Supreme Court Redistricting Decision Is Still Being Written - What I'd Like To See Them Address

 It's been nine months since the Supreme Court first ruled on the Alaska Redistricting Board.  That was a relatively short opinion which just answered the most immediate questions - was the latest plan acceptable and if not what needs to be done?.  They left themselves until later date to write up their reasoning for the decisions they made.  

The Alaska Court system suspends the pay of judges who don't complete their written decisions within six months of the trial..  But the Supreme Court is a little different because there isn't just one judge.  The judges who sat on the case must all agree or complete their dissenting opinions.  The Court's clerk explained to me that a draft is written and circulated to the judges.  If there are changes, the six months clock is reset.  

The Redistricting decision is no longer time sensitive.  Given that the Court hasn't issued their decision suggests to me that the last Proclamation Plan will be the plan for the rest of the decade.  If not, they needed to let the Board know that early enough to make adjustments for the 2024 election.  If there were going to be any changes, they would be limited to a few Anchorage Senate seats at most.  So, I could be wrong, but I suspect the Courts longer, explanatory decision will leave the current Proclamation plan in place.  

The decision they are currently writing will be for the 2030 Redistricting Board.  They are taking their time, I assume, so the next redistricting board will have the clearest possible guidelines for what they should be doing and should not be doing when they divide the state into 40 House districts and 20 Senate Districts.

I've discussed some of the key outstanding issues in a Previous post.  I'm repeating part of that post here.  I've made some changes and added part 4.

Some things the Court ought to answer:

1.  Explain what appears to some as a contradiction between past rulings that said everything within a Borough boundary is considered Socio-Economically Integrated (SEI) and their finding this time that Senate pairings in Anchorage were political gerrymandering.  Those two findings are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but since the Board's attorney's mantra was "everything within a Borough is SEI" based on previous Court rulings, the Board majority seemed to think that then they could pair any two contiguous house districts within the Municipality of Anchorage, and it would be fine. (Contiguity being the main legal criterion for a Senate pairing.)  Aren't things like race, economics, political leanings part of Socio-Economic Integration? Why then are factors like race, economics, and political leanings  within a single Municipality  indicators of political gerrymandering?  That needs to be explained.  And maybe the past rulings about everything in a Borough being SEI should be adjusted to reflect the differences within a Borough as populous as the Municipality of Anchorage.  Here's a post I did looking at past rulings about SEI.

[UPDATED Sept 4, 2022:  Maybe this is better focused:  I'd like to see the Court explain how they differentiate the criteria used to determine political gerrymandering and the criteria used for Socio-Economic Integration (SEI).  If Board Member Marcum hadn't mentioned that ER would have gotten an extra Senate seat, would the other characteristics of the two paired house districts been irrelevant?  At one point in the Supreme Court hearing there's an interaction between Board attorney Singer and Supreme Court Justice Warren Matthews [not to be confused with Superior Court Judge Thomas Matthews or Board attorney Matthew Singer] on terms like 'communities of interest,' and 'equal protection.'  It would be nice if they could explain clearly the different concepts that Attorney Singer discussed and how the Court distinguishes between the idea that a Borough, by definition, is SEI, but, as Justice Matthews pointed out, there are differences in communities of interest within the Borough of Anchorage.]

2. Address the issue of geographic contiguity.  While the House districts paired in the revised map were technically contiguous, the borders that were touching were in unpopulated and roadless mountain areas.  While that 'connected' the two districts physically, the communities in those two districts were geographically far apart (relative to the population of Anchorage) and not really sensible political units. 

"Auto-contiguity" came up as a concept.  That 'auto' refers to cars - can you drive from one part of the district to another without leaving the district?  This was an issue in the Valdez/Mat-Su case and in the Eagle River Senate pairings. 

 I understand that being contiguous in large, roadless rural districts will sometimes require those rural Senate seats to have much less ideal connections between communities.  But in urban areas where there is much greater population density, it seems more than reasonable to consider contiguity as a continuum from "more to less," than an "either/or, yes/no," evaluation.  It was clear that the Board majority paired HD 22 and HD 9 with such an unusable border for political reasons.  The Hickel Decision tell us that

"In addition to preventing gerrymandering, the requirement that districts be composed of relatively integrated socio-economic areas helps to ensure that a voter is not denied his or her right to an equally powerful vote."

In urban areas, extreme contiguity such as we had, should also be an indicator of possible gerrymandering,  particularly when much more natural contiguity alternatives are available.  

3.  Explain why the Supreme Court disagreed with Judge Matthews' finding that the Board needed to pay more attention to public testimony in the Skagway case.  Did they disagree with his reasoning on the Board's need to justify why they were making a decision that was contrary to the overwhelming public testimony?  As I understand it, they basically said, it didn't matter since the district met the criteria for a district.  

4.  The State Constitution says that Board Members should be chosen without regard to political party.  This has rarely been the what actually happens.  And in this case, the Governor picked three Board members who were not only Republicans, but were highly partisan Republicans who, in the end pursued maps that were clearly politically gerrymandered.  Budd Simpson even testified that he was selected for the Board because there are many Republicans in Southeast.  The Court did not really deal with this clear violation of the Constitution by the Governor in selecting Board members.  But perhaps it was on their minds when they said the Board was guilty of illegal gerrymandering with some Anchorage Senate seats.  It would be very helpful if the Board set some standards for dealing with such partisan choices by those given the power to choose Board members. If they don't, they are essentially saying that that part of the Constitution is unenforceable.  

5.  There was a request from Calista plaintiffs that ANCSA boundaries be found acceptable as local boundaries for the Board to use making their maps.  This makes some sense in situations where those boundaries connect villages (water districts, schools, roads).  But the for-profit Native corporations are just that: profit making corporations that have a lot of power.  We wouldn't want corporations, say like Conoco or Monsanto, to have their own corporate political districts.  I think the Native Corporations have the burden of proof here that they are sufficiently different, in ways that matter to elections, that it would be okay. Or the Court could identify which ANCSA boundaries might be permissible and which might not.  Would making a district that exactly matched the boundaries of a Native Corporation be legal?  By refusing to accept Cantwell into the larger 'Calista' district, the Court suggests probably not.  More clarification would be helpful.  

6.  Also on hold has been the decision about whether the Board has to pay attorney fees for the Girdwood plaintiffs.