Haven't had time to read the whole thing - it's very long - but I thought reviewing Justice Samuel Alito's confirmation hearing might offer us some insight. Unfortunately, it's another sunny day and Alaska is calling loudly. So I offer you this short bit where the committee chair Sen. Arlen Specter questions Alito:
Chairman SPECTER. Judge Alito, the commentators have characterized Casey as a super precedent. Judge Luttig, in the case of Richmond Medical Center, called the Casey decision super stare decisis. In quoting from Casey, Judge Luttig pointed out, the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again re- affirmed. Then in support of Judge Luttig’s conclusion that Casey was super stare decisis, he refers to Stenberg v. Carhart, and quotes the Supreme Court, saying, ‘‘We shall not revisit these legal principles.’’ That is a pretty strong statement for the Court to make, that we shall not revisit the principles upon which Roe was founded, and the concept of super stare decisis or super precedent arises as the commentators have characterized it, by a number of different Justices appointed by a number of different judges over a considerable period of time. Do you agree that Casey is a super precedent or a super stare decisis as Judge Luttig said?
Judge ALITO. Well, I personally would not get into categorizing precedents as super precedents or super duper precedents, or any—
Chairman SPECTER. Did you say ‘‘super duper?’’ [Laughter.]
Judge ALITO. Right.
Chairman SPECTER. Good.
Judge ALITO. Any sort of categorization like that—
Chairman SPECTER. I like that.
[Laughter.]
Judge ALITO [continuing]. Sort of reminds me of the size of laundry detergent in the supermarket.
[Laughter.]
Judge ALITO. I agree with the underlying thought that when a
precedent is reaffirmed, that strengthens the precedent, and when the Supreme Court says that we are not—
Chairman SPECTER. How about being reaffirmed 38 times?
Judge ALITO. Well, I think that when a precedent is reaffirmed, each time it’s reaffirmed that is a factor that should be taken into account in making the judgment about stare decisis, and when a precedent is reaffirmed on the ground that stare decisis precludes or counsels against reexamination of the merits of the precedent, then I agree that that is a precedent on precedent.
Now, I don’t want to leave the impression that stare decisis is an inexorable command because the Supreme Court has said that it is not, but it is a judgment that has to be based, taking into ac- count all of the factors that are relevant and that are set out in the Supreme Court’s cases.
Chairman SPECTER. Judge Alito, during the confirmation hearing of Chief Justice Roberts, I displayed a chart. I do not ordinarily like charts, but this one I think has a lot of weight because it lists all 38 cases which have been decided since Roe, where the Supreme Court of the United States had the opportunity to—Senator Hatch is in the picture now.
[Laughter.]
Chairman SPECTER. It is a good photo op for Senator Hatch. Senator Leahy is complaining.
[Laughter.]
Senator LEAHY. Just balance it on Orrin’s head. Senator HATCH. Put that over by Leahy.
322
Chairman SPECTER. He wants it on his side.
[Laughter.]
Chairman SPECTER. I think the point of it is that there have
been so many cases, so many cases, 15 after your statement in 1985 that I am about to come to, and eight after Casey v. Planned Parenthood, which is why it has special significance, and I am not going to press the point about super precedent. I am glad I did not have to mention super duper, that you did. Thank you very much.
Let me come now to the statement you made in 1985, that the Constitution does not provide a basis for a woman’s right to an abortion. Do you agree with that statement today, Judge Alito?
Judge ALITO. Well, that was a correct statement of what I thought in 1985 from my vantage point in 1985, and that was as a line attorney in the Department of Justice in the Reagan administration.
Today if the issue were to come before me, if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed and the issue were to come before me, the first question would be the question that we’ve been discussing, and that’s the issue of stare decisis. And if the analysis were to get beyond that point, then I would approach the question with an open mind, and I would listen to the arguments that were made.
Chairman SPECTER. So you would approach it with an open mind notwithstanding your 1985 statement?
Judge ALITO. Absolutely, Senator. That was a statement that I made at a prior period of time when I was performing a different role, and as I said yesterday, when someone becomes a judge, you really have to put aside the things that you did as a lawyer at prior points in your legal career and think about legal issues the way a judge thinks about legal issues.
Chairman SPECTER. Judge Alito, coming to the role you had in the Solicitor General’s Office, where you wrote the memorandum in the Thornburgh case, urging restriction and ultimate appeal of Roe, that was in your capacity as an advocate. And I have seen your other statements that the role of an advocate is different from the role of a judge. But when you made the statement that the Constitution did not provide for the right to an abortion, that was in a statement you made where you were looking to get a job, a pro- motion within the Federal Government. So there is a little difference between the 1985 statement and your advocacy role in the Thornburgh memorandum, is there not?
Judge ALITO. Well, there is, Senator, and what I said was that that was a true expression of my views at the time, the statement in the 1985 appointment form that I filled out. It was a statement that I made at a time when I was a line attorney in the Department of Justice. I’m not saying that I made the statement simply because I was advocating the administration’s position, but that was the position that I held at the time, and that was the position of the administration.
Chairman SPECTER. Would you state your views, the difference as you see it between what you did as an advocate in the Solicitor General’s Office to what your responsibilities would be, are on the Third Circuit, or what they would be on the Court if confirmed as a judicial capacity?
323
Judge ALITO. Well, an advocate has the goal of achieving the result that the client wants within the bounds of professional responsibility. That’s what an advocate is supposed to do, and that’s what I attempted to do during my years as an advocate for the Federal Government. Now, a judge doesn’t have a client, as I said yesterday, and a judge doesn’t have an agenda, and a judge has to follow the law. An important part of the law in this area, as we look at it in 2006, is the law of stare decisis.
Chairman SPECTER. Judge Alito, you have written some 361 opinions that I would like to have the time to discuss quite a few of them with you, but I am only going to pick up one in the first round, and that is an opinion you wrote in the Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women v. Knoll, and that was a case where there was a challenge between a Pennsylvania statute, which required as a prerequisite to a woman getting Medicaid, that she would have had to have reported a rape or an incest to the police, and second, a requirement that there be a second opinion from a doctor that she needed an abortion to save her life. And that statutory requirement, those two provisions conflicted with a regulation by the Department of Health and Human Services. You were on the Third Circuit, which held that the Pennsylvania statute should be stricken in deference to the rule of the Health and Human Services Department. And Judge Nygaard entered a very forceful dissent say- ing that this was an interpretive rule and it was inappropriate to have that kind of an interpretive rule by the Department counter- vail a statute.
What was your thinking in that case? Had you been predisposed to take a tough line on a woman’s right to choose or on Medicaid support for someone who had been raped, you would have upheld the statute. What was your thinking in that case?
Judge ALITO. Well, what you said is correct, Senator. I cast the deciding vote there to strike down the Pennsylvania statute, and I did it because that’s what I thought the law required. I thought the law required that we defer to the interpretation of the Federal statute that had been made by the Department of Health and Human Services. If I had had an agenda to strike down any—I’m sorry, to uphold any regulation of abortion that came up in any case that was presented to me, then I would have voted with Judge Nygaard in that case, and that would have turned the decision the other way.
I’ve sat on three abortion cases on the Third Circuit. In one of them—that was the Casey case—I voted to uphold regulations of abortion, and in the other two—the Elizabeth Blackwell case and Planned Parenthood v. Farmer—I voted to strike them down. And in each instance, I did it because that’s what I thought the law required.