporations and money to create their own alternative map.  And Doyon attorney Tanner Amdur-Clark was allowed to act as an Intervenor attorney during the trial.  That is not to say that there is anything wrong with wanting to get all the Doyon (and Ahtna) villages into one district.  But that is not one of the constitutional requirements for putting the districts together.  Attorney Brena is trying to convince the Supreme Court that by locking in District 36, the Board created 

  • an unnecessarily large (not Compact) district
  • a district that was not Socio-Economically Integrated (even though it has all those Native villages, the population is 70% non-Native) and
  • Put Valdez into a district which in which it has serious conflicts and thus whose interests in the legislature would be overwhelmed by Mat-Su portion of the district

[Note:  I scanned the brief fairly quickly, but I read the conclusions more carefully.  I'm just trying to give readers what stood out to me as the main thrust of the argument.  You can read it for yourself in the link below.]

From the VALDEZ-DETTER’S CORRECTED PETITION FOR REVIEW March 3, 2022, here's the conclusion of their argument::


"VII. CONCLUSION

The Board chose to prioritize the nonconstitutional goals of its individual members

over the consistent application of the constitutional requirements throughout the

redistricting process. Time-and-again the Board deferred to the priorities of the individual member from the geographic area under discussion. This is simply not the constitutional process the Board is required to undertake, and, as a result, the process failed to produce constitutionally compliant outcomes.

The Board set aside its constitutional obligations to establish compact and socio-economically integrated districts when it prioritized the nonconstitutional goal ofcreating a “Doyon” or “Doyon-Ahtna” district (District 36). The Board’s favored treatment of the Native voters in these villages, which constitute less than 30 percent of District 36, over all other voters cannot possibly survive constitutional scrutiny.

The Doyon district is not compact. It would be the third-largest state in our union. It is not so large because Alaska is a vast state with low population densities, as may sometimes justify a larger district, but because the Board set aside the constitutional requirements for establishing house districts and instead decided to (1) establish VRA [Voting Rights Act] districts early in the process in direct violation of the Hickel process, locking in portions of the Doyon district’s boundaries; (2) inconsistently and arbitrarily apply ANSCA boundaries to artificially separate Native villages along the lower Yukon drainage, while ignoring other ANSCA boundaries altogether; (3) form a noncompact horseshoe shape around the population of Fairbanks in an effort to keep Fairbanks intact in deference to Chair Binkley; and (4) establish and advance a goal of maximizing the voting power of far-flung Native villages (that are currently in four different districts) by combing them into a single district, even though the district was over 70 percent non-Native. The Board then further violated compactness by adding two strange appendages to capture 30 Ahtna shareholders in Cantwell and to capture the predominately non-Native population of Glennallen, breaking two borough boundaries in the process.

The Doyon district is also not relatively socio-economically integrated. There is no substantive or creditable evidence in the record suggesting the communities along the lower Yukon and those along the Richardson Highway are relatively socio-economically integrated at all, much less to the maximum degree practicable.

Since statehood, every governor and board has properly applied the constitutional standards of article VI, section 6 to place Valdez in a house district with the Richardson Highway communities, with the Prince William Sound communities, or with both. The Board in this case has orphaned the voters of Valdez from their closest neighbors and placed them completely in a district with voters with whom they do not work, live, or share common concerns. The Board took this action as a default in order to achieve thenonconstitutional goals it had already committed to achieve.

The Board’s actions ignored the public process, which overwhelmingly suggested Valdez should not be districted, let alone exclusively paired, with the Mat-Su Borough. The public process yielded voluminous and near unanimous comments in favor of Valdezbeing placed with the people its voters live, work, and share common interests with along the Richardson Highway, as it has been for decades, in what has been framed by the courts as “the most strongly integrated economic corridor in the state, the pipeline corridor, the Richardson Highway corridor from the south region of the North Star Borough to Valdez.”274

Rather than ensuring District 29 met the constitutional requirements for a house district, the Board chose to protect its nonconstitutional priorities and reach out to everyone it could for justification supporting pairing Valdez exclusively with the Mat-Su Borough for the first time in history. In doing so, the Board stretched this Court’s prior authority beyond recognition and advanced theories that diminish if not entirely abrogate the limitations to the Board’s discretion set forth in article VI, section 6 of the Alaska Constitution.

The Board did not map, much less look hard at establishing (1) a Richardson Highway house district; (2) a Valdez, Seward, and Kodiak house district by shifting 274 In re 2011 Redistricting Cases, 2013 WL 6074059 at *13 (emphasis added).

Cordova into Southeast; or (3) an Anchorage and Valdez house district. The Board chose not to even look at the maps already prepared by Member Marcum because they would require modification to the VRA districts and Doyon district in order to form a Richardson

Highway or Prince William Sound district. In addition, the Board discouraged Member Marcum from mapping an Anchorage and Valdez district altogether. Any of these alternatives would have resulted in more compact and socio-economically integrated house districts throughout Alaska, which the Board could have considered if they had properly and consistently applied the constitutional requirements. This Court should enforce these requirements and remand this matter back to the Board for consistent application when evaluating the viable alternatives it chose not to consider for the voters of Valdez.


Some of the parties that have filed briefs (Calista and the State of Alaska) have done to support or oppose concepts raised in this case.  Calista is arguing against Valdez' argument that ANCSA boundaries are not appropriate to use for redistricting.  ????   And the State of Alaska is arguing that the broader than normal interpretation of the importance of listening to the public ruling by Judge Matthews should not be extended to other public bodies.  (Check if there are other issues)

Calista is not challenging the judge's decision about the Calista region and the State is not advocating one way or the other about the maps, or even the Judge's standard for listening to public testimony for redistricting.  


Wednesday, March 16, 2022

Derelict Blogger Catching Up On Redistricting Case

 Back in February, March 18 seemed a long way off, but today I realized it was only two days away.  It's not like I hadn't checked the Supreme Court website.  I had.  But there were several different listings under the Redistricting Case.  I checked one or two and the only documents I could find were from February 17, 2022, about five.  

Well, I should have tried them all - they've been consolidated into S-18332.  There I found 51 documents - the latest was put up yesterday March 15, 2022.  

I've got things downloaded.  A lot are short administrative documents - asking for more time or permission to go over the page limits and then responses from the Court.  Others are the much longer arguments of the various parties.  Those I'll look through tomorrow.  

Meanwhile, here are some excerpts from the Court's orders that apply to the actual hearing on Friday that might be of interest to readers.  


  • All petitions and responses will be assigned SupremeCourt Case No. S-18332.
  • Oral argument will be held on Friday, March 18, 2022 at 9:00AM. Argument is expected to take place in-person in Anchorage, although capacity for in-person attendance may be limited in order to allow social distancing. The argument will be live streamed on www.ktoo.org/gaveland remote viewing is encouraged. The time allowed for each side to argue will be announced in a separate notice following the submission of the parties’ written arguments. 
  •  The Court will strictly adhere to the time limits set forth above.
    • Oral argument will be held before the Supreme Court on 3/18/2022 beginning at 9:00 AM as follows
    • 9:00AM – 10:00AM: Alaska Redistricting Board’s petition for review regarding Senate District K. 30 minutes per side: Redistricting Board and East AnchoragePlaintiffs
    • 10:15AM – 11:15AM: Alaska Redistricting Board’s petition for review regarding House District 3 and Municipality of Skagway’s petition for review regarding HouseDistricts 3 & 4. 30 minutes per side: Redistricting Board and Municipality of Skagway. .
    • 11:30AM – 12:50PM: Matanuska-Susitna Borough’s & City of Valdez’s petitionsfor review regarding House Districts 29, 30, and 36. 40 minutes total for the Borough& City (20 min each, absent different agreement); 40 minutes total for RedistrictingBoard, Doyon Intervenors, and Calista Parties to divide by agreement. 
So, East Anchorage (Muldoon-Eagle River pairing) goes first.
Then Skagway.
Then Mat-Su and Valdez

I still have to decide if I want to try to get into the courtroom or watch online.  In a lot of ways, online has been much easier for many things.  And if I can't get in because there are too many people, I'd have to hustle home to listen on line and I wouldn't want to miss anything.  

Sunday, February 06, 2022

Redistricting : "Socio-Economic Integration" In Hickel v Southeast Conference

I wanted to do a post suggesting the Alaska Supreme Court rethink their rulings on Socio-Economic Integration.  Then I went back and read all of Hickel v Southeast Conference.   I'll lay out my argument at the end of this post, but first let's look at what the Court has actually said about socio-economic integration.   I think they probably have it right. 

I want to start with what we heard at the Board meetings.  

If you listened in to Alaska Redistricting Board meetings, you would think that all the Supreme Court has said about socio-economic integration (SEI) was this:  

Everything within a borough or city boundary is SEI.  

We heard that over and over again.  That's why south Muldoon and Eagle River can be paired.  Or why community councils districts in Anchorage don't matter.  They're all socio-economically integrated.  That was Board attorney Matt Singer's constant refrain when it came to SEI.  Member Marcum repeated it regularly until she started using SEI to justify pairing  Eagle River and Muldoon even though they are both within the Borough boundaries. 

What Board Attorney Singer Told The Board

We don't know what Singer told the Board about past cases on August 23, 2021 because it was in Executive Session.  What he said in public prior to that was (2.28-2:31 on video)

"We'll be meeting in Executive Session to review my legal memorandum and opinion and under Alaska law, law legal opinions are privileged and the reason for attorney-client privileges is to be able to have confidential discussions and for me to give my best legal advice.  What we'll be reviewing are things available to, my opinions are confidential but I can review for the public the key places where members of the public are interested can go to look at the information that will guide the Board's decisions, so 

Article 6 of the Alaska Constitution, specifically section 10 dictates the  timing for this process and many of the substantive requirements for the Board to consider are also in Section 6 of the constitution.  And then, in addition, the Alaska Supreme Court each time there's been a redistricting process there's been litigation.  Through that process the Alaska Supreme Court established what I call a set of guardrails or guidelines for the redistricting board, that include the process by which this must be done, and direction for things like deviation  of population, how the Voting Rights Act should be considered in light of Alaska's Constitutional requirements.  And also the Alaska Supreme Court Decisions have come out each of these ten year periods are another source of information for the public.  Those are available, there are public websites,  Findlaw.com is one.  The public can search those cases from the Alaska Supreme Court that deal with our redistricting process.  Without getting into my confidential advice, the public should understand we'll be guided here by the Constitution and the Alaska Supreme Court and that's all information that's available to you and we invite the public to read along and follow along as the Board makes decisions."  

Next member Borromeo moved: 

I move we transition into ES 44.62.3 Subsection 4 Matters that involve consideration of records that are not subject to public disclosure and I want to note for the record that no action will be taken in Executive Session

Last time I looked, the Alaska Constitution and the Supreme Court decisions are all documents in the public record.  But Singer has a broad sense of Executive Session.   At one point he said something like, "You can't go in and out of ES because you say something that isn't protected."  

I did a whole post on attorney-client privilege because it's come up in this trial.

Well, actually you can and it's what the law requires.  It's just not as convenient. You have to plan better.   I'm not  completely sure how what he tells the board about his opinion is confidential here.  

From Governor Dunleavy's Memo on the Open Meetings Act

What effect does attorney client privilege have in dealings between a public entity and its attorney?

Executive session procedure requires that the reason for calling the executive session is clearly stated. The attorney- client privilege exemption to the Open Meetings Act is limited to matters where public interest may be injured. This might include how to avoid legal liability, litigation strategies and candid discussion of facts, a proposed settlement conference, and a conference on a decision to appeal.

The emphasis is on "where matters of the public interest may be injured.  All the other examples MIGHT be reasons, are NOT automatically exempted.  There were no litigants at the time, what sort of legal liability strategies would he discuss other than 'obey the law' at this point?  There was no settlement to discuss.  

This was his interpretation of these documents which would be useful for the public - which the Board represents - to hear.  Especially for those third party map makers that Peter Torkelson had just said were important to the process before this.  [I'd note that while doing this post, I found a page on the Board's website that lists all the Constitutional language as well as Hickel v Southeast Conference language and links to the cases.  While I prowled the Board's website regularly over the last year, I don't recall seeing this page. Got to it googling Hickel v Southeast Conference.  I'm guessing Board Executive Director Peter Torkelson at some point put this up - after this August 23 board meeting.  Peter was relentless about giving the public as much information as possible.]

I'd note that Michael White, the attorney for the previous redistricting board did publicly discuss, on March 17,  2011, what the constitution and the prior court cases had said.  Singer didn't even give the public a list of the names of the cases.  

Misuse of executive sessions has been mentioned as an issue in these lawsuits.


But let's move forward.  

In reviewing Hickel v Southeast Conference I found the Court to be much more subtle about what Boards need to consider than "All parts within a Borough boundary are SEI."  

Here's the section of the decision that focuses on SEI (though it comes up frequently in other parts of the decision as well.)

3. Socio-economic Integration.

In addition to preventing gerrymandering, the requirement that districts be composed of relatively integrated socio-economic areas helps to ensure that a voter is not denied his or her right to an equally powerful vote.

This is a fundamental part of the Valdez and Skagway cases.  That the Board's map dilutes the power of the Valdez and Skagway voters by putting them into districts where they are a small minority among people who do not share their interests in crucial issues that they would like their legislator to support.  I'd say it's a critical part of the East Anchorage case, but that case was hardly argued at all in public and Holly Wells didn't have things lined up as neatly as Brena.  In part that was because she went first and because much of the evidence she was hoping to get wasn't released to the judge for review until after she presented her case.  Continuing with Hickel:

[W]e should not lose sight of the fundamental principle involved in reapportionment — truly representative government where the interests of the people are reflected in their elected legislators. Inherent in the concept of geographical legislative districts is a recognition that areas of a state differ economically, socially and culturally and that a truly representative government exists only when those areas of the state which share significant common interests are able to elect legislators representing those interests. Thus, the goal of reapportionment should not only be to achieve numerical equality but also to assure representation of those areas of the state having common interests.

Again, what was argued vigorously by Brena in the Valdez and Skagway cases.   

Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 890 (Alaska 1974) (Erwin, J., dissenting).

We have looked before to the Minutes of the Constitutional Convention for guidance in defining "relatively integrated socio-economic area." Kenai Peninsula Borough, 743 P.2d at 1360 n. 11; Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1215; Groh, 526 P.2d at 878. The delegates explained the "socio- economic principle" as follows:

[W]here people live together and work together and earn their living together, where people do that, they should be logically grouped that way.

"Do they live together, work together, and play together?" We heard that over and over in the digital courtroom.  The board conceded that Mat-Su and Valdez people don't live together, but argued that they work together (both have oil workers, but no numbers were provided).  Valdez folks said their people work on the pipeline and Mat-Su oil workers work on the slope.  So no, they don't work together.   And  to show they play together the Board argued they both hunt caribou off the Glenn Highway.  The Valdez official when asked if he hunted caribou there said he did, but with friends from the Richardson Highway area, not with people from Mat-Su.  So no live, work, or play.

3 PACC 1836 (January 11, 1956). Accordingly, the delegates define an integrated socio-economic unit as:  an economic unit inhabited by people. In other words, the stress is placed on the canton idea, a group of people living within a geographic unit, socio-economic, following if possible, similar economic pursuits.

3 PACC 1873 (January 12, 1956).

In order to satisfy this constitutional requirement, the Governor [Legislation creating a Board didn't happen until 1998]  must provide "sufficient evidence of socio-economic integration of the communities linked by the redistricting, proof of actual interaction and interconnectedness rather than mere homogeneity."

The Board regularly argued about similarities - homogeneity - and didn't offer much proof of actual interaction and interconnectedness.   

Skagway went to great lengths to describe all the work connections between Skagway and downtown Juneau, NOT the Mendenhall Valley.  Valdez did the same with their connections along the pipeline corridor.   

Kenai Peninsula Borough, 743 P.2d at 1363. In areas where a common region is divided into several districts, significant socio- economic integration between communities within a district outside the region and the region in general "demonstrates the requisite interconnectedness and interaction," even though there may be little actual interaction between the areas joined in a district. Id. (declining to draw a fine distinction between the interaction of North Kenai with Anchorage and North Kenai with South Anchorage). "The sufficiency of the contacts between the communities involved here can be determined by way of comparison with districts which we have previously upheld." Id. A district will be held invalid if "[t]he record is simply devoid of significant social and economic interaction" among the communities within an election district. Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1215.

In our previous reapportionment decisions we have identified several specific characteristics of socio-economic integration. In Kenai Peninsula Borough, we found that service by the state ferry

 7

Hickel v. Southeast Conference 846 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1993)

system, daily local air taxi service, a common major economic activity, shared fishing areas, a common interest in the management of state lands, the predominately Native character of the populace, and historical links evidenced socio- economic integration of Hoonah and Metlakatla districts with a hypothetical completely unintegrated area, as if a district including both Quinhagak and Los Angeles had been proposed. We decline to adopt petitioners' interpretation of this provision.

"Relatively" means that we compare proposed districts to other previously existing and proposed districts as well as principal alternative districts to determine if socio-economic links are sufficient. "Relatively" does not mean "minimally," and it does not weaken the constitutional requirement of integration.

B. EQUAL PROTECTION.
"In the context of voting rights in redistricting and reapportionment litigation, there are two principles of equal protection, namely that of `one person, one vote' — the right to an equally weighted vote — and of `fair and effective representation' — the right to group effectiveness or an equally powerful vote." Kenai Peninsula Borough, 743 P.2d at 1366. The former is quantitative, or purely numerical, in nature; the latter is qualitative. Id. at 1366-67.

Simpson argued that he was doing Juneau by the numbers and starting from the south end and moving north.  When he got a full district he stopped.  The fact that he had split the SEI residential neighborhood didn't matter.  He ignored the public testimony to keep the Valley whole and to move the line further south to the Fred Meyer.  Had he done this, then the inhabitants north of the Fred Meyer would have been almost exactly the same number as the Skagway, Haines, and Gustavus population.  And he could have moved them out of the Valley and back into downtown Juneau where they overwhelmingly want to be.  Attorney Robin Brena has obviously read more about socio-economic integration in these cases than just 'everyone in a Borough is SEI."   

The equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution13 has been interpreted along lines which resemble but do not precisely parallel the interpretation given the federal clause.14 While the first part, "one person, one vote," has mirrored the federal requirement, see, e.g., Groh, 526 P.2d at 875, the second part, "fair and effective representation," has been interpreted more strictly than the analogous federal provision.
13 The Alaska Equal Protection clause provides that "all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law. . . ." Alaska Const. art. I, § 1.
14 The Federal Equal Protection clause provides that "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const.Amend. XIV, § 1.
with several other southeastern 47 communities.12 743 P.2d at 1361. *47
12 We did not decide whether these characteristics were specifically necessary to pass muster under article VI, section 6 of the Alaska Constitution. Instead we merely found that a rational state policy existed in effectuating the constitutional mandate of relative socio-economic intervention. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 743 P.2d at 1361.
island
In the same case, we found it persuasive that North Kenai and South Anchorage were geographically proximate, were linked by daily airline flights, shared recreational and commercial fishing areas, and were both strongly dependent on Anchorage for transportation, entertainment, news and professional services. Id. at 1362-63.

This sounds a lot like the relationship Brena has painted into the record  between Skagway and downtown Juneau.

Respondent Southeast Conference contends that Districts 1, 2 and 3 violate article VI, section 6 of the Alaska Constitution. The trial court agreed, finding specifically that "The districts of Southeast are not socio-economically integrated and they easily could have been." We affirm this conclusion.

Again, Brena has argued this very point for Skagway.  The Board put Skagway with an area of Juneau they don't have common ties or interests, but they could have put them with downtown Juneau where they have been the last ten years and where the evidence presented shows "they easily could have been,"

There's more, but you get the point.  And the Board's mantra is there too:
As noted above, a borough is by definition socio- economically integrated. It is axiomatic that a district composed wholly of land belonging to a single borough is adequately integrated.

It's axiomatic - meaning 'by definition - because when Boroughs were set up after statehood, the law said that the people in the boroughs should have the same interests.

From Justia Law - 2001 (Alaska) Redistricting Cases - A more recent case seems to be the source of the Board's mantra:

House District 18 is sufficiently socio-economically integrated as a matter of law because it lies entirely within the Municipality of Anchorage.[8] 

 footnote 8:

"[8] See In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d at 146 ("Anchorage is by definition socio-economically integrated."); see also Hickel v. Southeast Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 52 (Alaska 1992) ("[A] borough is by definition socio-economically integrated."); id. at 51 (quoting AS 29.05.031) ("By statute, a borough must have a population which `is interrelated and integrated as to its social, cultural, and economic activities.'")."
The point is that when the statue that created Boroughs it defined them as  'integrated as to [their] socio, cultural, and economic activities.'  That appears to be why the Court has said everything within a borough 'by definition' is SEI.  In a recent post I went on to look at the statute.  You can follow that discussion here.


The court does talk about people in a Borough boundary being SEI (socio-economically integrated). At one point "sufficiently" so they could be in a district together.  I didn't see anything that wouldn't accept a different set of boundaries for a  districts within a Borough because the new district was MORE socio-economically integrated than another.

The Court has put a lot of emphasis on the idea that people should be in district with people they share common interests with and who can have a legislator who will represent those interests.  
 

The discussion I wanted to have - before I read more carefully what the Court has said - is this:

No one would argue that every neighborhood in Seattle or Chicago is SEI with every other neighborhood in those cities.  When Alaska became a state, there were about 200,000 people in the whole state.  The definition of a Borough made sense at that time.* 

 Boroughs is what mattered.  But at some point Alaska boroughs/cities will become more like Seattle and Chicago.  At some point Alaska will cross the line on a continuum from" every neighborhood in a Borough is SEI with every other' to  'not all neighborhoods are not SEI within a Borough.'  

I'd argue that we can see that already in Anchorage.  The Skagway case makes that argument between downtown Juneau and the Mendenhall Valley.  Surely parts of Anchorage like Fairview and Mountain View and the Muldoon area are economically and culturally different from Eagle River and from Upper Hillside or Campbell Lake that they need different representatives to insure their vote is able to elect legislators who can fight for their issues in the legislature. 

It seems that the court doesn't  forbid taking into account neighborhood differences, but rather it allows some pairings within a Borough that might not seem to be that compatible if there are no other ways to draw a district.  But I'm guessing here.  I've learned long ago that the law has hidden traps here and there.  But I'd just raise this point - that the Supreme Court explicitly recognize that what was the aspiration for Boroughs in 1961 is not necessarily true in 2022.  I think all the language about SEI in Hickel suggests recognition of that.  


*I wondered to what extent Alaska Natives' interests were considered in those early days.  I couldn't find anything that identified ethnicity of the legislature.  However, Wikipedia tells us:
In 1958 the first senate of the state of Alaska, unanimously elected Beltz president of the first senate of the state.  [Beltz was Inupiaq from Nome]

Sunday, January 30, 2022

Follow Up Making Sense of Redistricting Trial Post - "Socio-Economic Integration"

[NOTE:  This post is trying to dig a little deeper into the meaning and purpose of the redistricting criterion of 'socio-economically integrated.'  That takes me to some of the testimony on what SEI means, the Hickel decision, what Boroughs are.  It's a little behind the scenes of the trial.  And I'm rushing it out because tomorrow starts another day in court.  So excuse the typos and other errors and just focus on the basic points.  Thanks.]

 In Thursday's post, there were some issues I raised but didn't say much about at the time, but promised  I'd address them soon. Two - 

  • 4000 pop exchange between Fairbanks and Valdez into 36
  • Importance of hearing the wishes of Alaska Natives and understanding the cultures relationships, and differences 

I discussed a little further in the previous post on the four districts and two district clusters and how they're all intertwined.  

That leaves three more and I think the one on Socio-Economic Integration (SEI) is the most important given that that criterion is the hardest to prove, yet every one of the cases is based at least partially on it and the Valdez/Ma-Su cases are based heavily on it.  

Here's how I left it in the Thursday post:

Bahnke pretty much tells us that SEI (Socio-Economic Integration) is in the eye of the beholder SEI has been used to support and to challenge districting decisions by just about every party so far.  SEI is one of the Constitutional requirements for districts in Alaska.  One Supreme Court ruling concluded that everyone within a Borough boundary can be considered SEI.  That seems like a pretty broad conclusion.  The Fairview neighborhood (with a high level of diversity and relatively low income) is socio-economically integrated with the much whiter and wealthier hillside or other south Anchorage neighborhoods?   I don't think that's true. 

So, does that mean my interpretation of SEI is wrong?  Is merely different from the Supreme Court's?  Or that the decision of the court which is now 30 years old, is ready for a fresh look?  

First, what did Melanie Bahnke say on Thursday.  From my very imperfect notes.  The Board's attorney, Matt Singer, is following up on the questions from the previous attorney, Tanner Amdur-Clark (who is intervening on behalf of the Board) who had asked Bahnke the difference between issues that were statewide issues (ie everyone in Alaska no matter where they lived would agree on) such as salmon, by-catch, oil revenues, and whether these would count as SEI since everyone in Alaska would agree.  [That in itself is a big assumption.] And it by-passes the fact that Valdez' oil concerns are different from Mat-Su's.  But Bahnke agrees there are issues that are too generally held by most Alaskans to be used to assess SEI connections for redistricting.   Then we get this  

Bahnke: It was all relative to the part of the state we were looking at, do best we could without doing harm to other places.  May not live together, but live similarly.  Urban/rural;  subsistence, REAA [Regional Educational Attendance Area]  school district, cultures, customs, traditions.  Many factors going into this,  Short hand is live, work, and play together, but many factors that go into this.  

Singer:  Is it possible to come up with a utopian plan where everyone is in equal districts where everyone is happy?   

Since the definition of utopian is 

"having impossibly ideal conditions especially of social organization"

the answer to this question is clearly a 'No' and that's what Bahnke gives him. 

Bahnke:  No, we’re the biggest state geographically."

I'm not faulting Bahnke here.  In fact her answer is refreshingly candid.  While the attorneys kept asking "Do the people in X live, work, and play with the people in Y?"  Bahnke tells us that it's more complicated than that.  And as it gets more complicated and there isn't much guidance, then it sounds like it boils down to the opinions of the Board members.  

But it points out the problem of taking such vague concepts and trying to apply them.  Is there a better definition?


Attorneys refer frequently to The Hickel Decision in the trial.  When it comes to SEI we learned early in the redistricting process that the Hickel Decision says that inside a Borough, everyone is socio-economically integrated.  So I thought I should pull out that language from that case in 1992. [However this comes from a later case.]

From Justia Law - 2001 (Alaska) Redistricting Cases footnote 8

"[8] See In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d at 146 ("Anchorage is by definition socio-economically integrated."); see also Hickel v. Southeast Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 52 (Alaska 1992) ("[A] borough is by definition socio-economically integrated."); id. at 51 (quoting AS 29.05.031) ("By statute, a borough must have a population which `is interrelated and integrated as to its social, cultural, and economic activities.'")."

Let's backtrack a bit further to that statue about Boroughs:

"Section 29.05.031 - Incorporation of a borough or unified municipality

(a) An area that meets the following standards may incorporate as a home rule, first class, or second class borough, or as a unified municipality:

(1) the population of the area is interrelated and integrated as to its social, cultural, and economic activities, and is large and stable enough to support borough government;" 

This probably was true when Alaska established boroughs, but how long ago was that?  I did find  a document from the Local Boundary Commission  that suggests it was 1961:

To ostensibly carry out the constitutional mandate that the entire state be divided into boroughs, organized or unorganized, the 1961 Legislature enacted a law providing that all areas not within the boundaries of an organized borough constitute a single unorganized borough. (AS 29.03.010)

In 1960, the population was just over 200,000.  I would imagine that the writers of the Constitution envisioned that the interests of various boroughs were relatively unified.  Though I suspect they weren't taking in to account of the  interests of Alaska Native groups within the state.

In fact, that Local Boundary Commission (LBC) document which was written in 2004  raises this very question about the unorganized borough area in Alaska in a footnote.

"Most recently, the LBC recently expressed the view that the 1961 law creating the single residual unorganized borough, “disregarded the constitutional requirement that each borough must embrace an area of common interests.” , Local Boundary Commission and Department of Education and Early Development, School Consolidation: Public Policy Considerations and a Review of Opportunities for Consolidation, February 2004, p. 30."

They are saying the areas of Alaska in the unorganized borough did NOT have common interests.  

I dare say that most Alaskans who don't work with local governments have only the haziest notion of Boroughs.  Maybe they know 'it's like a county in other states.'  I myself wasn't sure how many boroughs Alaska has.  I did find this list and this map in a Local Government Primer put out by the Alaska Municipal League (can't find the date):  [The format is different in the original]

Alaska has 18 organized boroughs and a single unorganized borough. The organized boroughs are:

1. Aleutians East Borough
2. Bristol Bay Borough
3. City & Borough of Juneau 

4. City & Borough of Sitka
5. City & Borough of Wrangell

 6. City & Borough of Yakutat

7. Denali Borough
8. Fairbanks North Star Borough 9. Haines Borough

10. Kenai Peninsula Borough 

11. Ketchikan Gateway Borough 

12. Kodiak Island Borough


13. Lake & Peninsula Borough 

14. Matanuska-Susitna Borough 

15. Municipality of Anchorage 

16. Municipality of Skagway

17. North Slope Borough

18. Northwest Arctic Borough 19. Petersburg Borough

Source: DCCED

 

I'd note on January 26, Amdur-Clark asked Valdez expert witness Brace about whether he thought Valdez was in a Borough. Perhaps the Chugach Borough? (He and others also asked about whether you could drive from Cordova to Valdez - presumably to prove they weren't connected - and no one ever brought up the fact that while there is no road, the marine highway connects them, so technically, you can take your car from Cordova to Valdez.  That's a side issue but it does show the attorneys asking misleading questions.)

The point Amdur-Clark was suggestion, I'm guessing, is that perhaps Mat-Su going to Valdez was not breaking a borough boundary.  Or maybe that Cordova and Valdez are not in the same Borough. Or in any borough?  Or he was just setting Brace up for an Alaska gotcha.  From the map above, it does appear that Cordova and Valdez are in the unorganized Borough.  Brace responded that on the census maps they are in a borough.  Wikipedia says:

"Valdez–Cordova Census Area was a census area located in the state of Alaska, United States.[3] As of the 2010 census, the population was 9,636.[4] It was part of the Unorganized Borough and therefore has no borough seat. On January 2, 2019, it was abolished and replaced by the Chugach Census Area and the Copper River Census Area"

But back to my point about SEI and Boroughs.  Let's look at what the Supreme Court has said in more detail: 

From Hickel v Southeast Council 1992

"3. Socio-economic Integration.

In addition to preventing gerrymandering, the requirement that districts be composed of relatively integrated socio-economic areas helps to ensure that a voter is not denied his or her right to an equally powerful vote. 

[W]e should not lose sight of the fundamental principle involved in reapportionment truly representative government where the interests of the people are reflected in their elected legislators. Inherent in the concept of geographical legislative districts is a recognition that areas of a state differ economically, socially and culturally and that a truly representative government exists only when those areas of the state which share significant common interests are able to elect legislators representing those interests. Thus, the goal of reapportionment should not only be to achieve numerical equality but also to assure representation of those areas of the state having common interests."  [emphasis added]

 This was my point when I said (yesterday) that the most persuasive SEI argument that I've heard is from Valdez.  They point out that their interests in oil are different from Mat-Su's interest in oil.  Board members have argued this is a common interest between the two communities that have been put in the same district.  They say "Valdez has the pipeline and Mat-Su has oil workers."  Valdez responds, "Valdez people work on the pipeline and Mat-Su oil workers work on the slope."  Valdez also says that they get over 90% of their revenues from taxes on the pipeline and Mat-Su has other sources of revenue.  And most persuasive to me is that Mat-Su and Valdez are competitors on two major infrastructure projects where they compete for money from the state: on ports and on a competing natural gas pipeline corridors.

That seems to be the point that was being made in the Hickel decision:  

". . . a recognition that areas of a state differ economically, socially and culturally and that a truly representative government exists only when those areas of the state which share significant common interests are able to elect legislators representing those interests."

Valdez' key argument is that they don't share mutual significant common interests.  Most of the other arguments about SEI don't talk about how their interests need unified support from their legislators.  They are more about people feeling a district doesn't represent the neighborhood they self identify with, not how that would hurt them in the legislature.

But Valdez made that argument loud and clear:  If 76% of the voters in their district live in the suburbs of Palmer and Wasilla, then their representative is a) not going to be from Valdez  and b) not going to put Valdez' interests over Mat-Su's interests on key issues.

Truly, I don't have vested interests in Valdez.  I'm just pointing out what I see after all is said and done about socio-economic integration, the most logical arguments I've heard so far come from Valdez.  


There are two left over issues from the Thursday post:  


A lot of communication between the Board and the public was not on the record - Bahnke said that, Simpson said that, Torkelson said that, and we had the text message put on the record yesterday from Amdur-Clark to Borromeo and other emails.  Mostly they said there was just a lot of communication through conversations with the public and between Board members while traveling that ever got recorded.  Partly that's the tension between gathering enough information and documenting it.  For me the test is whether there were communications that were not documented or otherwise publicly acknowledged, that changed the outcome of the maps.  

^Reporting and the relationships you develop with your subjects - Another point I want to save for later, but it particularly relates to someone like me reporting on a governmental body over a long period of time - long enough to develop at least a professional relationship and getting to know people as more than just a role on a Board.  It's particularly apt today because of  my comments about Peter Torkelson.  This one can probably wait until after the trial is over.


I'll address these later.  Probably the last one after this part of the trial is over.   Tomorrow is more Calista.  


Wednesday, January 19, 2022

AK Redistricting Pre-Trial Hearing - Board Strategy Is Clear And Working

Another 90 minutes or so of five plaintiffs, an intervenor, a defendant, and a judge wrangling over the rules, less than two days before the trial begins.  [NOTE:  My quotes from the hearing are based on my faulty fingers trying to keep up with the speakers and don't represent verbatim quotes, but do give a sense of what was argued.]

Biggest news:  The Supreme Court overturned Judge Matthews' denial of the Board's request for a stay in turning over the emails between the Board members and their attorney.  Matthews had granted the Anchorage plaintiffs' request that Matthews review the documents to determine if they really have legitimate attorney-client privilege content.  The Board's attorney had asked for a stay and Matthews had rejected that request because the trial is so near and the plaintiffs don't have much time left.  Singer, the Board's attorney had agreed to deliver to the court a thumb drive with the documents after the judge promised that he wouldn't look at them if the Supreme Court ordered a stay.  Then a little later, during the meeting, they did.   Both Singer and Matthews said they expect a decision tomorrow.  

Observation:  It's gotten clearer and clearer that the Board's attorney's strategy has been to keep the plaintiffs from getting the information that they need.  The plaintiffs have been asking for these emails for a month now and when they are finally delivered to the judge the Supreme Court puts a stay on them.  Even if the Supreme Court lifts the stay and agrees with the judge's order, it's getting a little late for the plaintiffs to use the information.  The Anchorage part of the trial (over the Eagle River Senate pairings) will be Friday.  Aside from everything else the judge has to do in preparation, he may also have to read the emails - though they've been narrowed down to around 200 specific ones.  And then decide which to release.  And then get them to the attorneys.  

From what I understand of the discussion today and previous hearings, Singer has limited what information the plaintiffs' attorneys could get from the Board members.  He's done this through offering affidavits from the Board members in response to some of the attorneys.  Others have been able to get depositions.  Affidavits are where the witness writes up a statement.  I've read several that are posted for this trial.  They say very little.  In other cases, where there were depositions, Singer has told the Board members to refuse to answer many of the questions based on Attorney-Client privilege.  Last week when Holly Wells, the attorney for the Anchorage plaintiffs, raised this point while arguing that the attorney-client privilege claims were too broad, Singer said that they could ask the question in court and the judge would decide if they should answer the questions.  

But today he protested those same attorneys wanting to question the Board members.  From my notes: 

"Plaintiffs are trying to amend the process at the last minute before the trial.  It was very clear.  No one has right to do direct testimony.  We get the same right as any other party about who to call and defend these cases.  These folks have jobs and other commitments.  Changing the rules of the game 24 hours before the trial.  They asked for 5 separate trials and now they want a free for all for any lawyer asking questions at any case."

There's a lot packed into that.  First there's the bravado.  Singer is good at that.  It wasn't apparent at the Board meetings, but he throws out claims like "changing the rules at the last minute" with ease.  He made that point several times.  Let's try to unpack that a bit.  

1.  Direct Testimony at trial. "No one has a right to do direct testimony."  Yes, but no.  They had agreed that direct testimony would be through the depositions and affidavits in the discovery phase and in the courtroom, they would do cross exams.  To that end all the depositions and affidavits are on the record.  But Wells had argued that when she deposed Board members, Singer advised them not to answer because of attorney-client privilege.  She said that she'd agreed to only cross exams in the trial before she did the depositions and found out that they would not answer - so she has to do direct questioning in the trial because there isn't any basis for cross exams.  
Singer: I acknowledge, none of those witnesses have anything against that case   Ms. Wells has their affidavits.  I have no obligations to provide those witnesses.  We decided on which board member to offer for which case.
Wells:  Our position is intact. A board makes decisions as a Board, they did submit affidavits and goes to their ????
Singer:  Opportunity to do direct - that’s inconsistent from pre-trial from day one.  Solution - eight/nine hours of deposition from Borromeo.  That’s the way to present testimony.  Budd Simpson will be here Friday.  He’s offered on this.  [NOTE: Yes, Borromeo has lots of deposition time, but it's for the Valdez and Mat-Su cases that she worked on and agrees with the Board decision and not the Anchorage case on which she strongly disagreed with the Board majority.]
Wells:  All Board members are on our witness list and stay in the confines of the affidavit they submitted.  

And a little later

"Singer:  Plaintiffs trying to amend the process at the last minute before the trial.  It was very clear.  No one has right to do direct testimony.  We get same right as any other party  - who to call and defend these cases."  

Singer has done a good job of blocking the plaintiffs from getting the information they need.  Transcripts of Board meeting last November only showed up last week.  He's also claimed a very broad attorney-client privilege right to keep the plaintiffs from getting testimony. [I've discussed attorney-client privilege at more length in the last two posts - here and here.]  

At a previous hearing Wells complained that there was no direct testimony to cross examine because Singer had the Board members refuse to answer based on attorney-client privilege.  Then, Singer said something like, "You can ask your questions at the trial and the judge can decide if something is privileged or not."  Now he seems to have conveniently forgotten that offer.  But Judge Matthews didn't forget and raised that and said that's how it will go.  

In addition the transcripts from the Board meetings are part of the record and Board member Borromeo said then that the decision was unconstitutional and she couldn't wait to be deposed.  I guess Wells can ask her what she meant by that.  

The judge allowed that he'd call it as it comes along.   

2.  Trial Order.  Brenna had said that he thought they'd change the order of the cases when he (the Valdez case) and Mat-Su agreed to combine their cases since Mat-Su is complaining that Valdez is in one of their districts and Valdez is complaining that they were paired with Mat-Su.  But no one else except Mat-Su's attorney had that understanding - that they would go last.  I'm guessing that Valdez and Mat-Su, meeting together to discuss how to work jointly, agreed, but failed to adequately inform the others and get it approved.  In the end they agreed to the original order:
1.  East Anchorage case (the same thing I keep calling the Anchorage case)
2.  Mat-Su
3. Valdez
4. Intervenors - intervening on behalf of the Board 
5. Calista
6. Skagawy

3.  Separation of cases and whether attorneys can cross examine witnesses for the other cases.There was some squabble by Singer over comments by plaintiffs' attorneys saying they may want to question Board members as they come up as witnesses in other parts of the trial.  
"Singer: These folks [Board members and other witnesses] have jobs and other commitments.  Now we're changing the rules of the game 24 hours before the trial.  They asked for 5 separate trials and now they want a free for all for any lawyer asking questions at any case."

There were five separate cases filed against the Board.  The court consolidated all five cases into one case.  And they agreed early on that instead of one big case - which might be hard to organize and would leave a confusing record for the Supreme Court - it would be easier to try each case one by one.  The judge allotted two days for each case - one day for the plaintiffs and one for the defense. 

Then they further agreed since the Mat-Su and Valdez cases were about the same issues and would have the same witnesses giving the same testimony, to combine them, the judge allowing the two attorneys to work out how they would schedule.  

 In response to Singer's free-for-all comment Wells said:

"This is still a consolidated case, Pretrial clear.  This is one case with evidence taken at several times.  Not five distinct trials with distinct findings.  Much more important that case remains consolidated.  We will rely on the whole case for final argument.  I want that distinction to be clear."

Judge Matthews, after listening a while, said that things would be fluid.  

"Matthews:  A touchy subject for everyone.  Court’s function is to make the best possible decisions I can.  You all are shaping the testimony.  I’ve been given a hybrid case - but it may well be I’m listening to witnesses and if I don’t hear an answer to a question I need, I’ll ask that question.  If affidavits of Board members weren’t available before  Plaintiffs were allowed to get affidavit from Board members. . .  Plaintiffs have listed some or all of the Board members as witnesses.  These witnesses are important to the decision the court has to make.  I’m going to hone in on Bahnke and Borromeo, and I won’t stop cross even if there is no direct testimony.  Second question with privilege assertion - if there are questions that weren’t allowed at the time, if the Supreme Court allows it, I’ll allow the questions."

4.  Time 

As people were asked about how much time they would need, it sounded like they thought the trial would take less time than anticipated. Singer said he didn't plan to spend much time cross examining  the Anchorage lay witnesses, but more time - perhaps an hour or so for the expert witness.  And Wells seemed to think she could do things in half a day and so the Anchorage trial would be over in one day, not two.  That even led to a request to start on Monday, but the judge resisted, saying witnesses already had travel plans and there was also concern about it getting tight on the other end. But this was a heads up that the trial could shorter.  


Final Thoughts

Essentially, Matt Singer, the Board's attorney, has been arguing about process and procedure. He's the defense attorney and he's been defensive.  He's been doing a lot of blocking 

He's acted confident in the way he spoke that there was no other correct position than his own on attorney-client privilege.  He called the plaintiffs' arguments 'laughable.'  He's stalled in getting the transcripts from the November board meetings to the plaintiff's attorneys.  He's used attorney-client privilege to block Board members from saying much in some depositions. The plaintiffs' attorneys didn't have the Board meeting transcripts or the affidavits when the deposed Board members and other witnesses.  He's blamed the transcription service for some of the delays.  He's blamed all the paperwork he needs to get into the court for other delays.  And, that point has some merit.  He's got five separate attorneys filing requests and motions and he has to respond to them all.  But in his firm's proposal to be the attorney for the Board, they talked about all the lawyers who would be available to back him up.

In a normal two party court case, there would be two lawyers duking it out of these rules.  But here, when one is finished, another jumps in, and then another.  

The most focused and on-point attorney appears to me to be Holly Wells, the attorney for the Anchorage plaintiffs.  She keeps her comments short and to the point and cites relevant laws succinctly.  Robin Brena, the attorney for both the Valdez and Skagway cases, is a bit talkative, but he does make important points.  The other attorneys have said much less.  

Thursday, December 02, 2021

Some First Quick Thoughts On The Matsu Suit Against The Redistricting Board's Plan

Tthe first suit against the Alaska Redistricting Proclamation Plan has been filed.  By Matsu.  Back in September when all the alternative plans came in, there was one from Matsu.  But when I asked about it, the Board's Executive Director told me 

"The one wrinkle that has emerged is that Mat-Su and AFFER’s plans appear to be identical."

I assumed that's why we never saw that map again.  But I can't find it on the Board's map page, so I can't compare.  AFFER is the group that Randy Ruedrich makes maps for - a very Republican leaning group.

Anyway13. According to the 2020 United States census, Alaska had a population of 733,391 residents, an increase of 23,160 residents. The MSB had a population of 107,081, an increase of 18,086 residents, representing 78 percent of the statewide population growth. 

 the Alaska Landmine put up a link to the suit.  

A quick perusal suggests two major grievances:

  1. Getting paired with Valdez in one district
  2. Being overpopulated

AFFER made a big deal about keeping district deviations low.  But as I looked at the suit, I found these statements surprising:

13. According to the 2020 United States census, Alaska had a population of 733,391 residents, an increase of 23,160 residents. The MSB had a population of 107,081, an increase of 18,086 residents, representing 78 percent of the statewide population growth. 

30. Every House District within the MSB (25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30) exceeds the quotient for the ideal House District. Combined, the total overpopulation of the districts is 13.75 percent. This represents the most significant deviation of any geographic area in the State of Alaska as proposed in the Final Plan. 

31. Comparing the MSB to Anchorage, Anchorage has 18 House Districts included in the Final Plan, of those 18 only two are overpopulated, thus the Anchorage House Districts are underpopulated by 10.02 percent. 



They seem to be monkeying around with percentages to make the Matsu grievances seem terrible.

In 13) they tell us that Matsu had 78% of the growth in the state.  OK, so what difference does that make?  That was, in people, not percentages,18,086.  That's about 269 people under one new ideal House  district.  And Matsu got  a new district..  

In 30)  they again play with percentages.  This looks so obvious that I'm wondering if I'm missing something.  You can't add up percentages to get the cumulative percentage.   Lots of people make this kind of mistake apparently.
"The common error is taking the percentages at face value and adding them together to get the overall percentage change."

Each of these percentages represents district deviation / total district population.

So you have to add up the numbers, not the percentages.  First add the number of people over or under the ideal district size for each district.  Then divide that number by the ideal district size (18335) * 6 (districts)..  Then you do the math to get the percentage of the six districts altogether.   

If you add the number of people above the ideal number (18,335) of people per district, it comes to 2520.  
If you divide that 2520 by the whole population of the Matsu's six districts which they tell us is 107,081 (2520/107,081) the Matsu area is over populated by 2.4%, not 13.75%.  I know Randy Ruedrich is smarter than that, so someone else must have done it, or he must think that the judges would be fooled.  No, he's smarter than that too.  So who did the math

I did not go through all the Anchorage districts to add all the numbers, but the same rule of math applies - you can't add the percentages, you have to add the numbers for each district and then divide the sum, by the total ideal population of all the districts.  

But look again.  They say that Anchorage has 18 House seats.  Throughout this process everyone has always said that Anchorage has 16 House seats.  And when I look at the final map of Anchorage I can only count 15 seats, because the 16th, District 24,  is north, off the map.

That's just a quick look.  These are pretty glaring errors that may torpedo this challenge.  

I do think that fact that Matsu altogether is overpopulated is a legitimate issue.  In urban areas, the deviations should really be about 1% or less  But only tiny parts of Matsu could be considered mini-urban areas.  The rest is more rural, so higher deviations are more acceptable because the population is so scattered.

And pairing Valdez with Matsu is also a potential problem. But finding the right place to put Valdez is hard, because you have to keep the deviations down.  

The issue of taking just Cantwell out of the rest of the Denali Borough is also a reasonable complaint.  The Board did this, as I recall, to include it with other Ahtna region villages.  

The argument that some people made at public hearings - that Matsu is the fastest growing part of the state, so it should be underpopulated to allow for growth - goes against the basic rule of redistricting.  That rule is that the numbers you use are the Census data numbers you are given.  Not some future expectation.  Who know for sure that Matsu will continue to grow into the future?  It has grown in the last two decades and may again.  But it may not.  While the suit points out Matsu's large population increase, I didn't see them making this argument.  

I'm waiting for someone to tell me I'm wrong.   These errors seem way too basic.   It would be embarrassing to be wrong about my math when criticizing someone else's math.  But I do acknowledge that possibility.   I must be missing something.  I have a toothache, so maybe it's messing with my mind.  

Friday, November 26, 2021

Redistricting Board Allocation of Terms: "2022, 2024, 2026 ?? Something like that"

This post is a followup to a previous post on the impact of the Alaska Redistricting Board's decision on allocating senate terms to staggered cycles (it favored Dunleavy loyalists and punished GOP who worked with Democrats.).  This post looks at the vague and sloppy motion that passed to make it happen.  


KEY POINTS IN THIS POST

  1. The motion to Allocate Senate Terms was so sloppy and so vague that it's impossible for anyone implementing it to not make their own assumptions about what it means.  The member who made the motion never really articulated how it was supposed to work.  No one seems to have written it down.  The chair didn't really repeat the motion - such that it was - before the vote.  This seems to violate basic procedures required of Boards and Commissions to have  the most basic standards of documentation when making public decisions.  Every legislative bill has to be clearly spelled out and written down.  The Redistricting Board's decisions are arguably far more impactful than most legislation passed in the Alaska Legislature and should be handled with the same care.  What the Proclamation itself and the Proclamation Report show are neat sets of 2022 and 2024 senate seats, but this doesn't at all reflect what is really scheduled - that 19 of the senate seats will run in 2022.  
  2. It would appear that the staff had spoken off the record with the people who made the motion. Whether it was just when the Board was not on public record or in Executive Session is not clear.  In any case, this also raises questions about what was actually considered during the lengthy Executive Sessions prior to the board's voting on an Allocation Plan, and whether the Board's use of Executive Session was in violation of the statutes on Executive Session.  The session was supposed to be about the VRA (Voting Rights Act) and how the Eagle River pairings might be affected, so it shouldn't have spilled over into Allocation of Terms.  But how did staff know how to interpret the motion?  Why did Marcum ask the Executive Director, while making the motion,  "Is that how we say it, Peter?"
  3. The Alaska Constitution says senators serve four year terms. Because truncation messes the required staggered terms, redistricting boards have resorted to assigning two year terms to get the cycle back in order.  But this should be rare.  In this round two senators were given TWO, two year terms.   The Board shouldn't have the power to make a senator have two, two year terms if there is an available option to avoid that.  The Executive Director clearly said they can't extend the term to six years.  Then why can they cut it down to two years, twice, in some cases?  When there are two two year terms for one or more senator, the board should be required to make adjustments to avoid this.

INTRODUCTION

I've mentioned in previous posts that I'm struggling to keep my head above the details of the last couple of days the Redistricting Board process.  Up to the last week or so, I'd say the Board was run well.  Things were mostly transparent, there was plenty of opportunity for public input, the meetings were accessible often via video conferencing and always by phone, and the Board has posted video of meetings and all the public testimony.  The last three days leading to the Proclamation, though, things fell apart.  The three GOP-appointed members stopped engaging in meaningful discussion with the other two members (except on Truncation which didn't have any apparent serious political implications.)

I've been trying to write posts that give readers not only the facts, but the context of the facts.  But in order to get something posted, I find I have to focus very narrowly here so that all the details aren't  overwhelming.  There are plenty of previous posts to get some context.  They are indexed on a tab above, under the blog banner.

My criterion now for narrowing my focus is: would this possibly make a difference when there are court challenges to the Board's Proclamation Plan?  That's the arena where the rest of this process will be played out.  Everything else, at this point, seems moot.  Later there may be time to reflect on what the 2030 board should learn from this board - both to copy and to avoid.  

In this post, I'm focusing on the motion to allocate senate seats to alternating terms.  The state constitution requires ten seats must run in one election year and the other ten the next election year.  This intended result, as I understand it, is that at least half of the Senate has some experience.  One of the Board's duties is to allocate the seats to these staggered terms. 

A previous post AK Redistricting Board GOP Members Use Allocation To Punish Moderate Republicans showed the partisan outcome of this process and gave some basic background information for readers.  For readers who haven't seen that post, I'd recommend it strongly so you understand why this is important.

Why might the Board's decision making process make a difference in court?  Like all decision making public bodies, the Board is required to follow basic procedures of documentation when passing motions. The public should understand what the motion is and how it will be carried out.  I'm arguing in this post that the motion that passed 3-2 at the November 9, 2021 Board meeting did not meet that standard.  It was sloppy, vague, and even the person who proposed the motion didn't clearly understand her motion.  With such a motion, the staff is left to interpret it their own way.  I think the staff did the best they could, but they had a motion that really, on its own, was extremely vague.  If the staff 'knew' what it meant, it wasn't because of the motion; it was because the staff already had an idea of how this was supposed to work, or because of discussions that were held outside of public view.  And let me emphasize that all my dealings with the staff were good - they were very responsive and helpful and forthcoming.  But they serve the Board members.


THE PROCESS AND MOTION FOR DECIDING ON ALLOCATION OF SENATE TERMS

I want to start here by offering you my transcript of the motion to allocate senate terms to election year cycles.  [The words on the tape aren't always easy to hear. People are wearing masks, don't have individual mics, etc. ?? indicates something was said but I didn't catch it. Mostly those don't seem to be important to the overall text.  I think this fairly represents what was said.  You can watch and listen to the tape yourself here. I'd note the timing numbers on the video are not always exactly the same.]

[5:12:04]

Binkley: Bethany did you have a motion?

Marcum:  I propose we go in simple numerical logical order, starting with A 2 years 4 years 2 years cycle like that.??  Is that how we say it Peter? 2 years 4 years 2022, 2024?  I

Binkley:  So it would be 2022

Marcum:  The cycles do not work??  The link to the cycle ???

Binkley:  It’s the year. . .

Torkelson:  It’s the year in which the election was held.

Marcum:  2022  2024  2026  ??? something like that.

Binkley:  Does everybody understand the motion, Uh, is there a second?

Simpson:  I’ll second it.

5:10:57 Binkley:  Is there discussion on the motion?  Does everybody understand the motion? Is there any objection to the motion?

Bahnke and Borromeo?? I object

Binkley:  All those in favor of the motion?

Ayes.

Binkley: All those opposed same sign.

Ayes.

Binkley:  Looks like two opposed, three in favor.  The motion passed.  Peter, what’s our next task?


Do you - the reader - understand the motion?  And what exactly it tells the staff to do in terms of allocating seats to one cycle or the other?  What does "A 2 years, 4 years 2 year cycles, something like that" mean?  That seat A serves for two years and seat B serves for four years?  All Senate seats are supposed to be four year terms.  Because the truncation likely will interrupt that ten/ten alternating cycle, some seats may end up with a two year term, but they aren't assigning seats to two and four year seats.  They are assigning seats to years to start their cycle.  

Even the motion maker - Bethany Marcum - isn't sure.  She says, "Is that how we say it, Peter?" [Peter Torkelson is the Executive Director of the Board - the staff person in charge of overseeing everything the Board needs done.]  Then she says: "2022, 2024, 2026 ??? Something like that."

"Something like that" doesn't make for a very clear motion.  Not a motion that's acceptable for a Board with as impactful a mission as this one has  No one seemed to write the motion down.  The chair doesn't restate the motion.  

One of the problems here is that 19 of the 20 seats are up for election in 2022, so how can the cycle begin in 2022?  To maintain staggered seats, some will have to run again in 2024 and others in 2026.  

Here's what the staff wrote about this in the Proclamation Report (p.7):

"The Board then considered setting Senate term allocations and adopted a pattern of alternating election terms for the coming decade.  Seats A,C, E, G, I, K, M, O, Q, S standing for election in 2022/2026/2030 and Seats B,D,F, H, J, L, N.P, R, and T standing for election in 2024/2028/2032 in keeping with Alaska’s constitutional requirement for alternating 4 year Senate terms.”

But this isn't quite right, because every seat except T under this plan will stand for election in 2022.  What the Board has actually done is start the allocation of terms process in 2024.  Nine of the ten seats listed as starting in 2024 are actually scheduled to run in 2022.  The actual plan doesn't seem to follow the motion, but then, the motion would be hard to follow the way it was stated.

The Proclamation itself tells us which seats were truncated, but does explain what that means.

Second, that the terms of Senate incumbents – B, D, F, H, J, and N under the 2013 Redistricting Proclamation labeling system be truncated because those Senate Districts have been substantially changed by this Redistricting Proclamation, and that the term of the incumbent of Senate District T, not be truncated because that Senate District is substantially unchanged; and
Page 1 of 2
  Then on the next page we have this chart that shows the cycles.



This chart implies that all those running in 2022 run again in 2026.  Not true.  This chart misses the fact that all the seats but seat T in the right hand column run for election in 2022.  

The allocations should have been for years 2024 and 2026.  That's when the differences between seats actually matter.  This list doesn't reflect what's actually happening.  

But no one ever said this. What they DID talk about was: “running in 2022 or 2024”;  “two year terms or four year terms”; “alternating years starting at Seat A or Seat T”; and  "avoiding appearance of partisanship by flipping a coin to determine if they would start at Seat A or Seat B."   

But they didn’t talk about when those terms would begin.  At one point in the excerpt, Peter Torkelson says, " It’s the year in which the election was held."  Why does he use the past tense?  That makes sense if he's talking about the last time the seat was up for election - 2018 or 2020 - but no one ever talked about that in regard to this motion.  

The lack of understanding of how exactly this was going to be carried out was made clear by Budd Simpson when he asked if the Board could extend a term to six years.  He asked this about a previous motion made by Borromeo to alternate terms starting with 2024 for seat A. [As opposed to Marcum's later successful motion starting with 2022 (or 2-year) starting for seat A.]  He was pretty sure the Board couldn't extend terms, but the question shows he didn't understand how this process was going to be carried out.  Or it was just his way to objecting to Borromeo's proposal.
"Nicole:  The motion on the floor is that we start with A and that is on the 2024 cycle.  

Binkley:  OK, the motion before us is:  We start with A on the 2024 motion [sic].  All those in favor of the motion say Aye. All those opposed
Simpson: ???? That seat is currently on the 2022 cycle…..So that would be??   It’s already on the 2022.  That is somehow it is extending that seat.  It’s already on the 22.  
Binkley:  We don’t know? what the rotation is
Simpson: There’s kind of a 50/50 chance.  I’m just saying that that seat is currently on the 2022 cycle and I don’t think we have the power to extend it to the 24 cycle. That kind of throws [5:09:40] everything off doesn’t it?

There are a number of problems here.  The first one, that he knows who is in Seat A, causes Melanie Bahnke to ask about what information he and Binkley had that she didn't have because she doesn't know who is in that seat.  It also is in direct conflict with what he has said previously in the discussion, that he doesn't know who anyone on the list is.  

But if it is true that a seat, who's term is up in 2022, would be extended to six years for Borromeo's motion (to start with Seat A and assign that to 2024), then it would be true for some other seats in Marcum's plan, soon to be approved, which starts with seat A with (and it's not clear because she said both 2-4-2- years and 2022-2024. ) 

But as I check again the 2021 Senate Term Allocation Table, Seat A's previous election is listed as 2020, so the term was actually up in 2024 anyway.  So Simpson was wrong.  (The Term Allocation Table hadn't been prepared yet, so Simpson wasn't consulting it.) So it was used as an argument against Borromeo's motion, but it wasn't true.  So it would have been useful if Bahnke could have seen, as she requested, what he was referring to, in order to verify what he was saying.

There are a number of issues here, but my point is that he didn't understand how the allocations in Borromeo's motion would be carried out if he thought one or more seats might be extended to six year terms by the process. (He rightly didn't think they could extend a term to six years.) He didn't understand that 19 seats would be up for reelection in 2022 and that the allocation of terms would really begin with 2024 and 2026, not 2022 and 2024.  (I'd note that at that point Board members didn't know that 19 seats would be up for election in 2022, because the Allocation of Terms process itself would add some more to the list.  But there had to be at least ten running in 2022 based on the old rotation cycles, plus they added some more through Truncation.)

The Point?  That the Board members really didn't understand the motion and how this was going to play out when it was implemented.  I'm convinced as I've said in the previous post on this, that the GOP-appointed members had been given an assignment to pass a certain package.  They didn't quite grasp all the implications, only that they needed to pass it.  

They did not really understand the motion.  And if they didn't, how could the public? 

So, just how did the staff members figure out how to carry out the motion?  Was it discussed during the Executive Session?  Probably not - it was too off topic even for them.  During a break in the Executive Session?  Possibly.  But probably during the work session or another break.  Just not on the record.  


WHY IS NOT KNOWING WHAT THE MOTION IS, A PROBLEM?


Because every governmental body that makes official decisions is required to use standard procedures, whether Robert's Rules of Order or a similar set of rules so that all decisions made are clear, unambiguous, and understandable.  

Here's a link to guidelines for Alaska State Boards and Commissions - for ethics and for open meetings.  I'm sure there are other sources of guidance for Boards.  The last pages of that document is titled:  

Handout 4- Ground Rules for Good Meetings 

Ground Rules for Successful Meetings

One ground rule that is directly relevant to the motion for Allocating Terms is number 4:

  1. "4)  Re-state the motion and clarify amendments. This is a simple way for the Chair to be sure that everyone on the team is on the same page as you move through the process. It also gives support staff the opportunity to clarify the language or intent if needed. As a member of the board/commission, don’t hesitate to ask for clarification if you are unsure."

Another section reminds Board members:

"Most important, the consistent use of Robert’s Rules by the appointed members of Alaska’s boards and commissions builds the public’s trust and reflects positively on all involved."

[UPDATED Nov. 26, 2021 7:38pm - From Robert's Rules of Order for Dummies:

The member states the motion.

Offer your motion concisely (and with only minimal advance comment, if any at all) by saying, “Mr. Chairman, I move that. . . .”

"For all but the simplest original main motions, write out the motion ahead of time and be prepared to immediately submit the written motion to the chair or the secretary after making the motion. "

This was hardly the simplest of motions.] 

This is a fundamental given of all meetings where decisions that affect people are made.  John Binkley served in both the State House and State Senate. Phrases like "Is there a motion?" or "All opposed?" slip easily off his tongue.  So should clarifying the motion.  The state legislature has very precise rules for the wording of bills (p.17), for instance.  He did ask Board members if they understood the motion, but that's not enough.  This was a very flakey motion.  "Is that how we say it Peter?" and "2022  2024  2026  ??? something like that."  Even the person making the motion couldn't state the motion.  

But no one, not those favoring the motion, nor those opposing it, actually pointed out how vague and confused the motion was.  I suspect, perhaps, that different Board members thought they understood the motion, and those understandings were not the same.  

In fact, I suspect that, right after the motion was passed, the Board members had been asked, separately, to write down the motion, they all would have written down something substantively different.

And if they had been asked, again, separately, to write down instructions for the staff on how to carry out the motion, they would have all written something different.  

And without a clear motion that clearly spells out how the task of allocation is to be carried out, I don't see how the allocation process can be valid.  



PROBABLE ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE SESSION

The Board went into Executive Session around 5pm on Monday, November 8 and based on my blog posts that day, they were still in Executive Session around 7:45pm, because when I got home, I turned on the ZOOM and it was still running with a sign that said "Executive Session."  That continued the morning of November 9 until 10:35am.  

They came back into public view for about 20 minutes to pass Bethany Marcum's Senate pairings that split the Eagle River house districts and attached each one to other House districts giving Eagle River two Senate seats.  There was also a new map that changed the rest of the Anchorage Senate pairings. Then the Board adjourned until 1pm to allow the staff to work on calculations needed for the Truncation process.  

The public is still in the dark about what happened in the Executive Session and how the Bethany Marcum Anchorage Senate pairings got discussed.  Two of the Board members had serious objections.  

The same documents I linked to above with guidance  for Boards and Commissions includes material on Open Meetings and Executive Sessions.  Alaska's statue on Executive Session leans heavily toward openness.  

"Executive session procedure requires that the reason for calling the executive session is clearly stated. The attorney-client privilege exemption to the Open Meetings Act is limited to matters where public interest may be injured. This might include how to avoid legal liability, litigation strategies and candid discussion of facts, a proposed settlement conference, and a conference on a decision to appeal." [emphasis added]

It seemed to me that the Board did not carefully weigh whether the matters they were to discuss in Executive Session would "injure public interest" if they were in public.  They have assumed throughout this process that whenever they were talking to the attorney, they were covered by attorney-client privilege, although the statute says 'might.'  

I'd argue that the attorney telling the Board his interpretation of the Voting Rights Act was something the public should have been able to hear.  At that point, there were no cases against the Board.  And to my knowledge, none have yet been filed.  If the attorney's interpretation of the VRA was an unusual one, or aimed at supporting what the Board wanted to do, the public ought to know.  The rationale that the Board is discussing legal strategy in case the Board is sued and thus should be covered by ES is also questionable.  Indeed, "the public interest may be injured" by the Proclamation Plan of the Board and thus it would be in the interest of the public to have this information public.  This is not a situation where the Board wants to keep secret what they are willing to accept in a potential settlement.  This is not a discussion that might cause a defendant in a law case with the Board to know in advance what kind of deal the Board is willing to make.  This is advice to defend the Board's plan.  We already know that the pairing of Eagle River districts was in defiance of the overwhelming public testimony against that pairing.  And my previous post on Allocation of Terms shows that the Allocation process resulted in punishing Governor Dunleavy's Republican 'enemies' and rewarding his loyal Republican allies. These are partisan political moves that harm the public interest.  

And we don't know if in Executive Session the Board discussed other related but not ES covered topics, like Marcum's Allocation proposal that led her to ask:  "Is that how we say it Peter?"

While the Board is in Executive Session, they may only discuss the narrow topics that they went into  ES for and nothing else.  Their reason for going into ES was very broad - to give the Board advice on how the Voting Rights Act would be affected by Marcum's plan for Eagle River.  They appear to have been in ES for roughly four hours.  It's hard to believe that everything they discussed had to be hidden  to keep the public interest from being injured.  But I wasn't in the meeting,  And it was Borromeo who called for ES.  


UNNECESSARILY GIVING SENATORS TWO YEAR TERMS

When Budd Simpson raised the issue of adding two years to a Senator's term to make it six years, Board Executive Director Peter Torkelson said "You do not have the power to  extend a term from four years to six years."  But they do have the power to shorten a term from four years to two years because of truncation and allocation of terms. But it seems that this power should be used only where there is no possible way to avoid it.  The process previous boards have used and that was copied by this board, to just alternate starting election years alphabetically through the Senate seats A through T is a process that seems to make it more likely that more seats will be shortened.  

But should they have the power to give a senator TWO two year terms?  Under this plan two Senators get two, two year terms.  Senators Wilson and Wielechowski ran last in 2020.  Truncation requires them to run again in 2022.  And term allocation requires them to run again in 2024.  Two, two year terms, when the state constitution stipulates a senate seat is four year. 

In such situations, if there were a way to make adjustments to the plan to eliminate the two, two year   situation yet keep everything in compliance with the guidelines for truncation and allocation of terms, shouldn't the Board then have to go back and try to make adjustments?  After all, Peter said, "You do not have the power to  extend a term from four years to six years."  Why should they have the power to shrink a senator's term to two years, twice?  The constitution say four years. 

In Wielochowski's case, he's been cut short first by truncation.  But his district had a 24.5% constituency change.  That's well within the limit of 30% maximum change given the Board by their attorney based on past Alaska Supreme Court decisions.  In fact, Budd Simpson had proposed cutting it off at 25%, which would have left Wielechowski untruncated.  If Wielechoski were not truncated, he would fall in the same category as seat T.  He'd run next in 2024 (when his term expires) and he'd already be on the right cycle. I'd note that setting the cutoff at 25% would also "untruncate" two more seats - Sen. Myers (21.7%) and Sen. Begich (16.3%).  

Wilson's district was changed too much to escape Truncation. But Wilson's cycle (2024) could be swapped with someone who is already being moved to a 2026 cycle.  Say, give Sen. Stevens (who is not truncated) Wilson's 2024 year cycle, when he would normally run next  and Wilson takes Steven's 2026 cycle.  

Why shouldn't the Board be instructed to go back and make alterations, if possible, to prevent them from forcing a Senator to have two, two year terms?  I understand that the Board did Truncation without knowing exactly which seats were being truncated.  But in the end if the Board sees that their anonymous truncation and allocation decision results in forcing a senator to have two, two year terms, shouldn't they be able, even required,  to go back and see if they can adjust things so that the senator's normal four year term is only shortened once?  If as Peter said, they don't have the power to make a senator's term six years, why do they have the power to unnecessarily shorten a senator's term twice?

To my knowledge, these double two year terms have been part of the redistricting process from early on and no one has challenged it, but it seems like an issue that should be presented before the Supreme Court.  Is it better to have truncation at 16.3% and above and force a senator to have two two year terms, when a higher cutoff level - which is comfortably below the 30% threshold the Court has previously said was OK - is easy to do?  I think not.  The Constitution's requirement of four year senate seats shouldn't be violated so easily.



Note to readers:  I've been writing this post for over a week.  

First, the writing and then double checking the video to ensure I'm accurate is helpful for me to better understand what happened.  But as I find new wrinkles, I end up searching the internet to fill in new missing details. And the post starts to bulge in a different direction.  

But a key goal here is to bring light on the process and share anything that might be useful to attorneys challenging the Board's Proclamation Plan so that, whatever the outcome, the Supreme Court will have had a chance to review all the relevant issues.   

Second, this is all so full of details and nuances, that it's hard to write without forcing readers to go into all those details with me, something I know most readers won't do. Just having a label for what I'm writing about is difficult.  What the hell does "Allocation of Terms" mean? Nothing to someone not paying close attention to the redistricting process. But finding clearer labels like  "Assigning Senate seats to staggered terms" is almost as opaque and way too long. There are lots of examples of that kind of problem

That's why I have now narrowed this to issues that might have bearing on the Superior and Supreme Courts' decisions.  Imagine - this is the narrowed down version.  There is more that I have edited out, than I'm leaving in.  I hope to look at a few more issues in the next few days.  Like the constitutional requirements for those choosing Redistricting Board members with out consideration of politi